This is an argument for factoring out the means of virus detection into a closed-source plugin/module, while opening the source of the rest of the code. Particularly since detection is presumably pure (i.e. functional programming notions of purity and referential transparency), and thus much less likely to be a source of vulnerabilities, compared to the rest of the client which actually interacts with the OS, disks/files, etc. and is therefore much more likely to be exploited. Because the vulnerability scanner would still be a closed-source binary blob, the public would need to trust the company that the blob is actually pure, but seeing that blob within the context of an open-source client which is handling I/O makes that trust easier.
Yes, it makes it easier for malware creators to test their creations against the closed-source module before releasing their malware into the wild. But sophisticated malware writers are already doing that, by installing the anti-virus client into a VM, updating it, disconnecting it from networks, then loading the malware into the VM and seeing if the malware is detected or not. So malware writers don't gain that much from the opening of the rest of the codebase (unless they succeed in finding vulnerabilities that the rest of the world doesn't), and the white-hat public gains a much more trustworthy security tool.
But, you’re also forgetting that these virus scanners can also be vulnerabilities and exploits in themselves; i seem to remember one virus exploited a flaw in the compression code of a virus scanner to establish some type of malware. Just because something is a trade secret doesn’t exactly lessen the risk of it existing.
The same can't really be said of Google's algorithm, as it's essentially a hugely complex black box, and you can barely interact with it. That's kind of like reverse engineering a chip purely using its inputs / outputs.
BTW, this is true. Seeing the source code versus having to go through assembly listings - I know which one I'd pick if I had to find logic bugs.
>Why is this not applicable to virus detection algorithms?
Its not an algorithm, but a heuristic. If you want to look for a suspect, you don't announce "I'm looking for someone 5 feet 5 inches tall with a buzz cut who drives a ford and wears size 12 nike sneakers". In much the same way, security via heuristics doesn't mean creating a perfect detection system, because it doesn't exist. They want to make the game harder to play by hiding the rules of the game, not because they're sure that they're going to win. This is a real, tangible benefit for the customers. There is nothing really special about it, we've been using such ideas for centuries.
I don't know what that means. Perhaps superficially there is some overlap since both run on deterministic hardware, but a heuristic is completely different from an algorithm. Its a technique that can perhaps give you an imperfect answer to the question you're asking. An algorithm describes a method, which, if followed, gives you the answer. Here is an AV heuristic that I made up just now:
-Is it encrypted? +1 point
-Does it contain self modifying/unpacking code? +1 point
-Does it call OS APIs to monitor running programs? +1 point
-Does it run at startup? +1 point
-Does it have no UI? +1 point
-Does it try to punch a hole through NAT? +1 point
-Does its process name contain random strings? +1 point
If you get > 5 points, hash the executable and send the hash/executable for analysis.
>Perhaps the entire AV model employed by Symantec is flawed.
Well, for one, the heuristic isn't the "entire AV model". But what makes you think the entire AV model is flawed? Every major OS uses parts of the AV model.
the vulnerability i would call is if i sent you to hell and you found a way to escape.
We're talking about downloadable software here, not a cloud service like google. Once a hostile nation state has access to your binaries (as they would with an installed product like A-V) they can just fuzz the A-V detection method to find bypasses.
Heck that's what pentesters and red teamers do on a regular basis, A-V bypass is a common thing in that world, so if people at that level can do it you can bet that nation state actors can do it.
We also did third party security audits on a regular basis, but still wouldn't be comfortable allowing that to be done with other countries. Purely my own opinion here, but my concern wouldn't be a security one so much as an intellectual property one- it's pretty well known that other governments (China, Russia) have strong links to their commercial sectors and little regard for IP protection.
Don't forget that nation states also produce malware (Recall Stuxnet?) [0] and evading detection is substantially easier when you know exactly what to avoid doing.