https://yourmortgageoryourlife.wordpress.com/2009/01/15/the-...
John Paulson wasn't featured in the movie, but fit the bill. But I don't know about those in the book/film.
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regression_toward_the_mean
A couple months later he made everyone who was suing him to get their money millions of dollars.
There are the occasional stories about companies that draw water from a local community for their own purposes, usually for retail, when that community would likely be better off without that relationship. In some cases there are shenigans involved and complaints over the contracts.
How big was the risk that they took ? Surely they knew that the market was insane. But would they have lost a lot of money if the market was insane for a long time ? I saw the movie but I don't remember a lot of the details. I was just trying to follow.
In this case though, my impression is that certain people who actually looked at the data knew it would happen. Not like "I think it will happen", it was "it will happen sometime in this month of this year" kind of thing. Because they knew when those stupid ARMs would kick in with their adjustable rates on top of the obvious number of failed mortgages. The risk wasn't that it would not happen, it was that high level people in finance and government would take steps to keep things moving along which would prevent them from cashing in. There was a great deal of fraud throughout that whole thing propping up the failed system.
Calling it "shorting" suggests the downside was unlimited (as it is when shorting equities). That wasn't the case for this trade.
I'm about half way through the book now, but I don't have it handy at the moment to look up the real numbers though.
The big question is the likelihood of the gamble paying off. For a lotto ticket that's easy to figure. Trying to time the collapse of a bubble? If that was easy bubbles wouldn't exist. Maybe it's implied that 7 years was clearly more than enough time, but that's only clear in hindsight.
Now some of the winners of the collapse seemed to have had a firm grasp of the situation. But how would _you_, as an investor, know that? How do you measure that?
Warren Buffett can write all the books in the world for as long as he likes, but successfully communicating his knowledge, his strategies, his intuition, has proven fairly difficult. It's probably not even possible because Warren Buffett probably doesn't 100% understand his strategy. Likewise for other consistently successful people. If they were capable of communicating it, there'd be many more people like them.
It's like the old adage, if you code to the best of your ability, by definition you're not capable of debugging it.
I agree. The gamble is tricky.
> Now some of the winners of the collapse seemed to have had a firm grasp of the situation. But how would _you_, as an investor, know that? How do you measure that?
Read all the data. Defaults of 4% are expected in the ideal market. Their bet only needed defaults to reach 5% to pay out. Those who started in the game carefully selected from the sub prime mortgages the ones most likely to default after 2 years: the interest only no documentation loans. The real question is why were they able to short the ones more likely to default for the same cost as the ones less likely to default. Those risks were all upfront.
Note that the methods these people used is obvious even with foresight: read the data on the investments, it was all there. The only hard part was the data was 100 pages of fine print. This data was was there and honest, if I gave any investor this data and forced them to read it they would arrive at the same results. Again though, reading the data is a hard job and so most of those who should read it didn't, they just assumed everything was as it was before not noticing the the numbers of no documentation loans was going from few to a majority.
If there was any luck involved it was only that the investors who made money had the idea to one day not read a stock 10-k report and instead read a bond report. There were signs that these guys saw that others didn't, but once they had the idea to look at the data it really is a no brainier.
The only thing I didn't have is enough money to invest (minimum investment is $30 million and that was raised to $100 million quickly), the patience to wait 2 years for it to pay off, the luck to think of the bond market (if I was looking for a great stock in China at the time I might have found something good, but not this great investment in bonds), and the willingness to wade though all these finance documents looking for any that are worth investing on. The last is by far the most important: I find the data boring and so I don't want to analyze it.
Note that the subprime bubble is over. You cannot pull that off today in subprime. Or at least I don't think you can: I haven't looked at the data. Every 10-20 years some opportunity comes up. 3/4ths the battle is the idea to look in the right place, the other 1/4th is to actually understand all the data. There might be something now, there might not. I don't have a crystal ball.
Even if I did, I don't have enough money to ride out the market. As more than one person has said, "the market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent". Several of those who made a ton of money nearly went bankrupt holding onto their bets for just the 2 years they knew it would take for them to pay off - and they were right about the 2 year prediction!
The short answer is.....
You(party A) and party B have a contract.
You want to eliminate the risk that Party B goes bankrupt and can no longer pay you.
You go to party C who will take small payments from you each month/quarter and in return they will pay you if party B goes bankrupt.
Now the important things to note are:
1) The amount you pay party C is based on how you and party C analyze the bankruptcy risk of party B.
2) The amount that party C pays you when the CDS is triggered doesn't necessarily have to have any relation to your original contract with party B. ie party B might be making a one time payment of $1 million to you but nothing stops you from taking out $10 million in CDS protection on party B.
3) The trigger for a CDS may not necessarily be the failure of party B to pay, ikt might be related to their credit rating, ownership changes, or really any term you can negotiate.
4) you can write a CDS when you aren't even involved in the original party A to party B transaction. This is what happened in teh big short where Michael Burry had no involvement in the Mortgage back securities, but had several banks writhe him a CDS that payed out if the original mortgage backed security had a certain percentage of its mortgages fail.
This is where things really went off the rails as companies like AIG wrote the CDS protection for a whole lot more MBS(Mortgage backed securities) than they could possibly ever cover, because their models predicted that there really wasn't any way they could fail in the manner they did. Suddenly a single MBS could have 100x its value in CDS default protection written on it. This leverage is how the 2008 bailout got so big.
What I have just done is to create more exposure than the underlying MBS. The MBS is still only $100 million, but the total outstanding contracts on the pool (MBS + CDS) is now much larger.
What you are talking about is related to offsetting contracts, which is different.
AIG was left holding the bag for most of these. They are one of the few who did not offset like you are saying.
Which just goes to show important the offsets actually are in practice.
I buy a house at a higher-than-usual price for the area, expecting its value to increase because of some development that is occurring nearby—an automotive manufacturer has recently agreed to build a plant about 10 minutes away, creating around 2000 jobs in the area.
However, the deal still needs to be approved by the Feds. If I wait until the approval, the house might cost even more to buy and potentially make my investment unprofitable (or not profitable enough). But if the plant is not approved, my house will likely not gain enough in value and I will have paid too much.
To insure against the Feds not approving the plant, I can by a CDS against that risk. I will lose a small amount of profit in my eventual sale of the house to pay for the CDS, but will also prevent a large (profit) loss in the event that the plant is not approved.
Note: In this example, I do not have any direct interest in the (future) plant, or the auto manufacturer, and I obviously do not control the actions of Federal regulators. Nevertheless, I am exposed to risks (and benefits!) taken by them as a homeowner in the area, and a CDS can be used to insure against those risks at minimal cost.
Admittedly, this is fairly sophisticated for an individual homeowner, but this kind of thing is routine for financial professionals. CDS is a kind of insurance, and it's totally legitimate, even though you are usually not insuring something you have a direct interest in.
Of course, this is just my own personal subjective consideration. Not related to the official definitions of these terms at all.
You can insure against possible negative outcomes of someone else's contracts.
e.g.) Party A and Party B sign a contract that Party B will pay Party A $X by some date. Party A has seperately agreed to pay you $0.9X shortly afterward.
You are a savvy businessperson and realize that Party A will not have $0.9X to pay you if the Party B fails to make their payment.
Party B is on the rocks after a nasty reorg, and you think the probability they fail to pay is significantly greater than 0.
You want to protect your business against this event. To do so, you purchase a Credit Default Swap from Party C for $0.05X that ensures the full $0.9X payment.
While Michael Barry was "speculating" using CDS's, you could also argue that he was "insuring" his firm against a housing crash, which did tank most investment vehicles.
Christian Bale's character's hedge fund wanted to make a big bet that mortgage backed securities would fail.
So he shopped the banks for those that would take that bet.
The ones that agreed to take the bet, he paid them a negotiated monthly amount (basically rent) to keep the bet in effect. If he stopped paying rent, the bet was off.
The banks thought it would never happen and it was free money coming in. Since they thought the risk was 0% it was free money coming in.
... basically, the banks thought he was crazy, but would take his money to keep the bet going.
In the movie, Bale's fund gradually loses money paying "rent" on this bet / option / contract. Things get dicey when conditions that should result in the bet paying off get covered up by the banks and government, and the investors in his fund get pissed they aren't getting any return on their money as promised.
It's like you are arguing that life insurance is a bet.
So the guy in the movie got the bank to write him an insurance policy on the mortgages (really mortgage derivatives) that other people held. When those mortgages failed, the policy paid out.
Let's say you have a little sister. It's been a little while since she screamed about her stuffed frog, but you think she is going to do it again soon. You come to me and say that I can have one of the cookies out of your snack every day if I agree to give you a whole bag of cookies next time your sister screams about the frog.
I wouldn't say that.
According to Bloomberg's interest rate predictor the probability of a hike before the end of the year, ie the definition of soon, is less than 50%.
Even if you go out to the end of 2017 you still only get to 67% probability of a fed hike. And 67% is a far cry from "pretty much everyone".
And even with all of that, the most predicted rate hike is a minuscule 0.25% to 0.5%.
Now, I agree that this is all up for debate and markets can definitely get this wrong, but I stand by my assertion that low rates are here to stay. I really don't think the years of 5-8% rates are coming back any time soon.
But I'm always willing to change my mind if someone can convince me, so back to you.....What makes you think that this era of low rates is going to end?
I don't work in the financial industry, but just as a bystander it seems clear to me that there are a lot of bond traders, like Bill Gross, who have strong interests in rates going up significantly. Just like small-cap, pump-and-dump scammers, they're trying to move markets with their sophist predictions.
I don't think there's much of a dispute that there'll be a regression to some mean. But judging by where people are actually putting their money, the time horizon appears to be much further away than many of the pundits would have us believe.
Also, Japan....
One reason to raise rates is that they were set as low as they were for emergency purposes. The emergency itself is over, so time to start increasing them a little.
Typically lowering interest rates pushes inflation higher. When your economy is sluggish, that's a good thing, but once it picks up steam, it can cause runaway inflation.
The challenge raised is that there is a delay in the response of the economy. Usually interest rates aren't increased dramatically until inflation is already underway. Otherwise, if you raise rates when the economy is only doing "a little" better, you risk squashing the growth.
So what happens is that inflation starts to go up and by the time the Fed has the balls to really raise rates (because it's plainly obvious the economy is doing well), it's too late and you really overshoot your inflation target which causes rates to rise dramatically.
Overall, I would agree that it seems unlikely interest rates will go up in the near future. However, that can change really quickly.
Back in 1979, the interest rate when up 400 basis points from 10% to 14% in less than a year.
Not to mention responsibility for setting up with swindle that is currently used as an excuse by those who want to feed Social Security to the ibankers.
The key to 'seeing it coming' of course, is to first willingly accept the possibility that something might happen, and then actually look into it. The issue was that many people were just not entertaining the possibility at all, and therefore not bothering to look into it. The information was all there for anybody to see, but this was a case of people missing the gorilla in the room because they were too busy paying attention to the game[0].
[0] http://www.livescience.com/6727-invisible-gorilla-test-shows...
Housing prices have to track rent, to some degree, and vice-versa. One of them will change to match the other and wages were not going up...
All the ARMs and layers of CDOs are irrelevant. They multiplied the results but didn't change the underlying issue. Leverage doesn't help you when the fulcrum shifts.
The Adjustable Rate Mortgages offered by for example First Republic Bank are referenced to one-month LIBOR, and it went from 1.11% in May 2004 to 5.11% in May 2006, i.e. 4%-points in 2 years.
On a $1M mortgage, that's $40k per year in swing over two years (typically deductible, so you'd have to factor in your marginal tax rate to get effective cost).
http://www.macrotrends.net/1433/historical-libor-rates-chart
We haven't even been able to get inflation up past 1.7%.
The Fed, setting interest rates way below the actual inflation, is actually taking money from savers and retirees (rather than rewarding them), or forcing them to be reckless with their money by investing in principal-at-risk investments (which they should not at their age)
I'd like to point out as the other poster did that you shouldn't look at housing in development constrained areas (though that's a very interesting sidebar to the whole thing - how much of development constraint exists to prop up housing prices)?
Incidentally "official" inflation in the SF Area is 2.7%, still not 3-7%. (http://www.bls.gov/regions/west/news-release/consumerpricein...)
(Edit since I'm fixing a typo: Look at the treasury yield curve. Has it gotten steeper, which would indicate an expectation of rising rates? No. The 30 year rate has been falling the last few years.)
You mean: it showed the part where the assholes had grabbed control of the government and rigged the market, pointing a gun to the head of the world economy, so that their idiotic bets would pay out by force, thus penalizing everyone who had bet on the facts, right?
The crisis now is that, and this is just my opinion, low rates are here to stay. with the amount of money in the system, people are being priced out of homes and as time goes on the amount by which they are priced out in the big cities is only going to grow.
As an aside...
I'm not a lawyer but I've heard people say My cousin Vinny is the most accurate court room movie ever. In a similar vein, I'd nominate the Big Short as one of the more accurate wall street movies ever made.
It showed the lone wolf who not only saw the coming crash, this was far and away the easiest part, but figured out how to profit form it by getting the banks to write him a CDS.
The two smart kids working out of their garage that were smart enough to succeed despite all their mistakes.
The hedge fund who did an incredible amount of due diligence, going to properties, knocking on doors, talking to people inside the industry to put together the pieces that no one else could.
The wall street sales guy who sold the CDS knowing that it might bankrupt his company but figured he'd make a killing on his commissions long before that happened.
And the most accurate part of the movie was that it showed the anguish that each of these people went through. They'd seen something no one else had, been right about it, had the event happen and even then everyone else continued to plug their ears and pretend nothing was going on while they continued to bleed money each month. It really did a good job of showing that you can be right about everything and still not make money if the rest of the market continues to act insane.
In 2007 there really was a sense that people knew things were way out of hand but everyone was thinking, "If I can just get one or two more years on the bonus cycle, I'll be able to get out". To be fair, this type of thinking probably ins't going away anytime soon.