I see this as "well, yes, obviously, because there's no continuity of identity between the two".
If I die and a perfect copy lives on, the copy is well-suited to preserve my legacy, but it's still not me.
* Are you a specific arrangement of atoms. If so, then you are constantly dying and being reborn.
* Are you a specific arrangement of neurons? If so you die and are reborn every time a memory is created or a brain cell dies.
* Are you an uninterrupted process of consciousness that evolves from one state to another? If so, you die and are reborn every time you fall asleep.
* Are you your soul? Give me a rigorous definition of soul.
Here's a question: What if, instead of a digital copy, an exact physical copy of your body and brain was constructed (down to the subatomic level) and then I woke you both up at once. Is one of you you and the other not? What if I didn't tell you which one was which?
"Identity" is a human abstraction, not a fundamental physical quality. We're examining hypothetical areas where that abstraction leaks.
If I go to bed and my copy goes out to party, I can't say I experienced a party. Friends can say netsharc experienced a party, since the copy will behave 100% like me. If they ask "is that really you?", my copy will believe he is, he has my/his memory, etc... even if he asks himself if he is me, he will say yes. But I still would have missed the party!
Another theory asks you to consider this scenario: every week/month, they replace 1% of your brain with its equivalent, identically functioning electronic part. After 1 week, your brain is 99% biological and 1% electronic. Surely you'll still feel like the normal you. What happens after 100 weeks? And what will happen if the data in that electronic brain is uploaded to the cloud/a robot? Or copied to another e-brain?
Your copy can. Her experience is as real as yours, and from her point of view, everything happened exactly as if her consciousness had been transferred from the original body to the copy. To me she's just as legitimate as you are to use the word "I" : both points of view are two different future versions of what was "you" before the copy was created. I don't privilege any.
> Here's a question: What if, instead of a digital copy, an
> exact physical copy of your body and brain was constructed
> (down to the subatomic level) and then I woke you both up at
> once. Is one of you you and the other not? What if I didn't
> tell you which one was which?
imagine you had something similar to a Star Trek replicator which could clone arbitrary objects down to the subatomic level. if you cloned a unique keepsake, the clone wouldn't _be_ the keepsake, but would be identical to the keepsake. Multiple equivalent instances is a separate concept from identity (and from the point of being awoken, I'd imagine clones would instantly diverge).Identical twins are a real world example of this. At one point, they are the same organism and split into essential two identical entities. They are two unique individuals. At the point of splitting, their identity diverges.
Which is precisely the question your parent commenter asked here. What do you exactly mean by the term 'you' or 'identity'?
A durable process, running on a human brain, that refers to itself in the first person singular and has a nasty habit of assuming it's the whole point of the exercise. (And which does something like checkpointing so that, when it crashes and comes back up, it can restore some state and pretend it's the same process as it was at last checkpoint.)
This process can be impaired or disabled entirely, whether permanently by brain lesions or temporarily by transcranial magnetic stimulation. "I" can be made to believe it is dead, or to cease functioning entirely. Curiously, this does not result in the state commonly described as "unconsciousness" - itself a telling choice of name. Humans in this state remain aware of their environments and exhibit executive and cognitive function. While cognition is often somewhat deranged and maintenance of the body lacking, the possibility is quite real that humans can, and perhaps do, function perfectly well without any self-awareness whatsoever.
I find this idea disquieting, but then of course I would, because it suggests "I" am far from the irreducible essence "I" like to imagine "myself" to be, and indeed this body might function more to both its own benefit and that of society if "I" did not exist at all.
The instinct toward self-preservation appears to inhere in consciousness as well as in the organism entire, so of course it makes sense that consciousnesses should fancy the idea of preserving their existence, even as copies with no ongoing continuity of identity past the point of duplication, at a frankly astonishing resource investment with its concomitant opportunity cost. Nonexistence is after all the ultimate terror for something whose most fundamental verity is the basically egotistical axiom that it exists. But the very fact that this idea of self-preservation at ruinous cost seems other than prima facie absurd to consciousness is in itself perhaps evidence that consciousness is maladaptive.
Yes.
> If so, you die and are reborn every time you fall asleep.
No. That's a silly claim; the brain doesn't literally shut off during sleep, and I am not composed of only conscious processes.
Fine then, cryosleep. Total biologically-inert suspended animation. Would that change your answer?
Assume that over time, you go to the neuroscientist, and they replace a very small part of your brain with artificial technology of some sort. But they do so in a way that you can not tell the difference.
You repeatedly do this, until there is no natural substances left in your brain.
If you like, you can continue with all other body parts.
Is it not you?
The problem is that some people privilege one branch of the "Y", not that one is continuous and not the other. They both are.
In short 'you' can live only at one place at a time. At any given point in time only one 'you' can be active.
Or its also possible that the 'you' we describe here is just everybody else, and just gets a different shape because of individual experiences. More : http://www.galactanet.com/oneoff/theegg_mod.html
No: one is right, and the other believes he is right but is wrong.
The complication is that each thinks of himself as "I". But that only matters if you think of "I" as something separate, magical, not bound by the ordinary constraints that make it possible to distinguish things from other things. In other words: mind/body duality. Which, if true, negates the whole concept of brain uploading, both because you can't capture a soul merely by copying the meat it animates, and because you don't need to.
You're talking about something you can't tell whether it is the case or not. It's an illusion.
A copy is not just a copy. It's as good as it gets.
That's some strange definition of originality. By this definition you are not yourself any moment because the atoms in your body are being replaced wholesale one-for-one every few months/years.
This is really: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus
If they took part of the ship and used it to build a new ship, and rebuilt the parts they took with new wood, they wouldn't call the new ship the same ship as the old ship.
So it's perfectly fine to identify as the continuous stream of awareness, and are perfectly justified to state that a break in that continuity would constitute creation of a new person rather than a continuation of the current one.
They don't call it anything. That is precisely the paradox here.
The pace is irrelevant because after time duration X, for whatever value of X the ship is not the same as before, or is it? We don't know!
To me a copy that "believes it is the same person as you were" is as good as it gets. How would you tell the difference?
Every morning when I wake up I am who I am because I believe so. If someone had scanned me last night while I was asleep and created a digital copy of my mind in a virtual, identical world, I wouldn't know. And if I was told someone was there and was capable of doing it, I could not even be sure he did not (seems like the same assertion, but it's not quite).
People who say "it's just a copy" are suggesting there is a difference between two things they have absolutely no way to tell apart, not even in a thought experiment.
They're chasing ghosts.