Had the US implemented a proper citizen's registry it could be managed as that with all the security and personal details isolation that entails, including but not limited to biometric and chipped ID cards.
We've had public key infrastructure for a long time, we have also had legal attestation; the reason we don't use these things to secure this information is that nobody cares.
When the state does it, you get breaches, but nobody gets all that upset. Just look at what happened with the data breach and subsequent coverup in Sweden. One person had half a month's salary docked, and that was it.
The apathy is really more of a practical matter -- they don't feel like they understand the problem or know how to solve it, and they don't feel like they'd have the power to do something even if they did.
They correctly realize that we don't have a system where entities like Equifax are accountable to individuals that care. The only way you'd get that accountability is through some kind of collective action.
Same thing is true for widespread adopting of PKI-based schemes. Saying "nobody cares" is about as true as saying nobody cares if the oil in their car gets changed -- they don't want to have to pay attention, they don't want to invest in understanding/adopting, and maybe rightly so because there's so damn much that already requires attention. But you might get adoption among private institutions that matter by some kind of legal policy.
A state-run identity registry and authentication solution isn't the only way, to be sure, and I think it's a weird shibboleth in the context of democratic republic run by elected representatives, but since it's not the only solution, nobody needs to die on that hill.
But by the time you're talking about society-wide improvements that address the relevant problems, you're almost certainly going to be invoking government-like powers. The issue you've discovered here isn't about who/how many people care, it's about one of the limits of market-like institutions to transform some forms of concern into effective action. Something even for people who don't trust the state to think about.*
(Also: "people who use this kind of language to insist that the only way to achieve this is through the state are just looking for excuses to be mean to people who don't trust the state" deserves an eye roll so hard. It's manifestly true that there are people out there who enjoy trolling, but the idea that's the only possible motivation is a non-starter and not a good way to indicate you yourself are approaching a conversation in good faith.)
(* I also don't trust the state, just like I don't trust many forms of private power. But it turns out both can be situationally useful and beneficial if you can get the balance right.)
You can roll your eyes all you want, but there are valid historical reasons for being concerned about the extent and disposition of the data that a government collects on its citizens or subjects.
Corporations didn't intentionally kill 100 million of their own customers in the last century alone. It took governments to do that.
If you think Equifax's security is bad, wait until you see what it's like at any government agency that doesn't explicitly focus on security.
It's also pretty unlikely that a credit bureau decides to use vast stores of personal information to prosecute people, but governments have done this several times throughout history, perhaps most notably during WWII.
I'm sure the FBI is looking into the Equifax breach but not as hard as if someone breached the Social Security Administration.
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.wired.com/2016/02/hack-brie...
This is interesting. I don't agree or disagree with it; I'm not informed enough to stake a position. But as a thought experiment, if we took it as given that any information a given entity tried to keep secure will eventually be revealed publicly, what kind of security infrastructure would we end up with?
In reality, we're in the world you hypothecate right now. Centralization is really convenient for a lot of uses, and security advocates are rarely in a position to impose the kind of privacy controls the rest of us might like. And the average people who buy services LOVE the convenience enabled by centralization - until there's a breach, and they disapprove for a few days.
https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/...
That's the most politically significant opposing group, IMO.
What do you find odd about it?
Had the US implemented a proper citizen's registry
Thanks, but no thanks. We don't need to do even more to enhance the ability of the State to monitor and track out every activity.
And it's interesting to note that the use of an identifier like the SSN spread not because its wide use was mandated (in fact, it spread despite being discouraged) but because it turns out organizations both public and private have the same incentives that drive them to want increased legibility throughout their systems through such an identifier. And most individuals also have a motive to want them to be able to positively identify and authenticate them (and negatively rule out imposters).
It's almost like it'd make a good utility, though that's not the only possible solution.
And the anti-govt bend is odd for at least two reasons: in a democratic republic with an elected representative government, it's pretty weird to treat the feds as a hostile occupying power. And two, even among those that do, their opposition often seems to have a cargo-cult focus on certain lines as tokens of liberty (firearms, national id, taxes) rather than frequent demonstrations of insight about the balance between having a useful federal apparatus and different ways that it can be (and is!) limited and checked.
But that's exactly our ethos and, I think, our major problem. We believe the gov't doesn't work, so fight hard to make sure it doesn't work, then sure enough, when you need it to do its job, it can't, and so it reinforces the negative loop.
It's probably why we're at where we are now where a large percentage of the voting age population didn't vote on two candidates no one really wanted to run a gov't while ceding most of our representatives to the power of the corporate world, rather than the people actually being able to hold them accountable. But that gets even more off-topic.
Sorry. And thanks for the very cogent statement vs my ramble.
You don't explain why you think the sentiment "is weird". Maybe you have never been the target of repression so congratulations.
Government officials with lists are potentially very effective ashes-creators:
https://www.google.com/amp/s/amp.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/...
Read: IBM and the Holocaust
There is zero incremental security because of this. Why pick the lock on the door when the window is open?
I made a statement of fact. I'm making no normative claims, I'm describing reality. At this point in time, there is zero additional security provided by the implementation. Am I supposed to ignore reality and lie about it, because someday things will be better?
> protects against credit card cloning at a particular point of sale
A sieve stops water from streaming through at particular points in the mesh, too.
Your black and white reasoning is not how most humans think. What if the answer is "Bob graduates in a month."?
Which is great, as even some chip ATMs you put the card in far enough to have a magstripe skimmer work on most cases (presumably so that they work with the magstripe cards also)
Not the case for contactless!
(Of course here in Australia, Chip+Pin is Universal and Contactless is near-universal... I can use Apple Pay almost everywhere even small shops and have been able to for several years.. different story to much of the world)
Now the one thing that annoys me, is that currently shops here despite having separate payment terminals customer facing (largely for pin numbers) still operate sometimes on you handing your card to them - which is totally not necessary - especially in drive throughs. This is getting less common with tap to pay using mobile phones as people are (somewhat amusingly to me, given the value potential) hesistent to hand their phone to someone versus their actual card. I really wish merchants would enforce hard not letting the shop assistants handle cards (at least, prompt to handle it, if someone really wants help I'm not against that, but I don't like the default expectation).
But I also realise this kind of thing is much more common in some places so your mileage and feelings may vary.
As a warning before trying this for real: most ATMs annoyingly check both the chip and magstripe, so you won't be able to get cash out even in countries where chip & PIN are the widely used in payment terminals. Found out by carrying my cards in a phone case with a snap-close magnet.
Eventually banks are going to stop issuing cards with magstripes on them. But this will take years, until everyone has both on their cards and both readers in their terminals.
(Yes, really! I don't know what the delay is in the US.)
These terminals still have a mag stripe reader, and our cards have mag stripes as well. But they're just for compatibility: if you try to use the mag stripe of a chip-capable card on a chip-capable terminal, it beeps at your angrily and tells you to use the chip.
Do the terminals have an order of preference in terms of what's required for payment. For instance, try chip+pin first, then try chip+signature, then try mag stripe+signature? If that's the case, then I don't see why all stores that have chip readers won't start using chip+PIN as a first preference for payments with chip enabled cards.
It's allowed to happen for the same reason the US uses credit cards without PIN numbers - a lack of desire to spend money on security/upgrades (it's easier to pass on the cost of fraud via the transaction fees), a weak regulatory structure for protecting consumers, a glacial rate of technology adoption in banking systems, and ignorance/unwillingness to evolve by customers/businesses/executives etc.