https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renaissance_Technologies#Medal...
> "From 2001 through 2013, the fund’s worst year was a 21 percent gain, after subtracting fees. Medallion reaped a 98.2 percent gain in 2008, the year the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index lost 38.5 percent."
Holy cow, that thing is kinda crazy. There has to be a catch, right? (Or everybody would be doing it.) Or is their algorithm genuinely so clever that nobody else has ever figured it out?
If you take some of the smartest people in the world and have them intensely focus on making money via trading you get Renaissance. Everyone can't do it because there are only so many some of the smartest people in the world intensely interested in making money via trading to go around.
http://www.thetalkingmachines.com/blog/2016/2/26/ai-safety-a...
No, everyone can't do it because they are in an 0-sum game. If everyone was as good as Renaissance, then Renaissance wouldn't make money. But if all the smart people are in Renaissance, then Renaissance makes money.
Like with a lot of math, you learn more about the basics once you are on to the advanced stuff.
And the more advanced stuff you learn, the more you see limitations. Very advanced can very well mean brittle.
I reckon what they have is a well distilled common sense setup where they are able to reject models that appear to be profitable but aren't. I'm guessing they are also able to procedurally generate models that capture the same few common sense notions in new ways as the market evolves. In contrast I reckon most quant shops are still at a stage where the models are hand coded, causing some severe issues that I'll touch upon.
There's also an organisational aspect about them. They're all very very good at math. Any BS is likely to get rumbled. Intellectual carelessness will probably be detected and the boss is a proper math guy too. Here's a subtle thing that many people I've worked with would not detect: to calculate my fund's information ratio, I take the monthly returns, average them, and divide by the standard deviation. I have to multiply by root 12 because there's 12 months in a year. Standard procedure.
Having worked with some mere mortals I can tell you a lot of time is spent convincing oneself of the intellectual merits of something one's found despite evidence to the contrary. I think the fact that quants tend to be low quality coders with high internal prestige causes a lot of funds to do less well than they should. A lot of effort goes into hand tuning models rather than trying a bunch of different ones. You get things like unconscious "optimizations" that are very hard to spot, and hard to argue against because the person doing the talking is of high rank.
When I worked in a long-only equities asset manager, there even were frank discussions with the client services team about how to organize materials for when a client was preparing to fire us. We actually assisted them with the process of firing us, told them what to say, etc., so they would save face with the rest of the board or whomever they answered to.
Basically, it's a lot like hiring a manager in international soccer. Very few of them actually bring results, but big, wealthy clubs will still go through a huge media circus, pay a huge wage, and do all sorts of things, to hire status-signalling managers. Then, later, when it's not working out, it is that manager's job to be sacked gracefully, once again creating media buzz that makes the club look good in front of the fan base for "doing the right thing" and firing the manager.
In asset management it's the same. "Hire-us-now-to-look-fancy" and "Fire-us-later-to-look-like-you're-dedicated-to-ideals-and-righting-the-wrongs" are both very much the major parts of the services they provide, and both are things that these companies go on at length about when courting a new prospective client.
Heck, some client service employees even get part of their bonuses based on how happy the clients are with the assistance they receive in drafting press releases, putting together slide decks, or writing white papers about firing that manager.
Sharpe = E[Return - Financing] / StDev[Return - Financing]
You could only have infinitely high Sharpe if the standard deviation of your returns, minus your financing cost, is zero. That means that Return = Financing + Constant. Now, some people are able to achieve that because they have abnormally low financing (e.g. they are an insurance firm with a large float, or a bank which is able to loan money at a higher rate than it borrows) but for most investors, the only way to make that equation hold is if the constant is zero or negative.Going long 3 month T-bills does not give an infinitely high Sharpe Ratio (if it did, everyone who could would lever it up and do it in large size).
As an experiment, I simulated holding a long position in the nearest to expire Eurodollar futures contract (which give a return similar to the 3 month T-bill return) and rolling every 3 months, which gives a Sharpe of 0.92, an annualized return of 0.65% and annualized standard deviation of 0.7%.
Similarly, a long position in nearest-month two year treasury futures contracts gives a Sharpe of 0.94 with 1.59% annual return and 1.67% volatility.
These are attractive Sharpes (better than equities!) but they are certainly not infinite, and to juice up the returns to anything approaching an equity investment you need to be looking at 5-10x leverage.
Your point about selling puts, with skewness/kurtosis risk which is not priced by Sharpe, is a fair one, and probably the most common method of gaming returns, but it is a side-issue.
If your investment has a high Sharpe ratio (especially in respect to other investments), by definition you have the highest returns at the lowest risk (variance) possible, so you can't have a "infinitely high" Sharpe ratio with "crap" returns.
Investments with low returns and low risks are penalized by Sharpe just as much as investments with high returns and high risks for the same reason: the expected value is simply less in both cases than for the ones with highest returns at lowest risk.
If you're a hedge/venture fund you will want to optimize for a high Sharpe portfolio eventually, you simply can't survive if you keep losing money for investors in the long run (low expected value).
also, you can mitigate black swan events by not being too leveraged up, and going further out on expirations. and finally, just keep rolling.
And you can't just going further out on expirations without posting proper margins. That is, you can, but not legally.
a) Not scalable (e.g. most intraday market-making or scalping strategies)
b) Only available at a very high fee (think north of 3/30)
c) Not available at any price (e.g. Renaissance Medallion, which has been closed to outside investors for 20+ years)
So I'm not sure that it's particularly relevant to this discussion, which is about fee pressure on traditional, long-only asset managers.