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Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by reza_n on Friday November 10, 2017 @04:05PM (#15673033)
We have an encryption scheme where all user data has its own unique user based key. So compromising 1 user key only lets you have access to that user data and that key has access to nothing else. Your statement is correct when you said that automated systems which need access to all data will inevitably lead to mass decryption and compromise. In the system described above, there is no way for an automated system (or anything) to have access to all keys and therefor no system or person can access all data.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by kabdib on Friday November 10, 2017 @04:16PM (#15673116)
How does this help if you've got an API that decrypts for you?

It's possible that you've protected the data at rest, but if some 'get' operation is just going to serve it up, what is the effective difference?

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by SomeStupidPoint on Friday November 10, 2017 @05:45PM (#15673714)
You may have rate monitoring on the decryption requests, watching the traffic flow to the servers fronting your encrypted store.

An attacker is forced to either exfiltrate the data slowly (so the surge isn't noticed) or alert ops monitoring that the decryption service is unusually active.

Defense in depth raises the difficulty in going unnoticed and raises the time it takes to succeed.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by reza_n on Friday November 10, 2017 @04:22PM (#15673154)
The get operation provides parts of the key used to decrypt the data you are after. No key, no data.

Edit: the key comes from the user, its not stored anywhere on a server. The key can optionally never leave the user's device.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by usaphp on Friday November 10, 2017 @10:23PM (#15674836)
> Edit: the key comes from the user, its not stored anywhere on a server. The key can optionally never leave the user's device.

Does it mean if user loses his key - he wont be able to get access to his data?

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by rhizome on Friday November 10, 2017 @04:53PM (#15673374)
If someone drains your db, do they get the keys along with it?
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by kabdib on Friday November 10, 2017 @10:14PM (#15674809)
I guess you can have a key-per-row, or key-per-partition, and throttle and monitor access to that key. This isn't going to make operations like database indexing or joins very happy, so you're probably limited to payload-level data; hard to judge if that's okay since I don't know the requirements for the schema.

This presupposes you know what you're doing, security-wise, on your network, and with your backups, and with temporary data on servers. All of your interior traffic is encrypted, right? Right.

It doesn't sound like Equifax was even on the map.

Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by vehementi on Friday November 10, 2017 @05:11PM (#15673487)
No, of course you would not store those keys in that database.
Re:Equifax CEO to Congress: Not Sure We Are Encrypting Data by SAI_Peregrinus on Friday November 10, 2017 @10:57PM (#15674925)
Remember that the users in this case are the banks. Their data wasn't what got leaked. Product data got leaked.