> smooth
Meaning no abrupt kinks (for a notion of abrupt which is probably not physically achievable, so don't worry to much about it) or jumps/discontinuities in the path of a particle, applying to both space and time
> timelike
roughly speaking, traveling slower than the speed of light
> future-directed
meaning going into the direction of causality
> with intersections
meeting itself again.
In other words, it's a path through space/time on which you experience your own local time as always running forward, but yet somehow you end up in the past.
Perhaps an analogy is in order. Suppose we were in 1+1 dimensions, with the time dimension being compact (closing in on itself). Visualize this as an infinite cylinder (the infinite axis being space). Now, let's impose a finite speed of light (for simplicity 1cm/s) and define the direction of causality, say counter-clockwise. Then, this spacetime has CTC, because we can find a path that, is smooth, future-directed (going around counter-clockwise) and timelike (going at angles < 45 degrees compared to the spacial axis). The simplest such would be a simple circle around the cylinder, but any curve that matches the above rules and intersects itself would be considered a CTC.
Now, as a final note " a crude way of bringing out the fact that the application of familiar local laws of relativistic physics to a spacetime background which contains CTCs typically requires that consistency constraints on initial data must be met in order for a local solution of the laws to be extendable to a global solution." means the following. When we usually do physics, we know what happens locally (e.g. ball get shot at wall, bounces back), so we simply have to figure out (or decide if we're doing a thought experiment) where everything is in the universe at some particular time, apply our rules everywhere and we essentially know what's happening everywhere, anywhere. This doesn't work any more in the presence of CTC. "Consistency conditions" basically just means that you have to chose your placement of objects in such a way that they don't cause any paradoxes (there's a more technical notion here, but that's essentially what's meant).
Does consistency mean that some change must cause many other changes in order to make everything end up in perfect alignment?
So we may well live in a universe in which time travel is possible, and time travellers from alternate future timelines may even have arrived in it in the past (or may arrive in it in the future from more distant futures), but the 'final value' of the timeline would exclude the events that lead to their actual invention.
Now, with this setup, let's imagine living in this 1D world, just sitting still, reading off numbers. Our life would be cyclic with period cm/((2pi r)s).
Then, the (t,x,y,z) coordinates could all be parametric functions of observer_id and subjective_observer_time. If you follow a CTC and meet your younger self, then convince your younger self to not follow the CTC, you may simply be reassigning your younger self to a new observer_id, rather than creating a paradox that destroys the database integrity.
As long as all observers obey the rules of causality locally, your elder time-twin will never remember meeting their own elder time-twin, and your younger time-twin will never remember not meeting their own elder time-twin. The CTC has no way of knowing whether anyone ever followed it or not, because it isn't an observer. So if you ever meet yourself, you're no longer meeting yourself, because the person you meet is from that moment no longer you. If you do anything at all within the past half of your own light cone that interrupts causality, you are just creating a new observer.
So the photograph doesn't change itself, like in Back to the Future. Marty can't erase himself, but he could erase all references to himself from the historical record, except for whatever he carried through the CTC. He could then take a DNA test that proves him without a doubt to be the child of two people who cannot recall ever even touching one another. Even if he mostly restores causality, upon reversing through another CTC to a time before he entered the first CTC, there will be a different third child of his parents living with them when he gets back--someone who might not ever traverse a CTC.
If that's how it works, time travelers could do no worse than completely erase themselves from all historical records and the memories of every living person. They would be considered people who never previously existed, who spontaneously appeared, complete with memories of future events that might never come to pass. In that case, almost anything even remotely plausible could come out of either end of a CTC.
While it's dismissive of "paradox mongers" it doesn't deal with any of the very real issues created by very obvious potential paradoxes - not least of which is that physics fundamentals like conservations of energy stop working.
(If you can move anything or anyone back in time you have a universe with two of something instead of one of something - which means you can get something for nothing, over and over. If you can't do this because the CTC forms a time loop, you don't have a paradox, but you don't have much else of interest either.)
A contrived spacetime with a CTC is fundamentally useless as a practical time machine. And the whole point of a Thornian wormhole is that it offers practical engineering benefits - such as being able to travel in a way that effectively bypasses the speed of light limit.
In any case - relativistic speculations are metaphysical, because it's a fair bet that spacetime isn't a smooth continuous manifold at all. It just looks like one from a distance under normal conditions - normal meaning anything outside a singularity or black hole.
No one has much of a clue what spacetime is made of, and that makes it hard to say much about its properties under stress. For all anyone knows CTCs may be impossible because if you stress spacetime enough it may not act like a manifold any more, and a clean description of what happens at that point needs new completely physics.
I'm from the other side of philosophy, the continental-philosophy area, which mostly talks about ethics and art and identity, so for me to talk about CTCs I would be talking out my arse.
Philosophy is, generally, very hard to read. So much so that reading Descartes' Meditations (considered an alright starting text) in my first philosophy course took me about 30 mins per page.
But, it seems to me that this is one of those areas where analytic philosophy seems to be breaching an area where actual experiments can be proposed and tested in a physical sense, and it leads me to think, what's the point? The logical (philosophical) consistency of light being a particle and a wave doesn't come in to the reality of it. Was it worth ancient Greeks wondering whether all matter was made of water?
I think similar questions can be asked about continental philosophy. I certainly read a lot of it as a lot of wank that could be answered by real-world surveys (what makes people happy? I dunno, how about we ask them). But I think questions like, how do we determine whether happiness is the thing we should optimize for in life, are still relevant, and philosophical, and more basic! I think the underlying basic question of CTCs might be, does something being a logical paradox actually prevent it from happening?
And, if CTCs are a physical phenomena that we can't observe (maybe, yet), what's the point of a philosopher wondering about them? Shouldn't that be a theoretical physicists job?
It's a simple read.
If you'd have said Kant, I might have agreed with you.
Most of the time complicated philosophy (or science) are hard to read because either they're talking crap (Hegel) or they can't write for shit (Kant). Descartes was pretty good in my book (although obviously the 2nd half complete failed).
I think Heidegger is actually deliberately obscure!
I think it would be fair to flip that around: if your philosophy doesn't result in testable predictions, then what's the point?
Similarly I feel like there are philosophy-of-politics discussions that can (through political change) become the realm of actual politicians, sociologists, etc.
I apologize, but I'd like to flip your question about again. I think philosophy is the realm of the untestable, so in my mind you're asking "what's the point of philosophy". I think philosophy is the place to explore the full ramifications and implications of untestable ideas. I'd also ask what's the point of your question? If its not testable, I think its a philosophical question, QED. If it does result in a testable prediction, what's the test?
Note that something can be political or sociological and still be testable. You can have a utilitarian moral philosophy where you assign utilities and sum them up, then do surveys or focus groups to to measure agreement with the results.
But if a theory literally has no testable predictions? That is the definition of useless.
It's provable that things that are true are not demonstrable(see Gödel's incompleteness theorem). It follows that things that are not testable are true, and for some d definition of truth, it means they have an effect in the word. So we absolutely can, in a meaningful way, wonder about the posible consequences of something that while not testable may be true. Just because something it solely potentially meaningful does not mean it it's entirely meaningless.
As a scientific person, I'm only concerned with truth that derives directly from observation. "True but not demonstrable" is an oxymoron.
"Truth from observation is the only truth that matters."
Where can I also observe this?
Let me stop you right there. You can have a utilitarian moral philosophy, sure. But the question of if you ought to have such a philosophy is a philosophical one. To get to the point of having tests of optimized utility there is an underlying question that has no tests, which is are tests for utility really the best tests to run?
Its either turtles all the way down: tests testing the effectiveness of tests, or, you get into philosophy.
Have fun with your waste of a mind.
I think its a fair question if everyone should work on the problem, but I'm wondering if that same question could be applied to every problem?
I don't think many would agree that a mathematics degree should be made entirely of pottery electives. I'm not saying we shouldn't encourage mathematicians to dabble in pottery, I'm just saying pottery is not mathematics, like CTCs don't seem to me to be philosophy.
"Untestable philosophies are pointless" is an untestable philosophy, and therefore pointless by its own standards. This is a well-known problem with logical positivism, which is roughly the position you are advocating.
If you're interested in the topic, I suggest reading Time and Space by Barry Dainton[1]. It was suggested reading for our class and primed me for anything from time time travel to general relativity.
[1] http://www.amazon.com/Time-Space-Barry-Francis-Dainton/dp/07...
In mathematical physics, a closed timelike curve (CTC) is a world line of a material particle in spacetime that is "closed", returning to its starting point.
So it's essentially like in the movie Groundhog Day I guess.
Although, intuitively it seems that a time machine for information should be easier to build than one for matter, because information is so much easier to teleport.
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2397535/
Alternatively, read the short story "All you Zombies" by Robert A. Heinlein, on which most of the movie is based:
http://emilkirkegaard.dk/en/wp-content/uploads/Robert-A.-Hei...
CTC means time-travel with structure. If you can send say a book back in time then our ideas of paradox ect have meaning.
Next suppose you could time travel, but only far from your own past that light can't reach you. Further you block other time travelers so you can't send messages back to your self. Again not interesting, you need to be able to influence your past (self intersect) to be fun otherwise it's just like moving quickly.
PS: Quantum entanglement is also less interesting than you might think for similar reasons.
This literature equates the possibility of time travel with the existence of closed timelike curves (CTCs) or worldlines for material particles that are smooth, future-directed timelike curves with self-intersections.[3] Since time machines designate devices which bring about the existence of CTCs and thus enable time travel, the paradoxes of time travel are irrelevant for attempted “no-go” results for time machines because these results concern what happens before the emergence of CTCs.[4] This, in our opinion, is fortunate since the paradoxes of time travel are nothing more than a crude way of bringing out the fact that the application of familiar local laws of relativistic physics to a spacetime background which contains CTCs typically requires that consistency constraints on initial data must be met in order for a local solution of the laws to be extendable to a global solution.
I'm not sure what the intended audience for this is; combination philosopher physicists? Given that it's on SEP it seems unreasonable to assume that CTCs need no other explanation than that they are smooth, future-directed timelike curves with intersections. I would love it if someone would ELI5 this concept, though.