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Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mindslight on Friday November 11, 2016 @07:50PM (#12935862)
Secure boot solves the opposite problem from counterfeit hardware. If you make the hardware, you can insert whatever signing key you'd like - including Cisco's.

This argument demonstrates why architecture is so insidious. Yes, "Secure Boot" solves real problems. As I said, these problems can be solved through similar functionality that does not anchor the trust root to private keys. But now that Microsoft (et al) have promulgated their naive fully-trusted-publisher implementations, we're left having to dispel the primacy of "keys" in the first place.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by Cyph0n on Friday November 11, 2016 @08:01PM (#12935918)
I don't understand your point. You cannot "insert" Cisco's signing key into your own hardware because 1) the device does not possess it, and 2) only Cisco (ideally) has access to its signing key.

If you instead mean that you can build your own custom hardware that mimics the functionality of Cisco's TPM and uses another key pair for signing boot code, then I give you a pat on the back for the accomplishment.

Re:UEFI boot: how does that actually work, then? (2014) by mindslight on Friday November 11, 2016 @08:05PM (#12935938)
Sorry, by "signing key" I meant "public part of the signing key", which is what is used for verification. Counterfeit hardware can also just ignore signatures on binaries.

Presumably Cisco is really talking about using trusted hardware to preserve secrecy of their binaries (as the march of software eats their custom hardware, too). Which as I said, is possible to do without privileging specific signing keys.