One example given is if you admit you had written your banking pin down somewhere, the bank can say "well there you go, it's your fault" and stop helping you there.
Another is that some bank fraud departments have worse hours than banks themselves. In a fun little phrase "Friday afternoon fraud" you'll find the explanation that much bank transfer fraud happens on Friday afternoons after fraud departments have gone home for the weekend, giving criminals ample time to retrieve ill-gotten gains before the fraud department comes in Monday morning.
Not a great article, but it ends by calling on banks to be more responsible - so, it's also funny.
That's not even considering that passwords suck anyway.
a four digit PIN is pretty secure when you have centralized authentication (the one bank) and get very very few tries before account lock-out, which is how Debit cards work.
If you had 3000 stolen debit cards, you'd have a shot at guessing a few of them while locking out 2990+ other ones, and I'm kinda thinking the bank might notice you doing that.
have you heard that thieves are guessing PINs someplace in the world? I haven't, and the world is full of dedicated thieves.
and even then, do you know how long that would take versus what you get when you guess one? $500? you might actually make more money panhandling or flipping burgers; of course you've got to trade that off against free meals and healthcare in prison :)
Not so much guessing, but there have been several cases, at least one very well publicised, where thieves have gamed the PIN generator sequences[1].
What often happens, of course, in cases where wide systemic problems exist in banking is it's very effectively hushed. For rather obvious reasons.
[1] http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/10/21/phantoms_and_rogues/...
Today, pretty sure that a solicitor in the same situation would be required by law to report the information to the Serious Organized Crime Agency.
Now, it may be encrypted (not during renewal) or hashed (10000 values, <1s verification) but neither gives any security. (It's safer however than sending a new PIN with the card or in another letter)
The security is based on how hardened the server storing those PINs is.
This however needs a way to send your initial PIN over an insecure channel. To limit the attack surface go to the secure website to receive your PIN (no humans) (either an old card/digital state ID) or go in person and force a new PIN.
> Of course the bank has your PIN (or hashed PIN)
All the previous poster said was that the bank said they sent him a card with the same PIN. The bank can do this by storing PINs or hashed PINs.
As rrobukef noted, storing a PIN hashed offers little additional security as storing them unhashed because of the small number of unique PINS that are possible.
Essentially it's insurance. If someone else crashes into me, and it's their fault, their insurance pays. That's why they're insured.
Secondly, if banks have to cover the mistakes of their other customers, they will need to make that money back somehow, by higher fees for customers like you.
(That's not to say that 50% is the right split, but 0% seems too low.)
She may well have had an automated call to confirm, I get them from my British bank whenever I transfer money to someone new.
Transfers are instant up to £20000, or something like that. This is very useful.
That's a shame, because giving people warnings about common scams when they're transferring large sums of money might reduce the amount of successful scamming.
And this is the whole point of anti-money laundering and fraud detection controls within banks.
There's not enough information in the story to tell if the customer turned controls off, if a transfer of this type was unusual, if the customer confirmed an alert, etc.
Reporting in the story is horrendous, almost to the point it appears it is intentionally exploiting the victim and misinforming the public.
Bear in mind the bank had no reason to expect there was anything wrong with this transaction.
Do you really pay that much in bank fees to warrant covering you making a mistake like that?
There are special accounts that come with travel insurance, a personal advisor etc, which charge a fee.
- Traditional banks are jacking up fees - For people who already don't need it (good credit, savings) those fees can be waived - Credit unions can reject you for credit scores (obvs)
Where do the online banks fall on that spectrum? If you need good credit or stable cash you can't spend, it leaves a whole lot of people out in the cold. Never mind that a lot of the same class of people can't always reliably use the tubes to do their transactions (phone primary Internet device, often shut off, often changing numbers).
The UK ATM phantom withdrawals fiasco rather demonstrated that in the 80s.
It took 15-20 years in court before banks stopped always blaming the customer and stopped claiming their systems (computer and otherwise) were infallible. A position they've generally returned to, despite holes in chip and pin and internet systems.
Are you implying that being a victim of fraud automatically results in the damages being covered by someone other than the victim? If so, you're wrong; yes, some types of transaction do, but not this type of transaction.
In the end, here, she made the transfer - after the fraudsters were able to do multiple things that emulated the behavior of the bank - sending activation codes to her that were genuine, because they were able to get that from the bank.
Using that logic, why would the scammer even need to call the victim?
>> "after the fraudsters were able to do multiple things that emulated the behavior of the bank - sending activation codes to her that were genuine, because they were able to get that from the bank."
According to the victim, who's story does not add up and appears to have been coached by the expert hired by the paper.
Feel free to look into it, but I'm not about to go auditing bank security measures without written permission.
This appears to be a completely baseless accusation.
This is not how an investigation is done, regardless of if you're law enforcement or not.
Further, none of the statements from the victim support the speculation provide by the expert, nor does the experts speculative commentary appear to be based on investigation in how the bank process works, what information the bank provided, what information the bank has on record to recover an account, how the account was deactivated without information from the customer, etc. -----
More importantly, this conflicting statement from the expert:
>> Mr Freedman added, “With these frauds, there always comes a point when the victim 'buys’ the story. From that point, evidence to the contrary is ignored or explained away. [...] In cases such as this, it is not the bank’s system that has been hacked, it is the victim.”
One of the reasons I have a contract with a bank, and that I pay the overhead of having the money sit in a savings account instead of growing at market rate, is that they will protect my money from fraud. If the bank is looking into finding ways not to protect me, I'll look into ways not to keep my money with the bank but instead invest it at market rate. That's all.
What am I missing?
More importantly, the customer referenced in the article basically wired all the funds in her account to a scammer then asked the bank for it back. Sorry, but that is the customer's fault, not the bank's fault.