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Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by madeofpalk on Thursday May 19, 2016 @10:02AM (#11730233)
The problem here is Canvas fingerprinting - that's what I found the most surprising and interesting.

How do you prevent that, apart from working on 'fixing' browsers to create pixel-perfect renders across different browsers/platforms/configurations. Would that even be possible?

Edit:

> Tor Browser notifies the user for canvas read attempts and provides the option to return blank image data to prevent fingerprinting.

Huh. I guess that's one attempt, but being able to read pixel data out of a canvas is completely reasonable.

Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by Freak_NL on Thursday May 19, 2016 @10:24AM (#11730409)
> […] but being able to read pixel data out of a canvas is completely reasonable.

Not for every website. Most websites don't need canvas at all. One option would be to ask users to activate canvas support for a website that does need it, so users can judge for themselves if the request is legitimate. This is how the geo-location API works after all.

I am not convinced that this will work very well though.

Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by madeofpalk on Thursday May 19, 2016 @10:48AM (#11730637)
Seems like just another vector to fingerprint that browser by :)
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by Freak_NL on Thursday May 19, 2016 @12:57PM (#11731611)
It is! But a disabled setting has a much lower entropy in terms of identifying bits than the hash generated with an active canvas.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by ratbeard on Thursday May 19, 2016 @10:43AM (#11730584)
It seems possible to add heuristics like 'the canvas element has requested more than X fonts within about Y seconds' and then treat that as a tracking script and do something like prompt the user, or return the default font from then on.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by robmcm on Thursday May 19, 2016 @10:27AM (#11730446)
Disable canvas rendering from 3rd part domains? Prompt to enable canvas support for each domain?
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by kibwen on Thursday May 19, 2016 @11:57AM (#11731153)

  > apart from working on 'fixing' browsers to create pixel-
  > perfect renders
Alternatively, maybe have browsers slightly randomize canvas drawing results in ways that are essentially undetectable to a human eye.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by gruez on Friday May 20, 2016 @05:39AM (#11736572)
Or use a pure software rendering implementation so it's always the same across platforms.
Re:Online tracking: A 1-million-site measurement and analysis by boomlinde on Thursday May 19, 2016 @10:40AM (#11730561)
If the "fingerprint" really is a checksum/crypto hash, an ever so slight random element in rendering output could help. Of course, together with other techniques, it might just identify your somewhat obfuscating browser.