When you hire someone, whether to mow your lawn or run your fortune 500 company, you want their work effort to be aligned with you objectives. Ideally, every employee you hire is aligned with your interest, but that is impossible. This is a hard problem with a huge body of research behind it. If you would like to learn more, look up the "agency problem".
With regard to the ability to easily change investments - that is simply not true for the massive companies you are talking about. As an individual investor, you can shift capital around easily because your decisions have a negligible impact on the market as a whole. However, over 70% of the stock market is held by institutional investors, whose decisions significantly impact market prices.
Stock prices reflect the long term prospects of a company. Shareholders are merciless in punishing companies that optimize for the short term over the long term.
Because you think the wealthiest top 5% owning 82% of all stocks isn't an accurate statistic? Or because you think the top 5% are not what you'd consider "wealthy"?
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-07/you-too-c...
As for Welch, GE Capital was a good chunk of GE's revenue and profits... right up to 2008 [1] where it might have sunk the company; it is now being sold off by Immelt [2]. So much for the industrial group giving the financial side "stability"...
[1] http://archive.fortune.com/2008/10/09/news/companies/colvin_...
On its business: " though the average citizen probably thinks of GE as a great industrial company, its industry classification in the Fortune 500 is diversified financials. It is by far the largest company in that industry group. The next biggest - and here we begin to glimpse GE's troubles - are Fannie Mae (FNM, Fortune 500) and Freddie Mac (FRE, Fortune 500).
The reality is that for years, about half of GE's prodigious profits have come from General Electric Capital."
On 2008: "But now the stock trades for less than half its price 12 months ago. More than $200 billion of value has vaporized."
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GE_Capital#Restructuring_plan
[3] On who built GE Capital: http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive... [1997]
"At another level, a small crowd of professional GE watchers know that CEO Jack Welch owes a surprising amount of his success to a profit dynamo called GE Capital Services. What only a handful of people understand--given GE Capital's reclusive nature--is how important this secret weapon has become to GE's continued prosperity, and what a model it is for managers trying to grow in any business."
> Under Ballmer's tenure as CEO, Microsoft's annual revenue surged from $25 billion to $70 billion, while its net income increased 215 percent to $23 billion, and its gross profit of 75 cents on every dollar in sales is double that of Google or IBM.
...
> Ballmer also built half-a-dozen new businesses such as the data centers division and the Xbox entertainment and devices division ($8.9 billion) (which has prevented the Sony PlayStation and other gaming consoles from undermining Windows), and oversaw the acquisition of Skype. Ballmer also constructed the company's $20 billion Enterprise Business, consisting of new products and services such as Exchange, Windows Server, SQL Server, SharePoint, System Center, and Dynamics CRM, each of which initially faced an uphill battle for acceptance but have emerged as leading or dominant in each category.
It doesn't exactly sound like tanking.
MSFT Market cap when Ballmer announced he was leaving: $270B
That was the problem... even if the initial valuation was ridiculously inflated by the early tech bubble, post-crash, the stock was pretty stagnant throughout his tenure as CEO.
http://fortune.com/2013/08/23/steve-ballmers-market-cap-prob...
Ballmer gets credited with XBox etc, but I always thought MS was doing a lot of spray-and-pray management during the Ballmer years, and there were far more failures than successes. There certainly didn't seem to be any realistic strategy or vision. (I remember going to a trade fair with a huuuge MS stand showing off some kind of library or book management service. That product was dead less than a month later.)
Nadella seems to like strategy so much he has a handful running all at the same time. Which is how you get something like "Cloud-first, mobile-first" - which doesn't even make sense.
Point being that CEOs are there to signify the existence of leadership[tm], not necessarily to provide it - and markets and investors don't appear to be able to tell the difference.
Now, if you're going to hire a CEO with that skill, do you think he's not going to also negotiate a good contract for himself? He has that skill.
The purpose of a company should be to support every employee to make those kinds of contributions. If they can only happen at the top it's probably because the employees at the bottom are handcuffed, which totally negates the million dollar contributions the CEO is making.
The contention is that a CEO saves $x million, and thereby 'earns' some [preposterous] fraction thereof, as a finders' fee.
This is a similar logic to a broker taking a percentage of a large market transaction.
That part I disagree with and think many upset about CEO compensation (or market speculators/industry windfalls) is that this is earning in any meaningful way.
In particular, the presumption that there is some intrinsic relationship between the compensation earned and the numbers transacted seems baseless.
The CEO and market trader alike do not provide the value; they are simply in a desk where the numbers are large.
The reason a CEO can 'save millions or make billions' is merely because they have been seated where their quotidian decisions (however talented) have disproportionate leverage and consequence.
That is not a result of ability or skill, except in the unconvincing sense that they had the skill to weasel (my word) their way into that desk, nominally on personal merit, in fact, usually by virtue of connection and political merit.
That sort of 'earning' does not pass the smell test for most of us who have not lucked into those seats, and never shall.
"Luck" has a lot to do with it, but it also has a lot to do with many other types of success that most people don't have problems with.
Research, logic, and reason simply doesn't support the myth of the CEO. But board members and CEOs themselves like to indulge in that myth.
Is it any shock that a class of people value people in their own set over the people that actually do the work?
Other potential explanations for inflated CEO pay (relative to previous decades) include executive compensation boards staffed by executives in similar positions from other companies, and boards that want to keep up appearances by having a highly paid CEO.
Rich CEO = successful company = investor opportunity
No one cares about the shlubs doing the actual work.
Indeed, a lot of the time no one cares about the actual work, or the long-term prospects of success.
I'm sure that the devil is in the details, but for a company that is already up-and-running it seems like it should be possible to measure how much the company is spending currently, then how much less the company spent after the CEO negotiated, and then give the CEO a fraction of that.
Certainly, the stock value isn't going to rise or fall appreciably for most of the deals that the CEO will negotiate - it would have to be big enough to 'make the news' and/or show up in a press release, at a minimum.
I feel like I've heard the argument that "CEOs negotiate great deals and that helps to justify their compensation" before, but I've never heard of anyone actually basing a compensation schema on that directly. Given that we live an an Era Of Data I'd expect companies to be doing this (or trying to do this).
I agree this was the main reason for Dell to become private allowing them to concentrate on long term and i think they have done better as private company than public earlier.
I wonder if it is possible only have retail investor as shareholder who does not care much about strategy as long as they get dividend and stock price kind of keeps a phase rather than always going up.
It is an interesting exercise to take a moment and write down what you envision would fill the time of a CEO at the office over the course of a month. What problems would arise? Who would ask for their time? When they were investing time what would it be toward? Etc.
Ask yourself, what does the CEO actually do? And given what they do what determines how difficult it is to do that? And finally how would you evaluate their performance relative to the requirements for the job?
The above analysis casts the CEO as the 'decider.' This defines the CEO as the person who makes the decisions that could not be made by people that report to them. I have had the opportunity to ask some CEOs how they spend their time and deciding critical questions is always part of the answer, but it is usually a very small part, typically less than 20% of their time. I have also noticed it confuses the heck out of people who are CEOs of small companies and this is a big part of their time, and their company grows and it becomes less and less of their time (or worse they continue to try to make decisions that would be better off made by their staff) and they panic because they have no idea what their job is any more.
In a wider context at a larger company, the CEOs role moves away from decisions and into choices. Which path, of all the paths available, does the company proceed along. Those choices, and navigating those choices, has an inordinate effect on the long term success of the organization.
Tom Mendoza, who was the VP of Sales at NetApp and later President, used to turn everything into a sports analogy. It was so common that people would sometimes jokingly ask "How can I explain this to Tom in terms of sports?" But the reality is that sports can have a lot in common with business at the higher levels. When you look at the performance of a football team like the San Francisco 49ers across coaches and players, it is startlingly clear that the coach has a huge impact on the overall success of the team. But unlike sports teams, which get a sort of 'natural reset' each season, companies do not.
The CEO position is perhaps the single largest point of leverage on the future success of a company. And while it is impossible to know when you hire a CEO if they will have a positive, neutral, or negative effect on the company, it is clear after a while how it is going. And having it be that important to hire a good one, ones that have a 'proven' track record are going to be able to command a much better salary than one who doesn't. Not because their decisions are more employee focused or shareholder focused, but because their decisions are the ones that are good for the success of the company as a whole.
And then how do those decisions effect the company? Well in three obvious ways; they affect the effectiveness of the company at getting things done (its productivity), they affect the number of markets in which the company can complete, or they affect the company's focus. What is worse, in the midst of all these company critical factors they are trying to balance, they will have directors and VPs working for them who are actively sabotaging other directors and VPs efforts in an attempt to 'get ahead.' It would be like playing chess where sometimes a pawn just decides on its own to capture the piece it can see to make itself look more important to the other pieces on the board with no appreciation for where those other pieces are situated or what part they are playing in the current board strategy.
The bottom line is that there is a spectrum of 'CEO' from 'CEO' of a 10 person startup (which is indistinguishable from a line manager) and 'CEO' of a 100 person, 1K person, 10k person, and 100k person companies. Each order of magnitude changes the role in many ways. The one thing they all have in common is that they can destroy the company they are in charge of if they screw up or simply aren't up to the task.
If you don't mind, could you rephrase your conjecture as a falsifiable hypothesis?
A path is sequence of correlated activities that lead to a particular goal or deliverable.
A choice can increase or decrease the total number of goals or deliverables.
A decision can increase or decrease the success chances of a pre-existing goal or deliverable.
Generally a startup CEO has one deliverable, the product. And all of their actions are decisions on how to de-risk that deliverable at minimum cost.
An enterprise CEO has multiple deliverables, evalutated as 'enterprise value'. Their actions are generally choices to add or remove deliverables to increase enterprise value.
I think the distinction between choices and decisions is arbitrary.
The real difference is that startups have to keep customers and/or initial investors happy. They're also more likely - on a scale of "absolutely very much" to "I suppose I should care, I guess" - to take an interest in the employee culture.
Enterprise CEOs have to keep their boards and institutional investors happy, and mostly don't give a crap about employee culture, except in so far as it contributes to the first goal.
The problem for enterprise CEOs is that there are painful, obvious conflicts between Wall Street's persistent demand for high quarterly returns, the on-the-ground demands of keeping a business healthy and growing, and the value of their own personal stake in the company.
I certainly agree that Enterprise CEOs do have to be doing a good job in the view of the board, exactly like any employee has to do a good job in view of their supervisor if they wish to retain their job. The board can fire them. But that also raises the question of how much is the continued presence of a 'bad CEO' the Board's fault.
And I don't agree at all with this statement The problem for enterprise CEOs is that there are painful, obvious conflicts between Wall Street's persistent demand for high quarterly returns, the on-the-ground demands of keeping a business healthy and growing, and the value of their own personal stake in the company.
If the stock price is a proxy for the health of the company and the CEO is in charge of keeping the company healthy, then the stock price and the CEO are aligned. I've only really been on 1:1 speaking terms with two enterprise CEOs, Scott McNealy (Sun) and Dan Warmenhoven (NetApp). And neither of them was 'conflicted' about what Wall Street 'demanding' high quarterly returns, nor did the noise of traders on Wall Street enter into their business decisions as far as I could ascertain. When decisions were made and communicated they are very solid reasoning behind them around how the choice would improve the company. I have also seen startup CEOs that made extraordinarily bad decisions that benefited themselves personally at the expense of the company, both Zynga and Groupon showed how painful that could be. But when you look across the millions of companies, just in the US, it is hard to find a persistent, or even prevalent, pattern of CEOs who put themselves or by proxy the stock price, ahead of the company issues. I am certainly open to evidence that this is the case, I just haven't seen it.
If a small department has a great set of low-risk, high-reward projects, but runs out of budget, the company should run the project so long as the risk-adjusted reward is greater than the cost of capital. But instead, they must stick to the plan.
Being skeptical of arbitrary new definitions is a good defense against intentional conflation of two definitions. I find psychology papers are frequently guilty of using a very narrow, specific definition for a word in part of their research then switching to a very broad definition for their conclusions.
The other kind is the CEO who is hired by the board of directors. They're usually very well paid and given a lot of stock, but aren't wealthy the way, say, Bill Gates is wealthy. They also tend not to be as admired, since they didn't build the business from the ground up.
People wonder why the second class of CEO receives such lavish compensation, when they're essentially just a regular employee. I suspect that the compensation is actually part of the qualification for the job. It makes shareholders feel good if the CEO holds a lot of stock, because it's a strong incentive for them to put the interests of the shareholders (whom it's easy to stereotype as rich, entitled lazy people living lavishly off of passive investment income) above the interests of the employees the CEO works with every day (who are usually hard-working people who, if the company is successful, generate far more wealth than they're compensated for).
Normal human behavior would be to put the interests of the employees above the shareholders. Large stock grants counteract that. Sometimes I wonder if a hired CEO were to refuse to receive large stock grants, would that cause the shareholders to revolt and/or the board of directors to not hire or try to fire him/her, simply because they're not comfortable with a CEO who doesn't have an incentive to pump up the stock value.
(It's worth noting that shareholders can change their investments much easier than employees can change employers, so shareholders are more likely to prefer policies that pump up the stock value now even if they're bad for the company in the long run.)