Also, once you're signed in, every request sends a cookie which is also valuable to steal as it's an active session.
Every request needs to be encrypted. We haven't made TLS worse by deploying it everywhere.
How many more cases do we need where some stupid ISP or middleware puts ads into other peoples webpage. Not to mention that those ads might also be a security problem.
Privacy is another issue that HTTPS Everywhere at least helps considerably. The NSA literally tcpdumps the internet and uses sophisticated tools to analyse it. I prefer to have a internet that makes it hard for the NSA and company.
That's why the poster said "the stuff which only needs something like Subresource Integrity to make sure it hasn't been messed with".
Browser certificate validation hasn't been as simple as "check CA signature" for close to a decade, and even a decade ago you could configure your browser to trust only certain CAs, or, through the certificate exception manager, only certain specific certificates.
All of this functionality breaks MITM proxies.
https://jlospinoso.github.io/node/javascript/security/crypto...
Most of the usual client-side JavaScript crypto caveats apply: Of course, all bets are off if the man in the middle is also a man in your device. You should give up any expectations of privacy in this case.
In that case even if you MITM it - all the bad guy gets is encrypted (AES) data. Whitebox does sound a bit like black magic, but it's widely deployed (over 5 billion devices for Irdeto's) and add a nice layer to ensure that you're actually talking to the end users browser, and it's your code that's running on it.
However I'd also argue you don't actually need to stop people grabbing the data. Noticing achieves a large chunk of that, as (for example) I can notify the credit card system it's happened.
If you want to see exactly what it does and doesn't do see https://resources.irdeto.com/payments-banking/solution-overv...
And you can't guarantee that you can notify either, and for the same reason. The code that leaves your server won't be the code that actually runs on the client - it'll be a mutated version that will say "everything is OK" and acts normally to your server while it sends all the data somewhere else.
Nothing has changed since [1] was written; I don't see how that is anything but DRM promising more than it can deliver.
[1] https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/b...
It can't stop keyloggers, people looking over your shoulder, malware in the browser (MITB)/plugins as it still sits within the browser sandbox. It can in some cases detect that, and in some cases hinder it.
An attacker can stop it loading by MITM the connection, but then the site can't work against it's APIs as the solution also verifies as data goes into those API's the encryption is present and the code isn't tampered. If it's tampered a business rule is applied to decide what to do, either stop the messages, OR pass it back to risk management systems (very common in finance).
Alternatively, and in my opinion better, is to have a (sub)domain for static assets, served from the CDN, and keep the main one free from man-in-the-middle.
Yes, it's possible. The crypto bits the host is sending are different from the crypto bits the client is receiving. There are several ways to compare those, despite what the MITM box is doing. Out of band channels, timing, and order of data can be used.
I sometimes refer to HTTPS Everywhere as "Security Theater Everywhere". Before the mania for HTTPS, many sites only used HTTPS only for crucial transactions such as logins and credit cards. Those were infrequent enough that they didn't have to go through a CDN. Now, with HTTPS Everywhere, there's no distinction between the stuff that has to be hidden from observers, and the stuff which only needs something like Subresource Integrity to make sure it hasn't been messed with. So now the secure channel over which credit card numbers and logins are passed is exposed at the CDN.