Forgive my ignorance, but aren't most sellers in America willing to process transactions (even large ones) without PIN entry?
I realize pin-and-chip is a largely secure scheme, but the chip rollout in the US hasn't actually implemented a two-factor system.
http://www.emv-connection.com/best-practices/what-is-the-fra...
https://usa.visa.com/visa-everywhere/security/emv-at-the-pum...
While I don't doubt they're already out there, I don't recall ever seeing a gas pump in the US with a chip reader.
Also, it's at leas worth noting that technology for skimming chip-based transactions already exists in the wild:
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/01/atm-shimmers-target-chip...
The "shimmers" take advantage of poor implementations of the EMV standard, but the chances strike me as fairly high that there's going to be a lot of poor implementations of EMV out there in the wild. (Not only is the less secure "chip and signature" approach common in the US, I've made more than one purchase with what could be described as "chip and nothing": put my card in a chip reader and make a purchase without being asked for either a PIN or a signature.)
Buy stolen CCs without pin in large volume
Set up online merchant account (eBay is common), use software to scrape and copy listings for popular products that cost less than the floor amount but more than your costs. When someone orders a product and the payment clears automatically put in an order for the product on a different website (preferably one that allows a guest checkout). Automate more and more parts of the process as time goes on (e.g. using a different card when one is declined)
Keep the transaction volume low and you're basically printing money at the rate of the difference between card info cost and item cost.
This is a pretty common tactic to monetize large volumes of CC#s.
It doesn't help that most merchants don't cross reference billing address with the bank and some don't require the security code.
Two years ago at defcon, someone presented on advanced skimmers that could read chips too. He claimed they need a network connection to work, as there's only a two minute window to reuse the same token.
This was noted in the article. There appears to be availability on the board for an extra connection.
Not quite. The one who gets your card info probably won't use it. They will more likely sell it. If the person who buys it can't use it, whoops, too bad.
For the fraudster to receive any funds from my account they would have to go with that data somehow to my issuing bank and have their transaction request accepted.
My bank will never do this because my card is a secure one. They expect it to generate a signed document listing the details of my transaction along with the name (ID) of the merchant and terminal performing the transaction. The message also certifies that the PIN I entered was successfully verified by my card. The message can only be created by the card using my PIN. This requires the card to be stolen along with the PIN.
The only money I can loose in case my card is stolen without the PIN is up to a floor limit for offline transactions. It's peanuts but it allows for quick transactions for example from vending machines.
The gist of the story is to move to a bank that cares for security.