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Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mindslight on Friday November 11, 2016 @06:27PM (#12935426)
> And no, Secure Boot itself is not evil. I am entirely comfortable stating this as a fact, and you should be too, unless you think GPG is evil

Actually no, secure boot is evil, and comparing it to GPG is fallacious. The objection isn't to code signatures in general, but the inevitability of baked-in privileged keys inherent in its design. Calling it just an impartial mechanism is flat out naive, and the author even goes on to describe why:

> But it’s worth noting it’s no more bad or wrong than most other major ARM platforms. Apple locks down the bootloader on all iDevices, and most Android devices also ship with locked bootloaders.

While Microsoft exempts x64 hardware because they're concerned about further anti-trust action, the ARM ecosystem actually demonstrates the end result. By providing these companies the capability to lock things down, they inevitably will use it to enforce their inherent authoritarianism onto their customers. The majority of their customers will not care, accepting the age-old excuses for authoritarianism like "security". But capturing a pragmatic majority does not make something right, as apparent to anybody who struggled due to Microsoft's monopoly in its heyday.

A freedom-preserving boot verification specification is definitely possible. In such, there must be no privileged key that cannot be disabled or augmented. Microsoft's x64 requirements do fulfill this, but as a result cause the system to fall to evil maid attacks. However, evil maid attacks can be prevented by incorporating an open-to-all proof-of-work / timed-lockout scheme. The core specification must incorporate this type of non-privileging scheme as a required element, to preempt any contractual requirements like Microsoft's.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by boomboomsubban on Friday November 11, 2016 @06:57PM (#12935607)
The author directly addresses this, and hits it dead on with

>Most of the unhappiness about Secure Boot is not really about Secure Boot the mechanism – whether the people expressing that unhappiness think it is or not – but about specific implementations of Secure Boot in the real world

Maybe the UEFI specification should have implemented a way to distribute keys, though that would have been seen as a way to lock out smaller Linux distros. Maybe the ability to self sign keys should be part of the specs, I'm not sure it isn't, but that adds an additional security risk with fresh hardware.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mindslight on Friday November 11, 2016 @07:08PM (#12935662)
To me, creation and standardization of the capability is evil, even if it takes a further party's decision to cause actual effects. And I see those subsequent decisions as pretty inevitable, given how the market functions.

I would draw an analog to surveillance. I have a problem with surveillance itself, even without the surveillance being used to facilitate any bad effects. Even just building the systems normalizes the paradigm and puts us in a precarious situation.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by boomboomsubban on Friday November 11, 2016 @08:11PM (#12935955)
How is this different than every other instance of signing for verification? Are you opposed to package managers, publicly posted hashes, GPG, and even TLS works with the same method. What about it verifying the operating system makes it more prone to being misused?
Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mindslight on Friday November 11, 2016 @08:40PM (#12936059)
It's not the usage of the mechanism itself, but how the mechanism is used that mandates specific types of policy. It's a matter of where the trust is anchored:

> publicly posted hashes

The method you used to retrieve the hash and ...

> package managers

The method you used to obtain the initial install and ...

> GPG

The web of trust (how you came to associate a given key with an identity) and ...

> TLS

As commonly used, the CAs. Which we're presently having a problem with, because the list is too damn fixed. In the case of TLS applied to other protocols (eg openvpn), then the trust lies in how the keys are distributed. And ...

The "..." is of course the integrity of your machine. Which, unless you always keep it in your sight, is a big if. A large part of this is what boot image verification is aiming to solve. But to do this, one needs to choose somewhere else to anchor the trust. "Secure Boot" specifies that this trust should be anchored in manufacturer-designated entities using public key signatures. On x64 this this would raise antitrust hackles, so Microsoft mandates (for now) that its primary security property be destroyed, leaving the anchor back to possession/integrity of the machine.

What I'm advocating is that this trust anchor could also be something non-trapdoored like a proof of work (or simple waiting time, since we're dealing with trusted hardware). For example, imagine if the specification mandated that all conforming implementations allow changing the keys after waiting in an offline "key provision mode" for a week. The trust root would then be "possession of the hardware for a week" (defeating an evil maid), rather than a fixed set of manufacturer-designated signers.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by ecnahc515 on Friday November 11, 2016 @09:56PM (#12936341)
You could root your trust in a TPM or other hardware security modules. You still have to trust the manufacturer of the HSM chip but that's their entire business model, unlike Microsoft's.
Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mindslight on Thursday November 17, 2016 @03:14PM (#12981047)
You can't really "root" your trust in an HSM. Yes, the HSM is trusted in that if it is broken, then the security of the system is as well. But the "trust root" is what the HSM uses as a specification for what to trust. This still boils down to a public key, physical possession, proof of work, immutable hash, etc.
Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by boomboomsubban on Friday November 11, 2016 @09:50PM (#12936319)
>Secure Boot" specifies that this trust should be anchored in manufacturer-designated entities using public key signatures.

No, it doesn't. It doesn't specify how the keys should be dealt with at all. The implementation currently has manufacturers controlling that aspect, which the author views as flawed.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mindslight on Thursday November 17, 2016 @03:16PM (#12981065)
As long as the trust root consist of public keys and not physical possession of the device, then the manufacturer inherently controls those public keys.
Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by vilhelm_s on Friday November 11, 2016 @08:23PM (#12935991)
The problem is who uses it.

A packet manager is installed by the user of the system. It's protecting against attackers elsewhere on the internet tricking the user into installing malware. The "secure boot" is installed by the manufacturer before selling the computer. It's "protecting" the computer against running the software that the user wants. One of them gives users more control over what programs they run, the other gives them less.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by MertsA on Friday November 11, 2016 @10:49PM (#12936497)
That just isn't true, especially on x86. I can and have loaded my own keys and made secure boot validate against my keys to force it to only run what I wanted it to. The standard actually mandates this so it's pretty disingenuous to state that secure boot on a computer prevents the user from running whatever software they want to.

The user is always free to control secureboot except for on windows phones, you might have a point about it being a bad thing for mobile.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mindslight on Thursday November 17, 2016 @03:17PM (#12981072)
Please read my above comments more carefully. Secure boot on x86 (amd64) is deliberately crippled to avoid anti-trust scrutiny.
Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by MertsA on Friday November 18, 2016 @02:16PM (#12989311)
So they deliberately made it so that the end user has control over their own computer to avoid looking evil! How dastardly of them.

Either way, right now Secure Boot gives me more control over what runs on my computer, that's a fact.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by boomboomsubban on Friday November 11, 2016 @08:38PM (#12936049)
It's protecting users from running unsigned operating systems on their computer, protecting the user from a malicious operating system having full access to their computer. You're arguing against the implementation, which both the author and I agree is flawed, where hardware manufacturers are the only ones regularly controlling keys.
Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by comex on Saturday November 12, 2016 @01:56AM (#12936951)
> Are you opposed to package managers, publicly posted hashes, GPG, and even TLS works with the same method.

A lot of people are opposed to centralized package managers - not the (desktop) Linux ones, since Linux distros aren't monopolish enough to have political power, but their proprietary equivalents, the Windows Store and Mac App Store (also mobile app stores but that's a bit different). Nothing stops you from installing software from outside the store on Macs (in fact the store's pretty dead), but there's no end of complaints about walled gardens and speculation about an iOS-style lockdown being implemented in the future. Ditto on Windows, but Gabe Newell famously called Windows 8 a catastrophe (and was widely cheered for it) and started a big Linux push, just because Microsoft created a store to compete with his own company's centralized store.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by Hello71 on Friday November 11, 2016 @07:53PM (#12935874)
a more precise analogy might be surveillance cameras. while an argument could be made for their immorality, the vast majority of society accepts at this point that while they can be used for bad (mass surveillance), their uses are varied and beneficial enough that we accept their costs as one of society's.
Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mindslight on Friday November 11, 2016 @07:59PM (#12935908)
What benefit [0] does anchoring the trust root to immutable keys [0] have over anchoring the trust root to a non-trapdoored proof of work?

[0] Besides to a manufacturer, being able to retain control of hardware they do not own.

[1] In a scheme anchored in specific keys, the keys must be immutable to prevent against evil maid.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by NeutronBoy on Friday November 11, 2016 @06:39PM (#12935490)
> Actually no, secure boot is evil, and comparing it to GPG is fallacious. The objection isn't to code signatures in general, but the inevitability of baked-in privileged keys inherent in its design.

I mean, both my desktop and laptop have extensive BIOS options for key management - including removing the initial keys and loading your own.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mindslight on Friday November 11, 2016 @06:44PM (#12935530)
Yes, and this is actually encouraged by Microsoft to avoid anti-trust action. As I said, take a look at ARM for what an actual locked-down ecosystem looks like.

Manufacturers inherently want to lock stuff down (for one, they sell more devices when someone wants to try out a new OS), but functionality being called a "standard" should actually be accessible to device purchasers.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by johncolanduoni on Friday November 11, 2016 @09:09PM (#12936175)
Do you think their reaction to not having a standardized version would be "aw shucks, I guess we totally won't go with our own proprietary version then!"
Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mindslight on Thursday November 17, 2016 @03:42PM (#12981325)
If markets were perfectly efficient, then we wouldn't be having this conversation. In reality defaults matter, whether for a manufacturer following a standard or a consumer buying an off the shelf PC.
Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mwfunk on Saturday November 12, 2016 @01:14AM (#12936863)
I can see why you as a consumer might not want hardware that you can't install custom software on. I can see why it might not be the best solution for legitimate non-nefarious engineering problems as well. What I've never related to, however, is the application of a moral dimension to someone selling such a thing.

I'm all in favor of pragmatic arguments for openness and hackability for the sake of good engineering, transparency, generosity, customer expectations, etc. Those are all good things. I've never gotten the sense that the absence of those things are necessarily evil, however. You clearly do, based on your choice of words.

Maybe that's the difference between the (for lack of a better term) BSD philosophy vs. RMS. The BSD (permissive?) philosophy seems rooted in the sense that sharing is a virtue, and not sharing is neutral (not necessarily evil). RMS' philosophy has always felt like, sharing is neutral, and not sharing is evil.

It's a gross generalization, but copyleft vs. permissive reminds me of western vs. eastern religions. The FSF philosophy is defined by a large number of very strict thou shalt nots, defined as carefully and precisely as possible. Permissive licenses like BSD/MIT/Artistic/Apache/etc. are defined by their lack of conditions, which usually just amount to "do whatever you want, but you can't sue the author".

Similarly, one of the ways western vs. eastern religions (from the outside looking in, at least) feel different is the focus on not being evil, by being aware of all of the behavioral laws you shouldn't violate, vs. the focus on trying to attain enlightenment by trying to elevate yourself. Stamping out bad behavior vs. encouraging good behavior. I see the merits of both, but for whatever reason the latter has always been much more relatable for me. I wonder if an individual's preference of copyleft vs. permissive is correlated with whether they think humans are inherently evil, vs. humans being inherently good or neutral. As cynical and pessimistic as I feel about humanity sometimes, deep down I do have a conviction that people are inherently good. It might be naive but I've never been able to totally shake it.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mindslight on Thursday November 17, 2016 @03:36PM (#12981257)
> Maybe that's the difference between the (for lack of a better term) BSD philosophy vs. RMS

I like your characterization of this, but keep in mind you're proceeding to apply a moral dimension here ;)

> I wonder if an individual's preference of copyleft vs. permissive is correlated with whether they think humans are inherently evil, vs. humans being inherently good or neutral. As cynical and pessimistic as I feel about humanity sometimes, deep down I do have a conviction that people are inherently good.

Most people have an internal narrative whereby they are doing good, yet we still get emergent evil behavior. I tend to look at good/evil in terms of describing constructive end results, rather than as intent behind individual actions.

Pragmatically, I'm seeing an awful lot of Free software that has been locked down through one scheme or another, making it non-Free for its end users. Since the intention of at least some of this software was to be Free for end users, I'd say nullifying that goal is moving in an evil direction.

While fewer restrictions is indeed "simpler", such a regime isn't necessarily sufficient to achieve certain goals. When something is existentially defined as "base primitives", complexity will build on top of it to undermine the goals that fostered the axioms. Only by defining universal quantifications on behavior can specific qualities be preserved through time.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by krylon on Saturday November 12, 2016 @06:02AM (#12937409)
> "do whatever you want, but you can't sue the author"

Do what thou wilt shall be the whole of the law, but thou shalt not sue me! ;-) SCNR!

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by Cyph0n on Friday November 11, 2016 @07:42PM (#12935829)
Maybe it's evil in consumer devices, but secure boot is very effective when you don't want people to tamper with your hardware, e.g., preventing counterfeit commercial-grade routers from entering the market. Cisco for example is facing a HUGE problem with counterfeits and is looking at secure boot as a potential solution. I'm not affiliated with Cisco, but I did attend a talk by one of their researchers at Georgia Tech.
Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mindslight on Friday November 11, 2016 @07:50PM (#12935862)
Secure boot solves the opposite problem from counterfeit hardware. If you make the hardware, you can insert whatever signing key you'd like - including Cisco's.

This argument demonstrates why architecture is so insidious. Yes, "Secure Boot" solves real problems. As I said, these problems can be solved through similar functionality that does not anchor the trust root to private keys. But now that Microsoft (et al) have promulgated their naive fully-trusted-publisher implementations, we're left having to dispel the primacy of "keys" in the first place.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by Cyph0n on Friday November 11, 2016 @08:01PM (#12935918)
I don't understand your point. You cannot "insert" Cisco's signing key into your own hardware because 1) the device does not possess it, and 2) only Cisco (ideally) has access to its signing key.

If you instead mean that you can build your own custom hardware that mimics the functionality of Cisco's TPM and uses another key pair for signing boot code, then I give you a pat on the back for the accomplishment.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mindslight on Friday November 11, 2016 @08:05PM (#12935938)
Sorry, by "signing key" I meant "public part of the signing key", which is what is used for verification. Counterfeit hardware can also just ignore signatures on binaries.

Presumably Cisco is really talking about using trusted hardware to preserve secrecy of their binaries (as the march of software eats their custom hardware, too). Which as I said, is possible to do without privileging specific signing keys.