News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by danellis on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @05:26PM (#12132652)
If you copy your brain digitally and let that run while you yourself die, there's no benefit to yourself. You still die. You don't get to experience longevity. What would live on is a copy of yourself that believes itself to be the same person as you were. Your yourself would have no continuity of thought.

What would be needed is some way of merging yourself with a digital replica of your brain while you're still alive. I can't even begin to imagine what that would be like.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by grondilu on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @06:03PM (#12132882)
One version dies, the other lives on. The problem is that many people think only the one that dies deserved to be called "you".

To me a copy that "believes it is the same person as you were" is as good as it gets. How would you tell the difference?

Every morning when I wake up I am who I am because I believe so. If someone had scanned me last night while I was asleep and created a digital copy of my mind in a virtual, identical world, I wouldn't know. And if I was told someone was there and was capable of doing it, I could not even be sure he did not (seems like the same assertion, but it's not quite).

People who say "it's just a copy" are suggesting there is a difference between two things they have absolutely no way to tell apart, not even in a thought experiment.

They're chasing ghosts.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by zyxley on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @06:19PM (#12132969)
> The problem is that many people think only the one that dies deserved to be called "you".

I see this as "well, yes, obviously, because there's no continuity of identity between the two".

If I die and a perfect copy lives on, the copy is well-suited to preserve my legacy, but it's still not me.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by sparky_z on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @07:45PM (#12133464)
What do you think "you" are exactly?

* Are you a specific arrangement of atoms. If so, then you are constantly dying and being reborn.

* Are you a specific arrangement of neurons? If so you die and are reborn every time a memory is created or a brain cell dies.

* Are you an uninterrupted process of consciousness that evolves from one state to another? If so, you die and are reborn every time you fall asleep.

* Are you your soul? Give me a rigorous definition of soul.

Here's a question: What if, instead of a digital copy, an exact physical copy of your body and brain was constructed (down to the subatomic level) and then I woke you both up at once. Is one of you you and the other not? What if I didn't tell you which one was which?

"Identity" is a human abstraction, not a fundamental physical quality. We're examining hypothetical areas where that abstraction leaks.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by netsharc on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @08:32PM (#12133678)
I am currently replying to you. My eyes see my phone screen, my hands feel the phone vibrating, my brain is thinking about the words to type. If I go into a red box that makes a copy of me and puts him in a blue box, and we are awakened, my brain would say "According to my sense of sight, I'm in a red box.". There is another person in a blue box, which objectively is me as well, but subjectively..?

If I go to bed and my copy goes out to party, I can't say I experienced a party. Friends can say netsharc experienced a party, since the copy will behave 100% like me. If they ask "is that really you?", my copy will believe he is, he has my/his memory, etc... even if he asks himself if he is me, he will say yes. But I still would have missed the party!

Another theory asks you to consider this scenario: every week/month, they replace 1% of your brain with its equivalent, identically functioning electronic part. After 1 week, your brain is 99% biological and 1% electronic. Surely you'll still feel like the normal you. What happens after 100 weeks? And what will happen if the data in that electronic brain is uploaded to the cloud/a robot? Or copied to another e-brain?

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by grondilu on Thursday July 21, 2016 @03:53AM (#12135406)
> If I go to bed and my copy goes out to party, I can't say I experienced a party.

Your copy can. Her experience is as real as yours, and from her point of view, everything happened exactly as if her consciousness had been transferred from the original body to the copy. To me she's just as legitimate as you are to use the word "I" : both points of view are two different future versions of what was "you" before the copy was created. I don't privilege any.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by jonhohle on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @08:09PM (#12133579)

    > Here's a question: What if, instead of a digital copy, an 
    > exact physical copy of your body and brain was constructed 
    > (down to the subatomic level) and then I woke you both up at 
    > once. Is one of you you and the other not? What if I didn't 
    > tell you which one was which?
imagine you had something similar to a Star Trek replicator which could clone arbitrary objects down to the subatomic level. if you cloned a unique keepsake, the clone wouldn't _be_ the keepsake, but would be identical to the keepsake. Multiple equivalent instances is a separate concept from identity (and from the point of being awoken, I'd imagine clones would instantly diverge).

Identical twins are a real world example of this. At one point, they are the same organism and split into essential two identical entities. They are two unique individuals. At the point of splitting, their identity diverges.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by kamaal on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @08:35PM (#12133692)
>>Multiple equivalent instances is a separate concept from identity

Which is precisely the question your parent commenter asked here. What do you exactly mean by the term 'you' or 'identity'?

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by throwanem on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @09:17PM (#12133862)
> What do you think "you" are exactly?

A durable process, running on a human brain, that refers to itself in the first person singular and has a nasty habit of assuming it's the whole point of the exercise. (And which does something like checkpointing so that, when it crashes and comes back up, it can restore some state and pretend it's the same process as it was at last checkpoint.)

This process can be impaired or disabled entirely, whether permanently by brain lesions or temporarily by transcranial magnetic stimulation. "I" can be made to believe it is dead, or to cease functioning entirely. Curiously, this does not result in the state commonly described as "unconsciousness" - itself a telling choice of name. Humans in this state remain aware of their environments and exhibit executive and cognitive function. While cognition is often somewhat deranged and maintenance of the body lacking, the possibility is quite real that humans can, and perhaps do, function perfectly well without any self-awareness whatsoever.

I find this idea disquieting, but then of course I would, because it suggests "I" am far from the irreducible essence "I" like to imagine "myself" to be, and indeed this body might function more to both its own benefit and that of society if "I" did not exist at all.

The instinct toward self-preservation appears to inhere in consciousness as well as in the organism entire, so of course it makes sense that consciousnesses should fancy the idea of preserving their existence, even as copies with no ongoing continuity of identity past the point of duplication, at a frankly astonishing resource investment with its concomitant opportunity cost. Nonexistence is after all the ultimate terror for something whose most fundamental verity is the basically egotistical axiom that it exists. But the very fact that this idea of self-preservation at ruinous cost seems other than prima facie absurd to consciousness is in itself perhaps evidence that consciousness is maladaptive.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by zyxley on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @08:43PM (#12133727)
> Are you an uninterrupted process of consciousness that evolves from one state to another?

Yes.

> If so, you die and are reborn every time you fall asleep.

No. That's a silly claim; the brain doesn't literally shut off during sleep, and I am not composed of only conscious processes.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by sparky_z on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @09:13PM (#12133842)
"No. That's a silly claim; the brain doesn't literally shut off during sleep"

Fine then, cryosleep. Total biologically-inert suspended animation. Would that change your answer?

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by jhbadger on Thursday July 21, 2016 @06:58AM (#12136014)
The concept of "biologically-inert suspended animation" isn't really feasible though. I'm not just talking about how we can't do it with modern technology; I'm saying non-lethal freezing doesn't yield a "paused" biologically inert sample. Freezing living cells (which we do now), doesn't do that -- it just greatly slows down biological processes (which is also why frozen food doesn't last forever).
Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by mbfg on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @11:24PM (#12134421)
Let's play another game, then.

Assume that over time, you go to the neuroscientist, and they replace a very small part of your brain with artificial technology of some sort. But they do so in a way that you can not tell the difference.

You repeatedly do this, until there is no natural substances left in your brain.

If you like, you can continue with all other body parts.

Is it not you?

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by grondilu on Thursday July 21, 2016 @04:31AM (#12135538)
Honestly I don't get this focus on continuity. The letter "Y" is a continuous shape, unlike say the letter "i".

The problem is that some people privilege one branch of the "Y", not that one is continuous and not the other. They both are.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by grondilu on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @06:37PM (#12133077)
If a copy of you is made, there are now two persons. Both of them think they are "you" and both of them are right since being you is, by definition, a subjective experience which as such depends on a point of view.
Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by kamaal on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @07:16PM (#12133283)
My guess is there will some limitation which won't allow this. There will be be cut-paste and not copy-paste function here.

In short 'you' can live only at one place at a time. At any given point in time only one 'you' can be active.

Or its also possible that the 'you' we describe here is just everybody else, and just gets a different shape because of individual experiences. More : http://www.galactanet.com/oneoff/theegg_mod.html

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by zyxley on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @07:29PM (#12133371)
> Both of them think they are "you" and both of them are right

No: one is right, and the other believes he is right but is wrong.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by throwanem on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @09:50PM (#12134032)
No. From my perspective, I'm the real one and the other is the copy; from the copy's perspective, the opposite situation obtains. Both are both right and wrong.

The complication is that each thinks of himself as "I". But that only matters if you think of "I" as something separate, magical, not bound by the ordinary constraints that make it possible to distinguish things from other things. In other words: mind/body duality. Which, if true, negates the whole concept of brain uploading, both because you can't capture a soul merely by copying the meat it animates, and because you don't need to.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by grondilu on Thursday July 21, 2016 @03:43AM (#12135366)
Again: how would you tell the difference? Say the process could have happened the night before, and the person who was supposed to do it decided to do it or not on a coin toss. There is no way for the person who wakes up to know whether or not the process happened. That means that one time out of two the person would be "you" in your sense, whatever that means, and yet could not even tell for sure.

You're talking about something you can't tell whether it is the case or not. It's an illusion.

A copy is not just a copy. It's as good as it gets.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by kamaal on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @07:14PM (#12133267)
>>The problem is that many people think only the one that dies deserved to be called "you".

That's some strange definition of originality. By this definition you are not yourself any moment because the atoms in your body are being replaced wholesale one-for-one every few months/years.

This is really: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ship_of_Theseus

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by vinceguidry on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @07:36PM (#12133411)
The Ship can only be called the same ship because it was used continuously during one journey. If the sailors had disembarked, broke the ship down on land, and reused some of the parts to rebuild it, nobody would be calling it the same ship. Only because it happened slowly do they call it the same ship.

If they took part of the ship and used it to build a new ship, and rebuilt the parts they took with new wood, they wouldn't call the new ship the same ship as the old ship.

So it's perfectly fine to identify as the continuous stream of awareness, and are perfectly justified to state that a break in that continuity would constitute creation of a new person rather than a continuation of the current one.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by kamaal on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @08:29PM (#12133661)
>>Only because it happened slowly do they call it the same ship.

They don't call it anything. That is precisely the paradox here.

The pace is irrelevant because after time duration X, for whatever value of X the ship is not the same as before, or is it? We don't know!

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by bumbledraven on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @06:49PM (#12133126)
If you copy your brain digitally and let that run while you yourself die, there's no benefit to yourself. You still die.

No, you don't die. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information-theoretic_death explains why.

> You don't get to experience longevity. What would live on is a copy of yourself that believes itself to be the same person as you were. Your yourself would have no continuity of thought.

Do you have continuity of thought before and after you undergo general anesthesia?

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by CountSessine on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @07:02PM (#12133201)
Do you have continuity of thought before and after you undergo general anesthesia?

Perhaps, perhaps not - but it does remove any uncertainty, doesn't it? At least with general anesthesia we can say that there is continuity of process and form; with 'digital afterlife', we don't even have that - you've been extinguished and your electronic doppleganger lives happily ever after. 'Digital afterlife' resolves any epistemelogical ambiguity but not in a happy way - it isn't you - we know that.

Seems like a pretty lousy afterlife. I'd rather just be remembered.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by zyxley on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @07:29PM (#12133366)
If the options were "die" and "die, but with an immortal digital copy", I think I'd still take the second. It wouldn't help me much personally, but zyxley-2 would be able to carry my legacy forward and (hopefully) lessen the burden of grief on others.
Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by civilian on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @08:15PM (#12133600)
Might it increase the burden of grief on others? I had a hard time seeing my friend's facebook page after he died. Months and years later, it still hurts that FB suggest that I invite him to events. But I don't want to unfriend him, and I'm not sure I want to mess with Facebooks "memorial page" policy.
Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by wocram on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @07:41PM (#12133440)
You could ask the same question with 'sleep' instead of 'general anesthesia'. Every day we are born again (or die, if you want to look at it that way).
Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by aetherson on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @08:23PM (#12133641)
Well, maybe. People who believe they have all this completely figured out (in either direction) are deluding themselves.
Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by kndyry on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @06:56PM (#12133159)
For those who might like to see this concept explored more fully, I highly recommend Greg Egan's Permutation City [0].

To quote: “Paul struggled to imagine the outside world on his own terms, but it was almost impossible. Not only was he scattered across the globe, but widely separated machines were simultaneously computing different moments of his subjective time frame. Was the distance from Tokyo to New York now the length of his corpus callosum? Had the world shrunk to the size of his skull – and vanished from time altogether, except for the fifty computers which contributed at any one time to what he called ‘the present’?”

[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Permutation_City

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by sparky_z on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @05:42PM (#12132756)
It would be as simple anesthetizing you, copying/uploading your brain, then euthanizing the body and "awakening" yourself in the computer. From your point of view, it would be no more discontinuous than waking up after surgery.
Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by vkou on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @05:53PM (#12132820)
From the point of view of your body, it would be someone giving you anesthetic, and then killing you. The copy is in no way privileged.

What about this experiment:

1. We copy your brain into a computer.

2. We turn the computer on.

3. We shoot you.

Would you expect that when you get shot, you'll 'wake up' inside the computer? If so, by what mechanism? If not, how does this case differ from the first?

Alternatively, what if we copy your consciousness into another sleeping organic brain, and wake up both of you. What makes the new copy, but not the old one 'you'?

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by sparky_z on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @07:27PM (#12133361)
"From the point of view of your body, it would be someone giving you anesthetic, and then killing you."

The point of view of your body ends when it is anesthetized. That's the definition of "anesthetize" that I'm using here - a reversible cessation of consciousness. (Of course, if you woke it up rather than kill it, it would continue from that point on, and then there would be two of you, one in the computer, one out, whose experiences would then diverge.)

"The copy is in no way privileged."

Never said it was. Just the opposite, in fact. Neither the copy nor the body is privileged.

"What about this experiment: ... Would you expect that when you get shot, you'll 'wake up' inside the computer? If so, by what mechanism? If not, how does this case differ from the first?"

No, the other copy of you would wake up in the computer at step 2, not step 3. At that point there would be two entities with identical histories that then begin to diverge (like a git branch). Anything experienced by the physical body after step 1 would be erased after step 3, so there would be a death of a sort involved in this scenario. The anesthetization/euthanasia steps don't do anything special or magical, they just prevent that divergence from occurring.

"Alternatively, what if we copy your consciousness into another sleeping organic brain, and wake up both of you. What makes the new copy, but not the old one 'you'?"

Nothing. You're both you (though one of you is probably more confused than the other.) We're running up against the limits of the English language, which is why correct statements can sound so absurd. We just don't have the right pronouns for this type of consciousness split.

Let me put it to you this way: Suppose that there was some sort of sufficiently-indistinguishable-from-magic device that actually "transferred" you (whatever that means to you) from an organic brain to a digital afterlife. How would the experience of that be distinguishable to you from the anesthetization/euthanasia scenario I originally described? What would be the difference, as far as the digital consciousness is concerned?

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by kamaal on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @07:11PM (#12133247)
This is how I look at it. You go to sleep, some one take a snapshot of your brain 'as-is' and installs it into the electronic hardware.

The hardware already runs a Matrix like software. You just wake up as you wake generally after sleep. You won't even notice you've lost your biological body. Or anything strange at all! Except for whatever you've asked for. If you've asked a private disney land for yourself, you might wake up there!

At this time, your biological body is irrelevant.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by vkou on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @08:34PM (#12133691)
It's irrelevant to the digital 'you'. It's incredibly relevant to current 'you'!
Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by grondilu on Friday July 22, 2016 @06:14AM (#12142699)
> What makes the new copy, but not the old one 'you'?

There are now two versions of "you". That's the point of making a copy.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by derekp7 on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @05:34PM (#12132696)
But doesn't that happen anyway through normal repairs that happen at the subcellular level? I have a feeling that I'm not really the same person as from years ago, I'm just some bloke who thinks he is.
Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by logfromblammo on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @06:02PM (#12132871)
After watching The Prestige, I decided that I would probably not enjoy dying while an exact copy of me completely replaced me in every aspect of my former life. Then I remembered that Star Trek: the Next Generation episode in which a transporter malfunction created an exact duplicate of Cmdr. Riker, and decided I would not enjoy living while an exact copy of me took over my life, either. Between those two, I totally understand how Dr. McCoy would prefer shuttlecraft to the transporter.

After seeing Primer, I decided I probably wouldn't have to worry about an exact duplicate of myself ever kidnapping or murdering me, or vice versa. But then I played Bioshock Infinite and realized that it would no longer be an exact duplicate after the divergence point, so maybe I would have to worry, and think about what might cause me to turn against me.

So I'm definitely having wires plugged into my head before I die, rather than resorting to having my brain exhaustively scanned so that some emulated copy can go around pretending to be me after I'm dead (or while I'm alive). And if I ever do the latter, I'm definitely adding a feature similar to "reinitialize MAC address" when cloning a VM. If I'm ever going to wake up in a featureless white room surrounded by me, I want every last one of me to know our own serial numbers, so we can all follow my personality differentiation plan.

But no matter what, I'm definitely giving my original meat-body at least a 10% discount on whatever it is that I do, for as long as it can manage to last. I'm remembering that now, so I'd better uphold my end of the deal, if I happen to end up being a digital copy later.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by nickparker on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @07:10PM (#12133246)
I like the idea of merging with a replica then slowly turning off the original.

In reality there's simply no way around it, we're going to die someday because these chunks of meat degrade. If you accept that which I readily admit I haven't yet myself, your question should be "how would I like to die?"

I would very much like to be connected to a computer and have little chunks of my brain slowly swapped out for processes on the computer so that I can experience almost all of the transition along with the new me. I'll still hit the edge and fade to black at some point in the process, but the process seems at-least-as-good as every other choice in death.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by AgentME on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @07:37PM (#12133417)
Plagiarizing an older comment of mine...

>The things that scare me about death are the ideas that my specific goals would be left unpursued, that my responsibilities would be abandoned, my friends would lose my friendship, and that my memories and experiences would lose their significance upon the world.

None of those are necessarily an issue if an accurate digital copy of me continues on. Worrying about continuity sounds to me like worrying about whether you're the same person after sleeping.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by dTal on Thursday July 21, 2016 @01:45PM (#12138610)
The analogy with sleep is even more apt when you consider that we forget our dreams, mostly. Not only is there no "continuity of thought", there are actual forks in consciousness analogous to brain uploading. Not caring if a digital copy of yourself lives on because "you" are still dead is like not caring if you're still alive when you wake up because either way, your "dream self" dies.
Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by kamaal on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @07:07PM (#12133233)
No you don't. That 'yourself' you talk about is currently being carried around in a very fragile biological container. It will just be transferred to a fail-safe electronic container.

Whatever will run 'yourself' will also have a way of having that run in a electronic simulation of your body in whatever wonderland you wish to live in digitally.

Re:What a Digital Afterlife Might Be Like by zyxley on Wednesday July 20, 2016 @07:24PM (#12133342)
A copy of 'yourself' would be transferred. The original 'yourself' is still there.