First off, it's rather well-known that Germany's fear of a two-front war and encirclement led to much of its preliminary war plan. On the other hand, the circumstances that led up to such a scenario were not preordained from its construction. It was largely a result of the early 20th century Germany managing to piss off just about everybody else with amazingly inept foreign diplomacy. In particular, Germany decided to give up its relationship with Russia, which France eagerly took advantage of and bound the two countries fairly close together. Germany's naval race with Britain also did much to antagonize it for no real gain.
Also, Alsace-Lorraine is much oversold as a cause of war. It's true that France did want Alsace-Lorraine back. But many in France were not prepared to go to war to actually achieve that aim. Instead, the situation in France post-Franco-Prussian War was to try to find allies that could help divert German attention, and their allies were the Russians who needed lots of help to even minimally qualify for that role and the British who went to rather great lengths to try to avoid actually fulfilling their commitment when August 1914 came around (Germany marching through Belgium gave Britain the political cover to actually commit).
As for whether or not Germany could win, that's a difficult what-if to answer. The Schlieffen Plan was, in the abstract, a masterpiece of precision planning and timetabling. But the plan also had very little room for change if things didn't work out. Belgium put up an unexpectedly fierce resistance, Austria-Hungary had a surprisingly hard time in Serbia, and Russia was doing better at first than Germany expected. In the end, the German momentum and logistics chain was incapable of carrying them to Paris, which completely ruined their plans and any hope of a quick end to the war. And Germany was completely unprepared for that scenario (to be fair, no one else was).
It's amazing how much hubris it took to sink the Second Reich. As far as I can tell, Germany was on track to win the war as late as spring 1917. They had the resources and the right strategy: defensive in the West (retreat to the Hindenburg Line) and offensive in the East. The last crucial mistake was resuming unrestricted submarine warfare at the same time. This predictably drew the US into the war. By summer 1918, the benefits of defeating Russia and Romania in the East were nullified by American troops pouring in at a rate of 10,000 a day, and the war's outcome was pretty much sealed.
Even without US involvement, France, Britain, and Germany were effectively all devoid of manpower. Once the Spring Offensive failed, there really wasn't any ability on any side to carry on offensive operations, at least to the point of producing a clear end to the war. So the first country to fall apart from the stalemate would be the one to lose it all. And Germany certainly seems the strongest contender for being the first to fall. It was having problems keeping even its soldiers well-fed, and the Spring Offensive produced a very indefensible salient. Germany's hopes of victory died at the Second Battle of the Marne, and they probably would have died there even had the Americans not started streaming to the front lines.
Regarding 1918, the Germans were pushing so hard and getting stretched because the AEF was streaming in [1]. (American divisions were involved in plugging holes at the Second Marne BTW.) The Germans had a superiority of 300,000 men going into spring 1918, and inflicted 150,000 more casualties than they took during the Spring Offensive. Unlike 1914, there was no rush to beat the French before the Russians mobilized. If it wasn't for the US intervention, it would have been offensive after offensive until the Entente caved in.
Wilhelm II was even planning an invasion of America in the late 1800's/early 1900's, an attempt at gunboat diplomacy[1].
[1] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/may/09/kateconnolly
So did this fact provide the ground for the belief, which helped lay the groundwork for the success of the Nazi movement, that Germany had lost the war because it had been betrayed by its leadership?
[1] https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading...
As an example, read Aethelric's post here as it is important in explaining the seeds that set Germany as it was in 1869.
https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/1v3vk8/why_d...
The region we now know as Germany was a series of small towns with mostly independent rule. With instability (especially crumbling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire), Germany established formal alliances quickly as the political climate grew in intensity.
Franz Ferdinand was shot, the European states fought and the US (with late entry) injected fresh ideas, troops and supplies, which decisively turned the tides of a messy war.
So, 1869 was more like a traffic light that triggered the car crash. Without understanding the history, you can't really understand each participant's trajectories or motives. To limit the answer to "1869" is only slightly more informative than limiting the answer to "Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand's assassination".
The Crimean War was also significant because Austria-Hungary, though not much of a belligerent, turned on Russia which left them without allies when facing Prussia in 1866 and of course the two Empires were critically still enemies when the Archduke was assassinated.
One can keep going backwards in history with cause and effect, but for the two points above, I like to see the Crimean War as the turning point of the European alliances that were in place at the start of "the Great War".
(I believe this is also why Britain joined the EU in the first place - it's not a threat if Britain has a seat at the table.)
The upshot of this is that Britain was always going to enter WWI once it looked bad for France - if not Belgium, some reason would have been found.
Without that, the modern era would probably never have happened. That is because one state would have probably converted Europe into an empire, dominated by a single culture and religion, instead of the great competition of ideas and technologies that happened because there were so many independent states.
The dominant continental powers have been Rome, France, Germany and Russia. Each have, to put it mildy, their own special characteristics.
* Rome conquered and held on to (most of) Britain.
* France was Britain's neighbour. Each was a potential invader of the other right through the middle ages and most of the modern period.
* Up to 1945, Germany was an extraordinarily belligerent power that made enemies of just about everyone.
* Similarly Britain was a rival of soviet Russia only as part of a broader alliance that went far beyond any attempt at realpolitik.
For all the noise and heat regarding the EU, post cold-war Europe is a remarkably friendly place. By historical standards, there is "against" any more.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco-British_Union#World_War...
I agree that it's weak though. And Britain is definitely the reason Germany wasn't capable of overrunning France. America at best made it clear that Germany could not win. While 120,000 troops lost by the US is far less than the Europeans, that is by no means a small number, especially considering such brief involvement.
There really was no reason to ever believe the US would ever get involved in WWI. Even WWII there was no indication the US would actually enter the War directly until the Japanese forced the choice.
That seems like conventional wisdom, but the U.S. started a large military build-up before Pearl Harbor. The military draft began in 1940. And of course the U.S. was actively supporting the UK through lend-lease.
There were still isolationists in Washington and even prominent supporters of Hitler in the public sphere (if you ever wonder how misguided people can be, remember that), but certainly there were many indications that the U.S. would enter the war.
But, until Pearl Harbor and the Philippines there was no clear pretext for the US to declare war. And had they not attacked, it's not clear that FDR could have gotten congress to declare war. Some of those prominent supporters were significant industrialists like Ford, they would have fought intervention by all means.
After Pearl Harbor, there was no debate.
Maybe the first and third were seen as necessary to protect a neutral country? Or being short of declaring war, they were less objectionable? But I'm just guessing ...
Lend-Lease had fairly staunch resistance, as it basically shredded any pretense of neutrality. The draft and the military build-up were supported in large part due to neutrality--the need to have a sufficiently strong military to deter potential aggression (this was the strategy of Switzerland). When FDR extended the draft term from 12 months to 18 months, it passed by a single vote in the House.
But, yes the US had a constant stream of arms being supplied to Britain and Russia during the period before the war.
I always akin it to tag team wrestling. The first guy beats the other team almost silly, then tags out and the fresh guy comes in fresh and finishes them off.
If only USSR didn't enter WW2 on Hitler's side...
... You mean apart from the Indian wars which annexed territory, the Mexican-American war which annexed territory, and the Spanish-American war which annexed territory? Then there was the War of 1812, where the US tried and failed to annex Canadian territory. Or the Barbary wars.
The US not wanting to involve itself in internal European wars does not mean it was militarily isolationist. The US has been projecting military power beyond its borders pretty much since its inception. Military power projection is in the US's DNA, not isolationism.
I mean, how do you characterise sending warships to scare Japan into opening up for trade in 1868 as 'isolationism'?
George Washington's farewell address addressed this:
"The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities."
Thomas Jefferson said that one of the "essential principles of our government" is that of "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."
Monroe:
"In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken part, nor does it comport with our policy, so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded, or seriously menaced that we resent injuries, or make preparations for our defense."
Seward:
"defending 'our policy of non-intervention—straight, absolute, and peculiar as it may seem to other nations'...[t]he American people must be content to recommend the cause of human progress by the wisdom with which they should exercise the powers of self-government, forbearing at all times, and in every way, from foreign alliances, intervention, and interference."
Here's a Wiki on it: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_non-intervention...
You seem to be arguing that the US projects military power in it's own interests. That's undeniable, but claiming that as a counterpoint that we weren't isolationist in the 19th century is not what isolation means. For recent examples: invading Afghanistan was for our own interests; we were attacked by a group sheltered by their government. Iraq was not. Syria is not. Balkans in the 1990s was not. Panama was because of the canal and trade routes. WWI and WWII ultimately was in our best interests but it wasn't obvious at the time, particularly early on, and the cost was immense. Right now, we are so intertwined in alliances that if just about any country goes to war outside of sub-saharan Africa, we are automatically at war.
And despite you quoting several people including terms like "forbearing at all times, and in every way ... intervention and interference", I have already furnished you with more than a few examples of the US actively intervening and interfering. The US not only meddled a heap in the Americas, but also outside it's own area (like the Philippines and Japan, already mentioned). Neither does 'non-intervention' square with things like backing Cuba in a war of independence against Spain. That's the living, breathing definition of 'intervention'.
You seem to be missing my point that the US was politically isolationist with respect to Europe, but it wasn't isolationist outside of Europe.
> Afghanistan was for our own interests; we were attacked by a group sheltered by their government. Iraq was not. Syria is not. Balkans in the 1990s was not.
This is all total propaganda. Iraq was 100% in the US's interests (or perhaps better put, the incumbent government's interests), and the US fabricated a casus belli to invade, against the wishes of its allies, and with no quality intelligence. Syria is a leftover from the Iraq debacle; the US would lose considerable international reputation if it just shrugged and walked away from the consequences of the clusterfuck it caused in Iraq. There was no alliance requiring that the US invade unilaterally in the case of Iraq, and the consequences of that populist action are now tearing Europe apart. There is more to national interests than conquering territory and acts of military revenge.
If the US got itself involved in conflicts that weren't in its interests, then it'd be much more involved in sub-Saharan Africa. Or filling eastern Ukraine with gung-ho marines and reverting the annexation of Crimea. I don't expect any nation to act against its interests, but if people are going to persist with the myth that the US really is the 'world cop', then it's a corrupt cop who looks the other way when there's no kickback coming its way.
...and even then, it wasn't entirely clear that the US would enter the European war, until Hitler declared war on the US.
Prior to US involvement, the front line was quite close to Paris. After, it was just over the border of Germany, and then as you said, they knew it was over. US' involvement was huge.
Britain. Along with contingents from most of its Empire.
(Saying "England" when you mean "Britain" is like saying "Texas" when you mean "U.S.A.")
On the contrary, I think it is exceedingly likely that the US will always intervene (if it has the capacity to do so) if a single military power looks like taking over most of Europe. It's why the US intervened in both WWI and WWII, and created NATO.
Absolutely. Obviously the Civil War did play a role (there's nothing in history that isn't connected in some way), but trying to set it up as a major cause of WW1+2? No thanks.
To me, the whole article seems to be the author trying to shoehorn history into his idea that the events of the year 1866 would somehow predestine the next half century. He brings up some interesting observations, but his main thesis doesn't hold water.
By that reasoning, everything the USA has been involved in stems from "1866". Or various British Acts of Union led to two world wars. Or the Magna Carta, or the French Revolution, or anything before 1914 that involved any of the participants.
Furthermore, even if we un-ironically believe "1866" led to the US cavalry riding to everyone's rescue in two world wars, that is the end result, not setting the stage.
I know some people love to believe everything must revolve around the USA, but trying to argue that the two greatest events of the 20th century actually stemmed from 19th century internal American politics that meant relatively little to Europeans even at the time seems pretty desperate.
[1] Before anyone downvotes for this interpretation of what he wrote, he literally states the following simplistic, insulting garbage about WWI (where US involvement was barely more than symbolic): "[the USA] would intervene to defeat Germany just in the nick of time".
I wonder how he feels about the USSR intervening to defeat Japan just in the nick of time in WWII.
The analogy is that the Allied powers could probably have avoided the post-tranquility strife by not asking for The German Empire could not give.
By creating this imbalance, they fed the very outcome they dreaded (another Great War).
[2] https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/185253.The_Magic_of_Recl...
You essentially argue that the alliamce system caused the WW1 but I don't think that argument works very well. An alliance system alone does not cause war. The questiom is why within a given international situation some people start a war.
The reason the relation did not change was not just Alsace-Lorraine, there are other issues. So I really think it can not be called a root cause of WW1.
You could probably go back to the Middle Ages, but let's start with Napoleon. His invasion of the German territories officially destroyed the last vestiges of the Holy Roman Empire. This, of course, was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire any longer; but it did symbolize the national identity of the Germans at the time. (You ought to know that German national identity does not hinge on a political nation state but rather on a shared language, culture and history.) Apart from this abuse of national pride, Napoleon's armies of occupation were seen as evil oppressors, and his forced recruiting of soldiers for the Russian expedition didn't help either.
Napoleon's defeat, though a great relief to the rest of Europe, was a blow to the French pride. (As far as I am aware, he is still a national hero in France to this day.) It was followed by the Vienna Congress and the reordering of Europe, after which there was a period of relative stability. However, the distrust remained, especially as Prussia became more and more powerful.
Come 1871, defeat in the Franco-Prussian War was an absolute disaster for France. It was the greatest humiliation imaginable, both militarily and politically. Its armies outclassed, its king captured, it had to watch as the enemy paraded through the streets of its beloved capital. Adding insult to injury, Bismarck proclaimed Wilhelm of Prussia Emperor of the united Germany in the mirror hall of Versailles - the holy of holies of the French monarchy.
France could not forget. In the next four decades, it watched Germany's growing power with growing fear, seeking alliances to protect itself. At the same time in Germany, France continued to be presented as the historical archenemy. (In this period, a huge statue was built depicting an ancient Germanic tribal leader, Hermann. Symbolically, his raised sword points towards France.)
Everywhere in Europe, nationalistic fever ran high. The lead up to the Great War was an incredibly tangled mess of bad diplomacy that ignited animosity rather than allay it. Everybody knew war was coming, and nobody was trying very hard to prevent it. After all, they thought, it would be short, it would be glorious, and there would be the chance to right old wrongs.
When war came, almost everybody rejoiced. The Franco-Prussian war was still very much in living memory, and the military leaders of France and Germany were baying for blood. Four years of the deadliest war ever seen stilled the peoples' thirst for blood, but not the hate. Now it was France's turn to humiliate Germany, which it did it's utmost to accomplish with the Treaty of Versailles. (Signed, of course, in the same hall of mirrors that had seen Germany's triumph in 1871.)
France tried to ensure that Germany would never be able to fight another war. Of course it failed, and of course the attempt only served to increase German hatred. Hitler and his party then played a masterful game of psychology with the German people, in which the "shame of Versailles" had a very prominent part. War broke out again, the French defenses broke, and once again German soldiers paraded through Paris. Not one to forgo symbolism, Hitler had the French government sign their surrender in the same railway wagon that had seen the signing of the Armistice of Compiègne (which hat ended fighting on the Western Front in 1918). I need not go into the brutality of the ensuing occupation of France.
With this long history of mutual hatred, it is an incredible feat of the post war governments of Germany and France that they managed to forge a friendship between their nations. A lot of the credit is due to Charles de Gaulle and the first German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. Their Elysee Treaty of 1963 paved the way for what has become a very close international friendship and the center piece of the European Union. But it was a long road.
> Napoleon's defeat, though a great relief to the rest of Europe, was a blow to the French pride. (As far as I am aware, he is still a national hero in France to this day.)
Yes, to this very day he has a tomb fit for an Emperor[0]. Established in 1861, only a short ten years before the Franco-Prussian War.
I imagine some rather awkward conversations took place.
That Germany was 'destined' to lose is a non-starter anyways. From my understanding it was Britain's decision to enter WWI that really shaped the outcome, and that it was far from a foregone conclusion that Britain would enter a continental European war. If the British didn't get involved, Germany's chance of taking Paris is much better, denying the two front war Germany (rightly) saw as a worst case scenario.