By that I mean that either there was no customer demand for what they were building, or there were already lots of other companies that solved the problem just as well and they had no unique angle on the problem, or a key technical assumption they were relying on turned out to be false, or the market was better served by lots of little firms rather than one high-growth startup. In other words, they never found product/market fit, because there was either no market for the product or they couldn't build the product to serve the market.
The problem is that usually you can only determine this in hindsight. If everybody assumed that the only businesses that can work are those that already have a working product and customers, we'd never get any innovation. I've learned to think of "Finding a reason for the company to exist" as the primary job description for a founder, and failure means that you are doing your job but haven't completed it yet.
I'm not sure how much it takes, but there should be real evidence.
A valid question even when Google came to the fore. We had Yahoo, HotBot, Altavista, and then Google came along. And while the others were search engines, Google was superior.
Will people switch to a better internet search engine ?
The answer is always yes.
Instacart's founder is fond of saying that Instacart couldn't have existed before 2012. I suspect what he means is that there were a collection of technical & social changes that happened in the early 2010s that let him recast the problem Webvan was solving in an economical way. These were: 1) smartphones allow real-time coordination across thousands of workers, without hiring lots of managers 2) cloud-computing lets you run big-data algorithms to feed those instructions to thousands of workers, without building data centers 3) because of the Great Recession, thousands of workers were unemployed and desperate for some way to earn money 4) increasing urbanization has clustered people together in a city and made them disinclined to drive, which increases the demand for a grocery-shopping service and decreases the cost of servicing them and 5) everybody had Internet access and cellphones.
By contrast, WebVan spent a billion dollars building warehouses, at a time when the total number of Internet users was < 150 million. They bought their own fleet of delivery vans and hired their own drivers, at a time when employment was full and labor costs were high. They had to invest much more capital for a much smaller market, and then had much higher variable costs.
Being a "startup" doesn't repeal the laws of business - you still have to pay for labor, generate returns on capital, generate more value than you charge, and charge more than you spend. But because computers operate millions of times faster than humans and don't require wages, if you setup the business model right you can realize huge efficiencies of scale. "Setup the business model right" is the tricky part - WebVan thought that "Internet ordering" was a crucial part of the business model for online grocery delivery, but it turned out that "use existing supermarket infrastructure" and "coordinate lots of shoppers so they can work very efficiently" were the real keys, and the technology to do that hadn't been invented yet.
As evidence: I can get a 35 pound bag of dog food delivered to my house in about an hour via Amazon Prime Now. That's basically both WebVan's and Pets.com business model but on the back of Amazon's logistics ecosystem.
What makes this work is both that it's not 2001: both in that there are significantly more Internet users, they have higher speed connections, and they're much more comfortable with online purchases.
Plus also webvan.com blew a billion dollars building a delivery infrastructure that they couldn't support.
If you have an all new product you need to get into the market fast. Once you have the basic features working you need to see if customers really exist. Even if it means your customers have to try everything twice because you crash the first time, if they buy your product you fix the bugs they see so that it mostly works and move on.
However if you don't have a new product you cannot do that. If you want to release something where the market already exists you can just do one part better you need to be as good in everything else. Tesla didn't release their original roadster without a heater, in the 1950s heaters were optional.
You need to figure out which market you are in and release accordingly. Getting this wrong means the death of your company. If you are in the first investors are taking a risk that people will want your product - it would be stupid to invest in perfection when customers might decide your product doesn't fill a need, better to abandon your interesting but useless product early. However when you are in the second you need to meet your user's expectations - thus I don't need to check the feature list to tell you Tesla comes with a working heater standard. Expectations is also why the early reviews of Tesla showed a tow pulling it away with a dead battery - the equivalent stupidity in a gas car would be the tow truck charging $10/gallon for gas and you are on your way in a few minutes. (Tesla has been mostly successful in managing expectations in the years since - now everyone knows it isn't the best car for cross country trips but you can do it once in a while with a little planning - there is a lesson in this too when you are a little different in an existing market make sure the downsides of your different are understood)
Aggregating their reviews would cancel this effect out though.
Also, there's the risk of aggregate counts simply reflecting the population of each job function, unless you weight them. Then it'll just say that every engineering-focused startup failed for engineering reasons and every sales-focused startup failed for sales reasons, which may be true but isn't terribly helpful for a founder trying to figure out what to do.
It's because of that case I think free-form postmortems might be more insightful, despite their own obvious faults. Perhaps NLP and sentiment analysis could shed some light.
Not always. Changing a single person's bad habits or tendencies is hard enough. 10 people? 100? Culture carries momentum even if the prime mover is found.
Then the challenge becomes a game of synthesizing contradicting perspectives. That's what makes this exercise of distilling causes into "bitesized pieces" so difficult.
In most cases, there is, of course, no simple way to pinpoint a particular place where everything ran amok. That's to be expected. The analyst needs to listen to everyone with credible knowledge of the company and use their own judgment to come to an opinion on the biggest issue. This is a subjective analysis, and not something that can be authoritatively established.
Often times in an early stage startup the problem is the team doesn't gel enough to adequately explore the problem space. In those cases, the founder might conclude that the opportunity wasn't there, but maybe it's because people weren't aligned enough to push far enough in the right direction. It's impossible to know whether there was really a viable business there, or whether it was a failure of the team. But subjectively after going through several startups and other early stage projects, I know the feeling of a team that is gelling, and it can make an unquantifiably huge difference to early results.
This really resonated with me. It's truly a skill to build the self-awareness to realize when you're the problem. It's much easier to externalize or abstract the problems away, particularly in stressful times where everyone feels overworked. I've caught myself doing this.
I have to set aside part of every week to step back, breathe in, and candidly examine how I might be contributing to problems that are happening. Otherwise it's too easy to get wrapped up in the hunt for demons outside the burning house.
Similarly, many companies that fail made perfectly rational bets, but things outside their control killed them. Likewise many successful companies may simply have gotten lucky due to things outside their control, even if their initial odds where poor.
Which is why I feel like success and failure on their own tell you very little.
The funny thing about salaries that many companies don't understand is that those extra few dollars can make a huge difference to workers.
There's this kind of narrative going around recently that beyond some magic figure (pick a silly number like $70k or whatever) extra money doesn't make you happier etc.
What this totally misses out on is that to have a financial future you have to make money over expenses.
If it costs you $20/hr to live and you make $24 then $28 actually doubles what you have left at the end of the month.
This applies whether you make $15/hour or $150.
But consumerism encourages people to max bulls to the ceiling.
Sometimes solutions have to stick around and survive through a few waves of the solution becoming relevant - either the market catching up to demand the solution, or the solution developing to meet the market.
It's a fine reason for building solutions in a lean way that can have a longer runway to let things align
This also holds true for successful businesses!
For example, you will forever read books on successful companies and they will say things like "we were successful because we were agile". In reality that is probably not the case, more likely success was because of a million undefinable small things all mashed together.
I do like the idea though - an open commons of "lessons learned" that lets you pass the baton to whomever else wants to tackle the same problem next.
It's the flipside of a similar problem in analyzing why companies are successful. [1]
The little disclaimer at the bottom really says it all.
The attempt is a noble one, marred by data and insight quality issues. I think it could be useful if the site can source insightful analysis from founders/insiders and make it easy to search by market/product category. Perhaps even adding a badge to information which came from a founder.
[1] http://www.tomorrowtodayglobal.com/2011/12/09/good-to-great-...