Re:Why IRC over SSL is pointless (2009)
by Sidnicious on Wednesday April 13, 2016 @05:06PM
(#11492217)
I use IRC over SSL to avoid leaking my credentials (e.g. NickServ password). You can certainly assume that at least one person in a given channel is logging or on a compromised connection, but that's not the whole point.
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Re:Why IRC over SSL is pointless (2009)
by WallWextra on Wednesday April 13, 2016 @06:24PM
(#11492830)
Yeah, it's not like twitter runs https to keep your tweets secret.
Absolutely, IRC over SSL is not pointless
I wonder if some networks provide auth over TLS on the web:
- User visits IRC network website
- User logs in
- User is given a single-use token or command containing a token
- User sends token to NickServ
- User is authenticated
Not invincible to MITM, but at least it avoids leaking credentials in plaintext.
Many users run a permanent IRC connection with a bouncer or just run irssi/weechat in screen/tmux on a server. There may be occasional reconnects for them due to netsplits etc. Usually they also configure their bouncer/client to automatically authenticate when they connect.
Using any sort of authentication involving a separate channel would stop them from authenticating without user interaction. Unless of course it could also be automated. However, I doubt it is easy enough to create a standard for this.
If your only goal is to stop leaking the password in cleartext, that could also be achieved using established standards such as SASL or a challenge-response mechanism such as CRAM-MD5.
Not that CRAM-MD5 is particularly secure.
I really love Quakenet's nickserv alternative/bot, Q. It offers a way to do this with a /msg Q CHALLENGE command (https://www.quakenet.org/development/challengeauth ). ZNC (a popular irc bouncer) has a nifty authentication module that utilizes it, too (http://wiki.znc.in/QAuth/Module ).
Re:Why IRC over SSL is pointless (2009)
by crystalclaw on Wednesday April 13, 2016 @05:32PM
(#11492405)
That, and if you can do it, it's cool.