This feature is not meant to solve that use-case since if your case is security, you need separate browsers/contexts/proceses anyways.
Separate profiles in firefox implement separate profiles (which may all be independently open side-by-side in different windows).
This exchanges less secure/strong separation with better UX by intermingling.
Firefox is just choosing to support either set of tradeoffs there.
While if you had a "Create a new profile" button that does it in one step and that they would advertise on install much more people would be using it, even if it's just for family members separation.
The majority of people already separate family members with different user accounts on the machine or mostly just don't seem to care.
This seems to be the interesting UX compromise that the new "Container Tabs" is trying to meet "where they live": the users that could use some of the advantages of profiles without the full overhead of using multiple profiles. It will be interesting to see if the compromise is picked up by average users.
(Fwiw, I've used multiple profiles in Firefox off and on for decades but have yet to find a relative I'd recommend that to.)
In the old days, seperate profiles were used to seperate Moms browsing from Dad's browsing. Now, we need different profiles to browse: one for shopping, one for banking, one for work...
Seems to me that coders forget that people evolve. Same with Moxie saying that it is fine for WhatsApp not ticking the 'tell me when the key changed'-box by default because that confuses people. Perhaps it /did/ confuse people, when security was not a known issue. People tend to learn, in my experience. You can't say: "Well, we did an A/B test in 2002 and now we're done for the next millenium."
Which is where we arrive today with Mozilla's work on "container tabs". The code and UX evolve, too.
I'm not sure what your complaint here is, mverwijs? That Mozilla should test Firefox starting up with the ProfileManager again? Like I said, I think "container tabs" might be a good way to do this in a way that mainstream users might pick up and this will be interesting to watch.
(I guess one trick that might be interesting if there was a way to easily "graduate" from I know/love "container tabs" to "oh, the next thing I can try is profiles to do more complicated things", but I think the answer is that profiles will adapt more to work with "container tabs" UX than "container tabs" UX will adapt to the old profiles UX. Given "incognito" tabs in other browsers can be seen as a specialization of a "container tab"/"profile tab", I suspect mixing profile tabs in a single browser window is a UX that is here to stay.)
Even though people don't use multiple-user-accounts too much anymore, it's still usually present in schools and in older family computers.
Conceptually they're very similar.
I'm worried about that because I used to browse with no Noscript/similar, and then I got a infected by a rootkit, which I traced back to a new site I'd visited.
Since I didn't enjoy having to nuke my entire computer environment from orbit, I now have a rather locked-down browser.
I want to take it all the way to eleven and 'jail' a gui process (in this case, the web browser - any web browser). It gets its own filesystem root and its own IP BUT I don't have to pay the penalties of firing up a full blown virtual machine.
This isn't easy to do in the way that, for instance, jailing a daemon is easy to do ...
Further, even if I did have a workable recipe to jail a chrome process (and all of it's children) it would certainly only be for X. Maybe there's some recipe for that in OSX but it would be profoundly different. OSX doesn't even have the 'jail' command (although it does have chroot ...)
Well, yippee, now the application can read all keyboard input from that X11 socket, there goes your "sandbox"...
You really need Wayland to get a practical security benefit for GUI applications from containers.
install NoScript in firefox and allow flash/etc per domain temporarily or permanently.
profiles/context tab is all about tracking. You just happen to successfully abuse one tool to your ends in one case.
For example, when visiting example.com you could allow scripts from example.com but not from gstatic.com, analyticshost.com, or shadylookingdomain.com. Yet at domain.com you could allow gstatic.com scripts and images because it embeds Google Maps.
It's all done in an amazing, quick GUI that provides a visualization of the rules. I wish all firewalls would adopt the UI.
2. visit a site, click the noscript icon
3. allow the domains you trust.
no step 4.
how is this hard?
you only have to click the icon again if some site is not working.
And then you start realizing that blocking all scripts is a pain. You want just this script to work, but not this one. So you start filtering and it takes so much time.
Then often, a site is not working exactly right, and you don't know no-script screw you. Sometime you realize it after 10 minutes looking for something no-script removed. Waste of time. Then you for some time you want it one for a site, then off for the same site. And on. And off. And you have 30 tabs, then you have to jungle with the state of it.
do you have a link to an official chrome help page?
also what chromium do you use? and where did you get it?
sorry for my ignorance.
Example: my main general browsing profile has flash, PDFs and all plugins disabled, absolutely all handlers switched off, all hardware access off, WebGL switched off, no account logins and uBlock Origin set to aggressively block most third-party requests.
My second most used context is for personal sites I login for - with access to third-party cookies (for those sites) and running most third-party requests with standard uBlock rules.
I have yet other contexts (Chrome profiles) where Flash is enabled if I need that, then a separate browser for Java etc.
I'd like to see these security levels built into browsers where the contexts are built around permissions and site trust rather than access to the user store (which is also important)
I don't think it's realistic for most users to do this right now with profiles, as it requires a lot of discipline - it needs to be in the UI.
Browsers have become as sophisticated as operating systems and we're accessing more and more of our personal data using them, yet the model of 'every site has access to everything' be it a site you trust, like Gmail, or a random URL you're clicking on - has somehow survived.
It's the equivalent of the old days where everyone would run their local systems with an admin account for everything. I really think browsers need a rethink along these lines where websites are treated like apps and you can apply a trust group to each.