If you are trying to 'prove' subjectivity, in the sense of providing an argument for it, then you are missing the point: you already experience it directly by definition, so there is nothing to prove.
> This is a bizarre and unsupportable statement. Clearly physical processes can carry out computation, which is a special case of mathematics ...
I am arguing against the idea that the computation (i.e. the math part) carried out the physical process—not the other way around.
I can also perceive that glasses of water magically break and reconstitute pencils, in what we now know to be an optical illusion. "Self-evident" observations stand only so long as they are consistent with all other observations. The premise that subjectivity exists is not consistent with everything else we know without introducing additional structure to the universe that has no purpose but to stroke our egos. Therefore, it should be discarded.
We must be using different definitions of subjectivity. I'm just referring to whatever one experiences at some point in time. Do you experience anything? Then you have subjectivity.
We are, because an ontology that takes subjectivity as primitive/irreducible is different than an ontology that reduces apparent subjectivity via third-party objective facts. You subscribe to the former, I subscribe to the latter. It is precisely this distinction that differentiates materialists and dualists in the philosophy of mind.
This question doesn't yield any insight, because it still leaves us with the question of the nature of subjectivity, a term you use with impunity but without definition!
You seem to be implying that subjectivity and objects must form some sort of recursive relation, but this then already assumes subjectivity is irreducible and the question at hand is precisely whether such an elaborate construct is necessary. There's plenty of evidence hinting that we're just special pleading about consciousness's special properties.
>it still leaves us with the question of the nature of subjectivity, a term you use with impunity but without definition!
I didn't try to promote or define subjectivity, I challenged you to define an object without making any references to something subjective (as this is the ontology you said you subscribe to). What I was getting at is that you'll be hard pressed to present any object that is not a concept created by a subject. Mind you, I'm not saying objects and subjects are real, but that they are co-created by the mind and as such are equally unreal as far as representing what actually is.
I can easily posit an ontology that references no subjects. Just because I formulated said ontology from sense perception doesn't entail that it references subjective concepts.
> Mind you, I'm not saying objects and subjects are real, but that they are co-created by the mind and as such are equally unreal as far as representing what actually is.
Except as per Moore, this sort of skepticism necessarily presupposes the very knowledge that it attempts to undermine, and therefore it contradicts itself and is literally false.
My point is that calling it sense perception will not make the subjective pre-conceptual experience of it go away. I'm not advocating a ghost in the machine here, but trying to show that neither the ghost nor the machine can survive as primitives when put under deep scrutiny, but I first need to demonstrate how neither can independently exist as a valid concept.
>this sort of skepticism necessarily presupposes the very knowledge that it attempts to undermine, and therefore it contradicts itself and is literally false.
Not sure I follow how this relates to the quoted sentence, but the problem with any explanation (physical or philosophical) is that it is always limited to discussing concepts and relationships between them and can never break the boundaries of what can be grasped by thought (this explanation not excluded). My attempt is to show that thought (and thus any object derived from it) is not the pristine reality, but something that comes after reality is processed. At most, thought can point in the right direction (e.g, understand it's own limitations).
You're evading the issue. You initially claimed that there is nothing to prove about subjectivity. This is patently false.
The subjectivity you apparently experience by observation, if taken at face value as you initially suggested, ie. "there is nothing to prove", is logically irreducible to third-party objective facts.
And yet, third-party objective facts are the best explanation we have for everything else.
Therefore, you do have something to prove regarding subjective experience, contra your original claim.
Ah, I see. But that follows directly from the computable universe hypothesis.
Here's another problem. You know about the physical/mathematical properties of the world by abstracting away from our experience of a world with color, sound, etc in it. Remove the colors and how would you know about shape, extension, mass?
Predictive coding in the interoceptive and control networks of the brain, actually. Sure, it doesn't explain everything, but it pretty well dispels the intuition that makes p-zombies conceivable and explains the vast majority of the empirical and phenomenological facts to be explained.
Because it doesn't exist in a vacuum, it exists inside an agent, that is inside the world. And the agent has to achieve a goal, to maximize utility, by learning to act intelligently. This creates a complex value system for states and actions. The values are used to select our actions, and we experience them as "qualia".
So colors and pleasures are just sensory experiences accompanied by their action-values. In the end it's all a game, and qualia is generated by the game. We're mistakenly searching for qualia in the brain, while it was all around us, in the game itself. The brain is but one part of it.
Why wouldn't it? Not everyone shares your underinformed intuitions. Predictions about light are colors, predictions about reward are pleasure, etc.
Could you point to something related to predictive coding and control networks explaining anything phenomenological (or give an argument)? From what I can tell the two are completely orthogonal.
Edit: I should add that my suspicion is you are mistaking a system which is isomorphic to relationships between phenomenological entities with something which could account for the presence of the entities themselves.
I would recommend checking out the comment here from user 'theoh' on the "relations are what matters" perspective.
1. A physical phenomenon, spectrum of light in this case.
2. An entity with a retina with light perceiving cells at the right bandwidth.
3. A network that represents an invariant concept at that bandwidth without too many dependencies on object and context. However, there might be visual illusions that are hard to get rid of.
4. If the entity needs to describe this concept to others you need a(nother) network that maps the concept to a sequence of utterances that maps to vocal cords or muscle movements for a keyboard.
5. If the entity has to be able to reason about the concept it needs to be able to store it for longer times and have flexible ways to combine it with other concepts.
6. If the entity needs retrospection of this behavior it needs to have a representation of itself.
The same way that blind people do?
> Colors, smells, pains, etc. are not part of the mathematical or physical description, so you can't simply dismiss the problem of qualia by labeling it as dualism. Where do the colors, tastes, feels come from?
I'm curious: what is a concrete answer that you would find satisfying? Even if it's unrealistic, or would only work in a different universe, what sort of answer are you looking for?
Color is a stand-in for any subjective (or creature-dependant) sensation, which would include sounds and feels. Remove those and epistemology collapses.
> I'm curious: what is a concrete answer that you would find satisfying? Even if it's unrealistic, or would only work in a different universe, what sort of answer are you looking for?
I have no idea. How to explain the subjective in terms of the objective? Why does such a division exist? It's a deep metaphysical question.
Most of abstract mathematics and philosophy deal in concepts that have no color, shape, or mass. And yet we deal with them. We don't need to have physical grounding for every concept.
Do they? Everyone is entitled to their unquestioned assumptions as long as they state them outright and describe their parameters. I have yet to see dualists (which ultimately is at the base of this whole line of argumentation) admit that they posit subjective experience _without evidence_, since they equate asking questions and "seeing" things as subjective experience. It's worthwhile debating and deconstructing just exactly what that means before accepting it and its hoaky mystical follow-ons. The fact remains that no entity can successfully prove to another entity that it has inner experience, so how would proving you have subjectivity to _your own mind_ work? You can't, and probably, you don't bother, because it is somehow "self evident" that you have this property. The whole qualia and consciousness debate is riddled with circular reasoning about something that dualists just "feel." Well sometimes I feel like I might have the same thoughts as a jelly donut, go ahead and prove me wrong with math!
> I think people sort of push this point aside either by saying that qualia/subjectivity could be generated by math (or a computational process), and that's what really matters. But we have no examples of abstract math generating anything;
This is a bizarre and unsupportable statement. Clearly physical processes can carry out computation, which is a special case of mathematics (or vice versa, depending on what you got your doctorate in), and computation can produce statements in whatever language you desire, even English. Yes, chips and software stacks produce outputs, even in English. How is that not "generating" something? Ah, but you ask what is inside? Tons! There are gazillions of bits inside computers, and similarly gazillions of flashes in your neural circuitry. That's a whole lot of "inside". How do you know that it _doesn't_ feel like something to be all those twinkling bits? If you still accept without question that you do in fact have subjective experience, doesn't it stand to reason that if the neural network which absolutely definitely does correlate with your consciousness did feel like _anything_, then by definition it would have to feel like this?