Just to be clear, this is equivalent to saying don't bother with SSL for your blog or cat-sharing site (because without pinning someone else can get a cert for your blog/cat-sharing site).
> the ability for sites with low security requirements to opt out of HPKP.
opt out?! It's off by default.
> Remember, the threat model for HPKP isn't fraudsters or trolls; it's state-level adversaries.
Again, by saying HPKP is only for high security sites (now you're saying only for those threatened by state-level adversaries) you are essentially saying SSL is useless for everything less.
> opt out?! It's off by default.
I think tptacek meant that a site owner should be able to explicitly declare that nobody should be able to pin a key, so that nobody can hijack the site in the future.
[1] HTTPS as a ranking signal: https://webmasters.googleblog.com/2014/08/https-as-ranking-s...
In all seriousness, though, there are plenty of blogs where which page a user visits might, for instance, out a gay teen via gateway logs, hint about a private health issue, etc.
And of course, if you do find a defect like this in a web based secure messaging system that relies on HPKP, it'd be great if you'd report it directly to the service and allow them to fix the defect, per responsible disclosure anyway.
On the other hand, it's an internalized risk, which is kind of a beautiful thing: so many of the risks we create through poor security are externalized to end-users --- so much so that you can run a secure messaging site, get owned up, cost thousands of people their privacy, and still keep chugging along as if nothing happened. This particular risk though just wallops the owners of the site.
No disagreement from me here, which was one reason we set out to talk about RansomPKP at BH/DC in the first place :) That said, I do think this can, and should, be reported to site owners. You're not going to see much innovation if people don't take time to futz around with technologies and see what they can do with them. HPKP has plenty of potential to hurt, but as you alluded to, it's generally just your own feet in harm's way.
> This particular risk though just wallops the owners of the site.
Yeah, that's what the (cough) team was going for.
1. The fact that HPKP can create this kind of gigantic foot-gun is a pretty good sign that it actually works. So much of security technology turns out to be cosmetic. The stuff that isn't often is hazardous.
2. Don't HPKP your blog. Don't HPKP your cat-sharing starting. Key pinning is a good thing, but it doesn't need to be universally deployed.
3. In order to hijack your site with HPKP, an attacker needs to take control of your server; they probably need RCE. In other words: if you can't safely HPKP your secure messaging system (cough), you probably aren't yet qualified to be running it: something worse happened to your users than HPKP misconfiguration.
If there's a capability we're missing right now, it's probably the ability for sites with low security requirements to opt out of HPKP. Remember, the threat model for HPKP isn't fraudsters or trolls; it's state-level adversaries.