Also pattern detection is often raised in the way you just did, but it’s realy a distraction. Pattern detection just helps recognise things, it’s not inherently related to the ability to reason about things. So you need both, but they are not the same thing either.
We don't really know what consciousness is or how it happens. We believe that it's possible to be highly intelligent without being conscious. I mean, I really hope that's true, personally, since we would hope to one day make an AGI that will carry out human desires, and we'd hope we weren't making a conscious entity which would be the equivalent of a slave.
"Who cares?" and "yes".
I mean that e.g. if we create a machine that can solve every thinking-related problem that humans can solve, then we can be certain that we have created artificial intelligence. But how are we supposed to ascertain that we have created something conscious, as in a machine with subjective experience? Strictly speaking I can't be certain that _you_ are conscious. (Also, why would we replace "AGI" with "AC", when people are looking to build something intelligent, irrespective of whether it has internal subjective experience?)
> I guess this is not the right place to ask or think.
That has not been my experience.
This is the very notion I'd like to challenge. First of all, there is nothing concrete here so I will make up some definitions.
For simplicity's sake, if you define thought as a way of iterating a large knowledge graph (assuming that a graph is not a grossly inefficient way of representing knowledge), and forming new knowledge (or making inferences) as a way of extending that graph through certain constraints (maybe axiomatic, maybe probabilistic) that somehow also exist within that graph, what goal would a graph have other than the ones you give to it? This would make AGI just an interactive machine.
And if you can't give it adequate goals that will at least make it pass a turing test, what good is a graph that can be used for emergent inferences? My real gripe with that is "It" isn't intelligent. "You" are intelligent and "you" gave it goals. So subjectivity is, in my opinion inescapable when you are talking about intelligence.
I will concede that you can't know I have subjective experiences, but practically that's not a very useful thing to say. If it doesn't matter, why bring it up? If it does matter, why not use your past experience to have a belief that I am conscious despite that belief being subject to future modification? That's how I'd treat a perceived AC.
Blanket statements and short dismissals are great when their content is “that’s an interesting topic but not necessarily what everyone is trying to discuss right now.” Discussions on AI risk may not be augmented by understanding of subjective experience, or may require developments that cannot be acquired via even another 100 years of navel gazing on the subject. You’ve not even attempted to justify why this would be the case, and instead started complaining right off the bat that nobody had the inclination to immediately discuss your favorite tie-in to the subject immediately.
You’ll notice that people were actually happy to talk about consciousness once you brought it up, and probably would have been even happier to do so if you didn’t start off with such a curmudgeonly tone and spend a bunch of time accusing everyone of intellectual dishonesty because their interests differ from yours.
I'm happy that you feel you are so progressive in multiple disciplines and an expert on online behavior. If you think what I said is off-topic, that's just your opinion, man.
(if I am getting this right) those would be the minimal criteria for being able to (contentiously) prove if a person were conscious or not.
But the thing about humans is that they cannot simulate 2 consciousnesses simultaneously (apart from culturally-designated illness known as multiple personality disorder), nor can we import another's consciousness. Nor do we even particularly (barring Totoni's work, or Tegmark's work] know what consciousness is. Those two properties are (probably) never going to be human-capable. In that regard, humans are unlikely to be able to ever be a (or 'the') kind of being used to determine whether or not something is conscious; if ever it will be possible, that will be a machine's task.
Dennett denies Nagel's claim that the bat's consciousness is inaccessible, contending that any "interesting or theoretically important" features of a bat's consciousness would be amenable to third-person observation. For instance, it is clear that bats cannot detect objects more than a few meters away because echolocation has a limited range. He holds that any similar aspects of its experiences could be gleaned by further scientific experiments. -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_it_Like_to_Be_a_Bat%3F
Heterophenomenology ("phenomenology of another, not oneself") is a term coined by Daniel Dennett to describe an explicitly third-person, scientific approach to the study of consciousness and other mental phenomena. It consists of applying the scientific method with an anthropological bent, combining the subject's self-reports with all other available evidence to determine their mental state. The goal is to discover how the subject sees the world him- or herself, without taking the accuracy of the subject's view for granted. -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heterophenomenology
How? You say "query", but what would the query look like?
[...]
In 1870, Huxley conducted a case study on a French soldier who had sustained a shot in the Franco-Prussian War that fractured his left parietal bone. Every few weeks the soldier would enter a trance-like state, smoking, dressing himself, and aiming his cane like a rifle all while being insensitive to pins, electric shocks, odorous substances, vinegar, noise, and certain light conditions. Huxley used this study to show that consciousness was not necessary to execute these purposeful actions, justifying the assumption that humans are insensible machines. Huxley’s mechanistic attitude towards the body convinced him that the brain alone causes behavior.
[...]
A large body of neurophysiological data seems to support epiphenomenalism. Some of the oldest such data is the Bereitschaftspotential or "readiness potential" in which electrical activity related to voluntary actions can be recorded up to two seconds before the subject is aware of making a decision to perform the action. More recently Benjamin Libet et al. (1979) have shown that it can take 0.5 seconds before a stimulus becomes part of conscious experience even though subjects can respond to the stimulus in reaction time tests within 200 milliseconds. -- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Epiphenomenalism
Consciousness is usually only one of two things; either "being aware" or "the experience of having an inner voice".
And some people don't have an inner monologue. It's not specifically mentioned in http://slatestarcodex.com/2014/03/17/what-universal-human-ex... but it's of that same class of thing; there are certainly hits on Google for people claiming not to have an inner voice, and I didn't even bother reading the article on psychologytoday about it.
I didn't say that all "people" have inner voices (by which I meant inner life). But by that definition, it's a requirement to be conscious.
Let me set the record straight, though. I'm not claiming to not have an inner life; I'm claiming to not have an inner voice, except if I'm reading "out loud" internally or whatnot. (Which is useful when writing, but not necessary.)
I just use other modalities.
To the best of my knowledge there's only one guy, a philosopher, who's claimed to have no inner life at all--and I don't think I believe him.