During Operation Desert Storm there was consideration of using nuclear weapons to demolish very-deeply-set bunkers until it was determined that they weren't built under rock sheets. Although technically excellent thanks to Yugoslav and East German expertise, they had been dug-and-covered rather than drilled-out.
A GBU-28 conventional penetrator can punch through about 20 feet of rock, whereas a shallow-detonation 400kT B61-11 will crack structures several hundred feet deeper through shock effects.
The B61-11 remains in the inventory and has now been supplemented by the penetrating B61-12. I wouldn't rule-out first use of either type in the face of suitably challenging targets.
Under MAD an attack on the nuclear capabilities of a nuclear armed state or any attempt at unilateral disarmament is usually defined as a nuclear attack/first strike. This often interpreted both indirect and indirect means which is why the ABM work the US is been doing over the years in Europe causes such a big mess with the Russians.
The US spends trillion on missile defense, trillions that Russia cannot afford, so Russia is forced to spend it on improving their nuclear delivery capabilities. Russia restarting their investment in their nuclear arms made the US go and say "see Europe, we weren't just fear mongering, they are rearming you need our missile defense" which pushes the Russians even further.
Could a conventional attack on a power plant and the fallout from it be considered a nuclear attack? What about a nuclear powered air craft carrier?
Is an attack on a nuclear armed submarine, would they be considered an attack on their nuclear capabilities? The attacker might not even know what type of submarine it is.
Like everything in life you have to take it into proportion, if Russia or the US sink a single SSBN that's not exactly nuclear disarmament, if one party launches a preemptive non-nuclear strike against the SSBN fleet at large as well as the fixed and mobile ground based platforms that would likely invoke a very harsh response which traditionally under MAD has to be nuclear because if you do not use your nuclear arsenal while you still have it effectively you've lost it for good.
And if the other party knows or suspects you would not use your nuclear arsenal unless you've been attacked with nuclear or non-conventional non-nuclear weapons first even if the conventional attack is against your nuclear capability they would attempt to disarm you without thinking twice.
MAD works well when you under no circumstances would use your nuclear arsenal first in an offensive manner, but have very clear and public guidelines for nuclear response.
I don't believe this is true. You lower the risk that an enemy will misinterpret something as a nuclear attack, but you raise the risk of getting involved in a conventional war that goes nuclear.
Probability of enemy nuclear first strike decreased
Probability of enemy conventional first strike increased
Probability of enemy nuclear escalation ?
I am only addressing policy effects on enemies because the policy may be an intentional lie.
At the same time, keeping the policy ambiguous has a cost, namely that the other side will feel more threatened, raising the risk of an accidental nuclear war. (C.f. Able Archer 83).
Ruling out first use is the option that gives the lowest risk of nuclear war. To give the maximal stability, everyone should adopt as restrictive a policy as possible (the ideal example is China, who rule out both first use and use against non-nuclear countries). Such a policy makes the weapons less "useful", in the sense that they only used to deter a nuclear attack and not for "getting away with" weaker conventional forces, but it is safer.