It's allowed to happen for the same reason the US uses credit cards without PIN numbers - a lack of desire to spend money on security/upgrades (it's easier to pass on the cost of fraud via the transaction fees), a weak regulatory structure for protecting consumers, a glacial rate of technology adoption in banking systems, and ignorance/unwillingness to evolve by customers/businesses/executives etc.
Had the US implemented a proper citizen's registry it could be managed as that with all the security and personal details isolation that entails, including but not limited to biometric and chipped ID cards.
We've had public key infrastructure for a long time, we have also had legal attestation; the reason we don't use these things to secure this information is that nobody cares.
When the state does it, you get breaches, but nobody gets all that upset. Just look at what happened with the data breach and subsequent coverup in Sweden. One person had half a month's salary docked, and that was it.
The apathy is really more of a practical matter -- they don't feel like they understand the problem or know how to solve it, and they don't feel like they'd have the power to do something even if they did.
They correctly realize that we don't have a system where entities like Equifax are accountable to individuals that care. The only way you'd get that accountability is through some kind of collective action.
Same thing is true for widespread adopting of PKI-based schemes. Saying "nobody cares" is about as true as saying nobody cares if the oil in their car gets changed -- they don't want to have to pay attention, they don't want to invest in understanding/adopting, and maybe rightly so because there's so damn much that already requires attention. But you might get adoption among private institutions that matter by some kind of legal policy.
A state-run identity registry and authentication solution isn't the only way, to be sure, and I think it's a weird shibboleth in the context of democratic republic run by elected representatives, but since it's not the only solution, nobody needs to die on that hill.
But by the time you're talking about society-wide improvements that address the relevant problems, you're almost certainly going to be invoking government-like powers. The issue you've discovered here isn't about who/how many people care, it's about one of the limits of market-like institutions to transform some forms of concern into effective action. Something even for people who don't trust the state to think about.*
(Also: "people who use this kind of language to insist that the only way to achieve this is through the state are just looking for excuses to be mean to people who don't trust the state" deserves an eye roll so hard. It's manifestly true that there are people out there who enjoy trolling, but the idea that's the only possible motivation is a non-starter and not a good way to indicate you yourself are approaching a conversation in good faith.)
(* I also don't trust the state, just like I don't trust many forms of private power. But it turns out both can be situationally useful and beneficial if you can get the balance right.)
You can roll your eyes all you want, but there are valid historical reasons for being concerned about the extent and disposition of the data that a government collects on its citizens or subjects.
Corporations didn't intentionally kill 100 million of their own customers in the last century alone. It took governments to do that.
If you think Equifax's security is bad, wait until you see what it's like at any government agency that doesn't explicitly focus on security.
It's also pretty unlikely that a credit bureau decides to use vast stores of personal information to prosecute people, but governments have done this several times throughout history, perhaps most notably during WWII.
I'm sure the FBI is looking into the Equifax breach but not as hard as if someone breached the Social Security Administration.
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.wired.com/2016/02/hack-brie...
This is interesting. I don't agree or disagree with it; I'm not informed enough to stake a position. But as a thought experiment, if we took it as given that any information a given entity tried to keep secure will eventually be revealed publicly, what kind of security infrastructure would we end up with?
In reality, we're in the world you hypothecate right now. Centralization is really convenient for a lot of uses, and security advocates are rarely in a position to impose the kind of privacy controls the rest of us might like. And the average people who buy services LOVE the convenience enabled by centralization - until there's a breach, and they disapprove for a few days.
https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/...
That's the most politically significant opposing group, IMO.
What do you find odd about it?
Had the US implemented a proper citizen's registry
Thanks, but no thanks. We don't need to do even more to enhance the ability of the State to monitor and track out every activity.
And it's interesting to note that the use of an identifier like the SSN spread not because its wide use was mandated (in fact, it spread despite being discouraged) but because it turns out organizations both public and private have the same incentives that drive them to want increased legibility throughout their systems through such an identifier. And most individuals also have a motive to want them to be able to positively identify and authenticate them (and negatively rule out imposters).
It's almost like it'd make a good utility, though that's not the only possible solution.
And the anti-govt bend is odd for at least two reasons: in a democratic republic with an elected representative government, it's pretty weird to treat the feds as a hostile occupying power. And two, even among those that do, their opposition often seems to have a cargo-cult focus on certain lines as tokens of liberty (firearms, national id, taxes) rather than frequent demonstrations of insight about the balance between having a useful federal apparatus and different ways that it can be (and is!) limited and checked.
But that's exactly our ethos and, I think, our major problem. We believe the gov't doesn't work, so fight hard to make sure it doesn't work, then sure enough, when you need it to do its job, it can't, and so it reinforces the negative loop.
It's probably why we're at where we are now where a large percentage of the voting age population didn't vote on two candidates no one really wanted to run a gov't while ceding most of our representatives to the power of the corporate world, rather than the people actually being able to hold them accountable. But that gets even more off-topic.
Sorry. And thanks for the very cogent statement vs my ramble.
You don't explain why you think the sentiment "is weird". Maybe you have never been the target of repression so congratulations.
Government officials with lists are potentially very effective ashes-creators:
https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/...
Read: IBM and the Holocaust
There is zero incremental security because of this. Why pick the lock on the door when the window is open?
I made a statement of fact. I'm making no normative claims, I'm describing reality. At this point in time, there is zero additional security provided by the implementation. Am I supposed to ignore reality and lie about it, because someday things will be better?
> protects against credit card cloning at a particular point of sale
A sieve stops water from streaming through at particular points in the mesh, too.
Your black and white reasoning is not how most humans think. What if the answer is "Bob graduates in a month."?
Which is great, as even some chip ATMs you put the card in far enough to have a magstripe skimmer work on most cases (presumably so that they work with the magstripe cards also)
Not the case for contactless!
(Of course here in Australia, Chip+Pin is Universal and Contactless is near-universal... I can use Apple Pay almost everywhere even small shops and have been able to for several years.. different story to much of the world)
Now the one thing that annoys me, is that currently shops here despite having separate payment terminals customer facing (largely for pin numbers) still operate sometimes on you handing your card to them - which is totally not necessary - especially in drive throughs. This is getting less common with tap to pay using mobile phones as people are (somewhat amusingly to me, given the value potential) hesistent to hand their phone to someone versus their actual card. I really wish merchants would enforce hard not letting the shop assistants handle cards (at least, prompt to handle it, if someone really wants help I'm not against that, but I don't like the default expectation).
But I also realise this kind of thing is much more common in some places so your mileage and feelings may vary.
As a warning before trying this for real: most ATMs annoyingly check both the chip and magstripe, so you won't be able to get cash out even in countries where chip & PIN are the widely used in payment terminals. Found out by carrying my cards in a phone case with a snap-close magnet.
Eventually banks are going to stop issuing cards with magstripes on them. But this will take years, until everyone has both on their cards and both readers in their terminals.
(Yes, really! I don't know what the delay is in the US.)
These terminals still have a mag stripe reader, and our cards have mag stripes as well. But they're just for compatibility: if you try to use the mag stripe of a chip-capable card on a chip-capable terminal, it beeps at your angrily and tells you to use the chip.
Do the terminals have an order of preference in terms of what's required for payment. For instance, try chip+pin first, then try chip+signature, then try mag stripe+signature? If that's the case, then I don't see why all stores that have chip readers won't start using chip+PIN as a first preference for payments with chip enabled cards.
Most countries have some form of universal photo ID, and a copy of it is usually required, along with a signature that matches. Not perfect but better than a simple number. Some countries like Estonia include a cryptographic token in their ID, protected by a PIN. That's the 2 factor security you wanted.
But people in the US tend not to like the idea of government IDs. But when such a thing is needed, they use the closest thing they have, and that's the SSN.
And that's a Good Thing. Government should exist to protect property rights, provide rule of law, and maybe to enforce contracts. Managing everyone's identity is clearly not something that the State should be involved in.
In Denmark we have a government sponsored two-factor authentication system linked to the Central Person Register or CPR number which every citizen gets assigned at birth. The two factor authentication is used for all communication with state and municipal and for all banking. Works quite nicely from my point of view. Makes a lot of things a lot easier.
The US government actually does have a a convenient and reliable way of proving physical identity (a Green Card for example serves the purpose of identifying permanent residents), they've just declined to deploy it more widely.
It deals with them the way the government dealt with such cases before government identification ever existed - who do you say you are, and who do other people say you are? Where do you and other people say you live?
In your example, in the modern age, "John Smith" would have an arrest mugshot to aid with identification. Whatever criminal records are kept would probably just have the missing information blank. It's not as if there's a big database of citizens with Felon? Y/N as one of the fields, making you run the risk of marking the wrong John Smith as a felon.
The world is a very messy place - the US system does an okay job of treating it as one.
https://law.stackexchange.com/questions/589/in-uk-is-it-a-re...
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/201...
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/200...
I still have a paper driving certificate, and it is still legal (https://www.gov.uk/exchange-paper-driving-licence). I used it 2 days ago in Germany to hire a car. I have resisted "upgrading" to a photo drviers license because my address is still valid, and the photo driving license isn't (at least wasn't) valid without the paper extra anyway. If it ain't broke...
In reality I carry my passport in my briefcase because I both travel overseas fairly often, and visit customers where it is necessary to show a photo id and that is all I have.
As I recall, you may be required to report to a police station and show an ID or proof of identity if necessary - within a few days. But without evidence to the contrary (and subject to powers listed above for police), you are believed when you identify yourself.
Unfortunately, most companies aren't worth their salt.
Until Equifax and the like get sued out of business, Equifax and its shareholders won't feel the heat.
It would be better if we could get the monitoring from one of their competitors on Equifax's dime.
They've already built out the infrastructure necessary for the monitoring product. The marginal cost of every additional person they add to it is probably quite low.
Equifax's breach might be deserving of it being sold to the government for pennies and having leadership reorganized (read: fired), but I don't think we can nuke it out of existence immediately. Primarily due to it being relied on by so many other banks and services.
TransUnion
Experian
Innovis
Ultimately a major cause is that America doesn't have a national ID, PKI or 2FA systems. And, as such, there is the de-facto, cargo-cult tradition of ultimate reliance on inadequate systems designed for retirement pensions and drivers' licenses. People must give up the "states rights," delusions of privacy and other similar fallacies already and demand proper authenticated and authorized identity, banking and credit systems that require positive, possibly-interactive authorization to use details or complete transactions. Such tokens/documents could be physically enrolled/administered just like passports at USPS.
A government provided security token of some sort, backed by a government database? A lot of people have all kinds of problems with those, from trusting government's intent, to their competency, to their security.
A private party identity provider? Go start it.
A true public key system opens up each individual user to malicious spam. Given the current prevalence of phone, mail, and email spammers, such a system would create more problems than solve.
SSNs could technically be passwords. The problem then is that data servers need to not store SSNs in plaintext, but rather store hashes of them, just like passwords should not be stored in plaintext.
If I try to spend $1000 on my credit card at IKEA, my bank usually calls me to confirm the transaction. However, we don't have such a system when handling our most important information? Why is this allowed to happen? How many people have to be damaged before they stop watching Tom Brady throw touchdowns and get out there to make a difference?