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Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by pmlnr on Thursday May 19, 2016 @09:23AM (#11729956)
So... what we need is a browser, which says it supports these things but blocks or provides false data on request and looks as ordinary as possible for "regular" browser fingerprinting.

Is anyone aware of the existence of one?

Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by madeofpalk on Thursday May 19, 2016 @10:02AM (#11730233)
The problem here is Canvas fingerprinting - that's what I found the most surprising and interesting.

How do you prevent that, apart from working on 'fixing' browsers to create pixel-perfect renders across different browsers/platforms/configurations. Would that even be possible?

Edit:

> Tor Browser notifies the user for canvas read attempts and provides the option to return blank image data to prevent fingerprinting.

Huh. I guess that's one attempt, but being able to read pixel data out of a canvas is completely reasonable.

Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by Freak_NL on Thursday May 19, 2016 @10:24AM (#11730409)
> […] but being able to read pixel data out of a canvas is completely reasonable.

Not for every website. Most websites don't need canvas at all. One option would be to ask users to activate canvas support for a website that does need it, so users can judge for themselves if the request is legitimate. This is how the geo-location API works after all.

I am not convinced that this will work very well though.

Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by madeofpalk on Thursday May 19, 2016 @10:48AM (#11730637)
Seems like just another vector to fingerprint that browser by :)
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by Freak_NL on Thursday May 19, 2016 @12:57PM (#11731611)
It is! But a disabled setting has a much lower entropy in terms of identifying bits than the hash generated with an active canvas.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by ratbeard on Thursday May 19, 2016 @10:43AM (#11730584)
It seems possible to add heuristics like 'the canvas element has requested more than X fonts within about Y seconds' and then treat that as a tracking script and do something like prompt the user, or return the default font from then on.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by robmcm on Thursday May 19, 2016 @10:27AM (#11730446)
Disable canvas rendering from 3rd part domains? Prompt to enable canvas support for each domain?
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by kibwen on Thursday May 19, 2016 @11:57AM (#11731153)

  > apart from working on 'fixing' browsers to create pixel-
  > perfect renders
Alternatively, maybe have browsers slightly randomize canvas drawing results in ways that are essentially undetectable to a human eye.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by gruez on Friday May 20, 2016 @05:39AM (#11736572)
Or use a pure software rendering implementation so it's always the same across platforms.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by boomlinde on Thursday May 19, 2016 @10:40AM (#11730561)
If the "fingerprint" really is a checksum/crypto hash, an ever so slight random element in rendering output could help. Of course, together with other techniques, it might just identify your somewhat obfuscating browser.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by TazeTSchnitzel on Thursday May 19, 2016 @09:24AM (#11729969)
I think Tor Browser tries to do this for some types of fingerprinting.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by englehardt on Thursday May 19, 2016 @09:44AM (#11730091)
The Tor Browser folks have done some excellent work to reduce the fingerprintability of the browser. See "Specific Fingerprinting Defenses in the Tor Browser" here: https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#finge....

For Firefox and Chrome there are canvas fingerprint blockers [1] and [2]. These are heuristic based, so you'll likely see a bit of false positives. uBlock Origin includes an option to prevent the leakage of local IP addresses [3].

[1] https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/canvasblocker...

[2]https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/canvasfingerprintb...

[3]https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock/wiki/Prevent-WebRTC-from-l...

Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by pmlnr on Thursday May 19, 2016 @09:35AM (#11730044)
The Tor Browser does not send misinformation; it just blocks. A solution would probably be a browser where every version, on every platform reports the exact same things, always the same way.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by neerdowell on Thursday May 19, 2016 @11:22AM (#11730895)
> The Tor Browser does not send misinformation; it just blocks.

No, it doesn't. TB sends all kinds of misinformation, from the user agent string (always reports itself as being its base version of Firefox running on 32-bit Windows 7) to rounding javascript timing functions to reduce the precision.

> A solution would probably be a browser where every version, on every platform reports the exact same things, always the same way.

That's exactly what Tor Browser does.

Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by pmlnr on Friday May 20, 2016 @12:37PM (#11739268)
The last time I tried it this wasn't always the case; however, my information could easily be outdated, and in that case, I'm sorry.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by TazeTSchnitzel on Thursday May 19, 2016 @11:01AM (#11730752)
That's not true, Tor Browser does sometimes lie, see what englehardt linked.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by dredmorbius on Thursday May 19, 2016 @02:22PM (#11732399)
Or a browser which randomly permutes canvas values.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by brador on Thursday May 19, 2016 @09:32AM (#11730031)
The things you block and don't block could also be used to help form a fingerprint.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by cm3 on Thursday May 19, 2016 @11:42AM (#11731040)
I wish there was a Tor Browser without Tor but just things like fingerprinting fixes.