abuse@ ought to function and produce a rapid response.
(That doesn't mean we shouldn't have anonymous, untrackable services as well, but using such services means you have to put up with spam too. When you have a service like email, with all the tracking information readily available in the headers, it shouldn't be as near-impossible as it currently is to get something done with that information.)
The first is large networks that tolerate spam, and those are irrelevant because their IP blocks are already on every blacklist in the world.
The second is compromised machines, which are the real problem because they're ephemeral. Spammers can compromise a hundred new machines a week. You can't fix them or block them faster than they compromise new ones. The only solution to that is to improve computer security so they don't get compromised to begin with, which has nothing to do with ISPs.
Removing people from the internet is never the answer, both because it's too broad (should the spammers not be able to go to the government's website to pay their taxes?), and because the nominal current source of the spam isn't actually where the spammer connects to the internet anyway.
The better solution if you can actually find a real life spammer is to impose a fine on them that exceeds the profits of spamming.
Really, if your computer is spamming someone, even if you aren't aware of it, you are harming them, and ignorance shouldn't be protection. Maybe fines and jail are a bit too severe, but rate limiting and possible disconnection are more then fair.
It's a pretty solution to the problem in theory, but when you actually apply it, it doesn't quite work out as well.
They can literally compromise new machines faster than you can identify existing compromised machines. It doesn't do anything to impose anything on the machine owner -- as soon as you identify the machine you can blacklist it, and as soon as you blacklist it they stop using that one.
The problem is in the time it takes you to identify a compromised machine, they can compromise many more additional machines.
(2) Same with spam blacklists, you get de-listed either automatically, if few weeks pass without incident, or faster by manual request.
(3) It should not matter why bad traffic was sent. A much more realistic situation is: "So you work from home and your computer gets trojan which starts to send phishing emails, so now the ISP cuts you off from the Internet. Now what?"
In either case the answer is: prove to humans @ ISP that you are no longer danger to the internet and ask them nicely to unblock you. If you work from home is that critical, have a separate internet source (say 3G modem which you activate with a phone call)
That's exactly what I'd like to see. But that does depend on cooperative ISPs.
How does that help? The ISP can tell you where the compromised machine is, but it will be a different compromised machine in an hour so that's no help. It can't tell you where the actual spammer is because they're behind five proxies in six countries.
Often it's more feasible to apply costs to a higher level of responsbility than the party directly responsible. E.g., sanctioning a country which, say, harbours pirates or highly-polluting industries.
It's the model of collective action and pressure.
There might be other ways of managing traffic, though it would require more pipe smarts.
Generally, I'm in favour of ASNs -- autonomous systems -- taking responsibility as you describe. After all, they do present a single administrative bound of control, and ought take responsibility for their traffic as you describe.
The Routeviews Project (asn.routeviews.org) offers both DNS lookups and downloadable zonefiles for mapping individual IPs to ASNs.
Of late, the problem I'm finding is that far too many services are hosted on Amazon, though firewalling off a wide swath of a few AWS AZs might be an interesting approach.
Netflow data is extremely helpful, although not on its own (it will also identify legitimate customers running their own mail servers). It's a good start, though.
In the real world making large volumes of things appear at one specific location takes effort. The real world is also fairly good about having ways to track down and prosecute those who are unusually heinous about some activity. There are costs, resources, and attachments of presence involved.
In this context the closest example would be the PTSN (Public Telephone Switched Network). That analogy still fails because while the cost is low there is still SOME cost and a lot of documentation about who might be 'making someone's phone blow up'. However from the perspective of the solution it still holds true.
On many hard-phone-lines it is possible to dial a number sequence to block calls from the number which previously called the phone. In this case the provider hired by the victim will deny the connection request before it ever reaches the victim.
Something similar can currently happen as 'blackholing' the victim, but this is victim blaming and allows the attacker to win. What is necessary is to instead push the blocking far enough back the chain that the victim sees no bill and is completely impugned from the actions of bad actors. Logically, this means blocking it at the backbone level or lower, and still charging the sending party for the data.
How is this any different? You're putting the responsibility of being internet police on the ISP's, which have shown their either do not want that responsibility, or will abuse that responsibility.
Not to mention, this would go squarely against the notion of ISP's as "dumb pipes".