It depends​ on the specifics of what's being exploited but in general I think a short delay between informing those who can fix it and those who will exploit it is generally more moral.

In the case of the Lastpass exploit it would've been to not use Lastpass for a few days. That's one benefit of direct disclosure to the user.

I'd much rather transcribe my financial account passwords to paper, or not log in for a couple days than have multiple months where a vulnerability might be exploitable

What I don't want you do is secretly working with the vendor of my lock to fit some kind of solution to their problem into their product shipping schedule.

You won't be setting your deadbolt because, guess what, the guy who found the problem told your local Linux Users' Group, not you. And you don't attend your local Linux Users' Group.

If you were telling everyone that would be another thing.

I don't like telling vulnerability researchers what to do. Of all the ethical issues involved in vulnerability disclosure, the most important to me is the fact that these researchers are doing free work for the vendors, who bear all the obligations of ensuring that they're not shipping vulnerabilities in the first place. I think these debates about "disclosure ethics" mostly serve the vendors, who want to deflect from discussions about how they manage to ship vulnerabilities that third parties can find.

But if I had to have a problem with any disclosure process, it's the "secret cabal" model, which has always been an problem for me, all the way back into the 1990s with things like the CORE list.

Twitter is the equivalent of your local LUG in the scale of things. My mum is not reading Twitter for security news, or even at all. What my mum is doing, is having her stuff update. And my dad's no different.

It might as well be some presentation at DEFCON. I want my vendor to disable functionality that's vulnerable. And I want them to be given a chance to do that. If you feel you are adequately warning users by fully disclosing via a Twitter post then so be it. I think I've made all the arguments I have to make on the topic. If they are insufficient, then that is where I must leave it.

To anyone reading afterwards who may not be sure about my position, I feel positively about how this vulnerability was handled.

Not really. Any serious vulnerability in a widely used product disclosed by twitter announcement makes it into the mainstream media in no time and prompts a response by the vendor (if one had not been forthcoming already). Your local LUG, less so.

I would rather have the former. Also, I didn't pick the Bic pen thing randomly. Certain Kryptonite locks were once famously demonstrated to be Bic pen unlockable.

If a vulnerability in your lock is found and the lock manufacturer buys you a new lock within a week, do you stop trusting that manufacturer?

What is a serious problem is subjective. The right amount of time to wait is subjective. In both cases, there will be people that are unhappy with how they were or weren't informed. Instead of some select group of people deciding how important the fix is and when it will be fixed, announcing immediately empowers the public.

Of course not. In our analogy here, if the lock maker isn't issuing even a statement then hell no you shouldn't trust them. But in this case the locksmith fixed the lock and reissued the lock within a week.

> What is a serious problem is subjective.

Yes an no. There is a gray area. But what isn't is: lives, A TREASUREBOX OF PASSWORDS, anything that can cause physical damage, and anything that can significantly compromise a user's safety.

To be clear: in another post I said you should ALWAYS (read as "\Huge{ALWAYS}")publicly disclose. So that others don't make the same mistake. But obscurity can be useful in the short run.

Announcing immediately DOES NOT empower the public. They are not rational and quick to fear. ALL (EVERY SINGLE ONE) companies have vulnerabilities. What is important is if they fix them in a timely manner or not. SEEING that a company does fix a problem quickly empowers the company AND the user, because they find they have a company they can trust. Immediate disclosure only empowers the adversary.

Your statement would be true IF it were possible for software to be invulnerable. Since ALL software (and hardware) is vulnerable it is perfectly reasonable to give the owner of said software/hardware a reasonable time to fix the issue before releasing to the public. I fully believe you should always release to the public, but obscurity is a good temporary measure.

Remotely turning off a pacemaker is the ultimate example of empowerment. If I had a pacemaker, I would want to be informed immediately of a vulnerability, along with everyone else. Assuming it's a proximity-based attack, I'd have the option of driving to a rural area and booking a motel until the vendor deploys a fix.

This is obviously an extreme example, but addressing the most extreme example might be the best way to address all the rest.

How would I hear about it? Because HN, Reddit, and Twitter would all blast the information to everyone, along with "warn anyone you know who has a pacemaker." Even if I weren't technologically literate, someone close to me would tell me.

This is strictly preferable to the alternative: If the vulnerability is kept secret, my life would be in the hands of a select few who (a) know about the vulnerability and (b) may or may not use this information to their advantage.

When an independent security researcher informs a company about a vulnerability, the researcher has almost no transparency into how the company is responding to the report or what the timeline is for a fix. (HackerOne has made this a bit better, but most companies still don't have public bug bounty programs.) In the case of a pacemaker, it's very likely that the only thing the security researcher will hear is "Thank you for informing us. We are working urgently to deploy a fix" followed by a month of silence. This leads to the researcher doing increasingly desperate things to bring attention to the issue, such as emailing other security researchers in private. But an independent security researcher has no way of knowing whether the person they're emailing is trustworthy, nor can it be guaranteed that their conversation isn't being spied on. The researcher is also likely to tell someone (their husband/wife, their colleagues, etc) who are all trusted to keep it secret.

The responsibility for the pacemaker being able to kill me is squarely on the vendor, not the researcher. I would argue that the researcher has an ethical obligation to inform me, first and foremost, so that I can protect myself from the threat as quickly as possible.

When my life is on the line, giving me a chance to save it is much better than leaving it up to someone else to secretly guard it.

Some people might feel differently. For example, maybe they'd want to remain unaware that their pacemaker could kill them. But the point is that it's not a clear-cut issue.

Honestly, in that situation I would probably do nothing, since the chance that anyone would maliciously target me with a proximity-based attack is so small that it's more productive to be worried about being struck by lightning. But what if it wasn't proximity-based? Let's ratchet up the severity: What if somehow the pacemaker was connected to wifi by design, and someone gained control over whatever central server it was connecting to? In that case, I would want to be informed so that I could disable my wifi rather than trust that the server remains secure while a fix is deployed.

This all may seem unrealistic, but computing is still in its infancy. What about self-driving cars? I'd want to know immediately if someone could remotely gain control over my car so that I can not get in one. Ditto for planes.

My mind is open on the topic, so I assure you that if you try to persuade me otherwise, it will be a productive conversation. But it's hard to imagine a scenario where I'd rather not know of a threat. Can you think of one?

The only thing that comes close is if an entire city could somehow be destroyed remotely by any random troll on the internet. But in that case it might still be better to warn everyone immediately so that they can flee from the threat that was somehow constructed in their back yard, rather than keep them ignorant ostensibly for their protection and tell them later "By the way, you and your family were in serious danger."

Currently there have been no cases seen in the wild, how do you move forward? Do you give the company a chance to fix the problem before it is seen in the wild? I think so, and here is why.

If you fully disclose you WILL see the hack in the wild because of its ease to execute and there are malicious people out there. What does the public do? Not go into work for a month? People can't do that. Buy a new car? People can't just buy new cars. They are too expensive and it isn't like a dealer will want to do a trade in for a dangerous car.

Let's say you just tell the public that there is an easy to reproduce hack, and you fully disclose to the company. This can still be a dangerous thing because now that people know there is a powerful hack and they will be looking. Malicious actors will be quick to use it too, because they know it will be patched soon. It isn't unreasonable to think that the hack can be found before it can be fixed and a patch issued.

Now let's say that you just disclose to the responsible party. There aren't many people looking for the hack. Malicious actors that might know about it (definitely few at this point), will be wary to use it because if it is used then the people will find out about it. In the mean time the company patches it, issues an OTA update, and we never see the attack in the wild (or maybe once or twice). We then tell the public so that no one makes the same mistake. By doing it this way you minimize the chance of the hack being used. This method IS protecting your life better than you could do on your own.

We are presented with a problem if the responsible party brushes off the researcher. It is the responsibility of the researcher partially disclosing to the public. So now we're in the second case presented above. But now there is more power to the public. From a legal standpoint you can prove recklessness or malice by the responsible party and a lawsuit will be much easier. The company can be required to replace the vehicle, provide a temporary replacement, or buy it back. Whatever happens it will go much smoother in court than if one of the first two events happened.

The key here is that we need trust. No system is invulnerable and it would be naive to think there is one. What the trust comes from is that the company producing the product you are using fixes the issue quickly. The trust is that they are doing what they can to ensure the safety of the users.

Of course they have options. It's up to them to choose whether to get into a dangerous car. They can arrange to ride-share, or book a taxi, or ask a favor from a friend. And even if they have no options, the vulnerability researcher didn't make them less safe by disclosing immediately. The car company made them unsafe by shipping a car that could kill them.

Tangentially related, but you may find that the term "responsible disclosure" has covertly influenced your thinking, as it did mine: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12308246 It's easy not to notice.

> We are presented with a problem if the responsible party brushes off the researcher. It is the responsibility of the researcher partially disclosing to the public. So now we're in the second case presented above. But now there is more power to the public. From a legal standpoint you can prove recklessness or malice by the responsible party and a lawsuit will be much easier. The company can be required to replace the vehicle, provide a temporary replacement, or buy it back. Whatever happens it will go much smoother in court than if one of the first two events happened.

The company will undoubtedly be required to fix the vehicle anyway, if only to save their brand. Just because someone revealed the existence of a problem doesn't absolve them of any responsibility.

You make some good points, and the conclusions are logical and well-reasoned. Unfortunately I think we disagree on the central point: "This method IS protecting your life better than you could do on your own." Under no circumstances would I want to get into a car that an sdr could control -- this is the ultimate protection -- and the only way to ensure that is to be informed immediately.

What we're talking about here is the discovery of a vulnerability. Not that the company knowingly shipped the product with this issue.

Security is a constant cat and mouse game. Security through obscurity is an effective method in the short run. A company cannot and will not be responsible for shipping a car that could be hacked unless security researchers could show that there was gross negligence.

>Under no circumstances would I want to get into a car that an sdr could control

I suggest never entering a car with a computer in it. This likely means the car you own. Basically if your car has power steering and power braking then it can be hacked.

If you feel that the vulnerability is big, and the company is taking it seriously enough, you give them an honest chance, otherwise if they slack or hum and haw, you go to the public.

The nuance here is that we trust the person who discovered the hole to make subjective judgements about the severity of it and the company's response, and we force the company to be more transparent than usual to the person who discovered it about how they are working/nature of the code fix. But maybe that could be a good thing?

This. I fully agree with this. Obscurity is a good form of security in a temporary sense. But vulnerabilities should ALWAYS be disclosed to the public, for a number of reasons. The question is when. Disclosing does a couple things: 1) We see a company fixes them in a timely manner, which gives us trust in services that we use (and the opposite if they fail to) 2) other companies don't make the same mistakes because now the vulnerability is googleable and quickly becoming public knowledge.