The key the CA uses to sign OCSP must be held safely because it is important, even if that key can't sign new certificates. I think it belongs in an HSM.
I've read Let's Encrypt spends ~98% of the time of its intermediate signing keys on OCSP, not on new certs. If the OCSP was good only for an hour instead of a week, they would need to perform many more signatures per unit of time which would require more hardware.
And anyway, that's the server case. OP just wanted to check the revocation as a client as far as I can tell, which definitely doesn't require any extra hardware.
My use case involves embedding it, but also being able to verify it (Adobe distributes trusted CA certs through a signed PDF). Never would I need to run my own PKIX infrastructure.
(To be fair, it can be done without certificate chains, but it could also be done with chains.)