News for hackers. Stuff that matters.
Re:Why IRC over SSL is pointless (2009) by 15155 on Wednesday April 13, 2016 @05:36PM (#11492432)
I wonder if some networks provide auth over TLS on the web:

- User visits IRC network website

- User logs in

- User is given a single-use token or command containing a token

- User sends token to NickServ

- User is authenticated

Not invincible to MITM, but at least it avoids leaking credentials in plaintext.

Re:Why IRC over SSL is pointless (2009) by raimue on Wednesday April 13, 2016 @07:54PM (#11493323)
Many users run a permanent IRC connection with a bouncer or just run irssi/weechat in screen/tmux on a server. There may be occasional reconnects for them due to netsplits etc. Usually they also configure their bouncer/client to automatically authenticate when they connect.

Using any sort of authentication involving a separate channel would stop them from authenticating without user interaction. Unless of course it could also be automated. However, I doubt it is easy enough to create a standard for this.

If your only goal is to stop leaking the password in cleartext, that could also be achieved using established standards such as SASL or a challenge-response mechanism such as CRAM-MD5.

Re:Why IRC over SSL is pointless (2009) by ibotty on Thursday April 14, 2016 @01:46AM (#11494540)
Not that CRAM-MD5 is particularly secure.
Re:Why IRC over SSL is pointless (2009) by kylek on Wednesday April 13, 2016 @10:18PM (#11493898)
I really love Quakenet's nickserv alternative/bot, Q. It offers a way to do this with a /msg Q CHALLENGE command (https://www.quakenet.org/development/challengeauth ). ZNC (a popular irc bouncer) has a nifty authentication module that utilizes it, too (http://wiki.znc.in/QAuth/Module ).