http://web.onetel.net.uk/~hibou/ai-course/lenat.txt
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automated_Mathematician
Of course, you could argue that multiplication was implicitly there in the rules and facts it was programmed with.
Basically everything that isn't a science.
I think the OP's point was until humans invent true strong AI there is a qualitative difference between human and computer intelligence.
And even if/when a true "thinking machine" is invented, the intelligence which was able to create said machine would be nothing to sneeze at!
AM, the discovery learning program developed by Doug Lenat, discovered multiplication, beginning with a few basic facts about set theory, and using about 200 heuristics.
Would a program flag the discovery of multiplication as important because it understood that this discovery is interesting or would it flag its discovery as important because the programmer encoded it to have this understanding? That is can a program discover something new and alert to humans to this discovery and for it to be truly interesting and new?
From EURISKO: A program that learns new heuristics and domain concepts: "Almost immediately, symmetry heuristics produced a very powerful yet simple device, one which simultaneously computes NAND and OR, using only two small metal regions, two n-doped regions, two p-doped regions, and one intrinsic channel region."
I'm not sure how to convey the idea in my head to English in such a way to make it clear why I think BACON doesn't qualify as discovering new ideas. I'll try though.
From the write up, by Langely, of the program he wrote the program to detect regularity in data and if it found such regularity it would "leap out" to the program so that "it could take appropriate" action. As I understand the program it picks up on any sort of regularity. The program doesn't understand which forms of regularity are important and which are not. The programming system and data it looks at are geared to finding regularity that are meaningful. If the data inputs are vastly widened then it seems to me it would find regularity that wouldn't be considered meaningful. I can imagine the program fixating on a regularity pattern that is meaningless. I hope what I'm writing makes sense.
The work he did is interesting and I wonder what advances have been made since then.
Let me ask this question. Would a program that looks for regularity discover that in finite probability spaces probability zero events never occur? I think this is something a computer could discover. Could it end up concluding that probability zero events can occur if one looks at uncountable probability measure spaces? It seems to mean that programs will never be able to think or discover things at a meta level. Would a program be able to discover Godel's incompleteness theorem? Of course I don't know the answer. I just suspect that the answer is no. However, humans took thousands of years to discover these things. So perhaps an AI that ran for that long could as well.
Thank you for pointing me to the BACON program. I'd never heard of it before.
In any case, let me flip the question around at you: how did Goedel come up with his incompleteness theorem? Surely it didn't just magically appear in his head? Most likely he followed some standard procedures of mathematical practice: manipulate symbols according to learned rules, look for 'surprising' features in the result, build a sample demonstration of a surprising result, and use intuition regarding its outcome to drive further thinking, etc.
You can look at any intellectual behavior and find processes underlying it, unless you want to argue that we don't live in a materialist universe and people have souls. Unless you go down that route, there must be mechanisms to thought, and indeed applied psychology agrees. So if there are mechanism to thought, why can't those run on a computer instead of biology?
Yes. Abstract knowledge is learnable, and the brain is an inference machine.
I'm pretty sure computers, as we currently understand them, are entirely capable of inventing multiplication, provided sufficient source code and input. Evolution is unique in being able to "create" a thing that can formalize multiplication? Human intelligence is not magic.
What's amazing isn't that Deep Blue could beat Kasparov, given the depth of analysis it could do. What's amazing is that Kasparov could beat Deep Blue, despite not being able to analyze thousands of possible moves a second in his head.
My probably oversimplified understanding is that the neural network training on a massive amount of games develops something like intuition. It can't explain why a certain move it makes is the best, but only that it is the most likely to win.
This seems similar to advanced human play.
Are Kalman filters machine intelligence? It sort of doesn't matter, really.
I guess the straightforward counterargument here is that if multiplication only exists in humans' minds how can computers do it, but computers have absolutely zero autonomy -- a computer can't compute a product, or even "discover" multiplication without receiving explicit intructions from a human to do so -- in my mind a computer can't be deemed the one discovering multiplication if that discovery relied 100% on the design of human beings.
PS: I have even seen 'rediscovery' used for the same situations when a math idea was lost etc.
calculation itself really only exists with purpose. it's a thing to do if you have a reason to do it. of course, these kinds of things too seem more "discovered" than "invented", but it's a very different kind of discovery than "the earth revolves around the sun". the earth revolves around the son, as far as we can figure these days, whether any agent/subjectivity/etc intends anything or not.
however, no full-blooded calculation will ever occur anywhere in the universe unless someone needs to figure something out. in other words, intention is implicit with calculation (and truth-functional representation, by the by). as such, you could make a case for an argument for "inventing" strategies in mathematics. and of course, a lot depends on your ontology of mathematics in the first place. if you're a wittgensteinian about numbers, and you think any of what i said above is at all compelling, you may be inclined to believe that mathematics itself is an invention. you may admit of some more nuanced way that entities like "number" still exist without mathematics as a tool, you may not, but you'd probably see all mathematics existing as active work, not pre-existing objective Truth.
of course, most people think of math as an always-there abstract object (roughly). maybe they're right. even so, there must be some force in the "i use it as a tool" and "it just revolves around the sun no matter what anyone--god or man or beast--wants" distinction.
Inventing multiplication is something no computer (as we currently understand them) would ever be able to do.
For another analogy, moving ten tons of rock a thousand feet is something humans can do, and have done for millennia. It's very slow and difficult. A bulldozer can do the same thing in minutes. But a bulldozer would never, ever have a reason to move ten tons of rock.