Hobbyists would have to run their system in an insecure mode, though and it's a whole new story if a certificate-based system would actually work in a market as volatile as USB peripherals.
So, I don't think there's one magic bullet but it's far too silent on that front!
A reasonable criticism is that this would likely result in several examples of customers being screwed when SmallCorp Inc. loses control of their signing key, it's used to sign malware, and the revocation takes out all of the legitimate users but that's arguably an unavoidable cost of the industry maturing.
You likely also would need a way to update the key or flash new firmware and, possibly, a way for the updater to detect whether the device it is talking to has been tampered with. That's expensive for low-margin products such as USB sticks and mice.
Also, the average user would not know how to update the firmware, and even if he knew, might not be able to because his keyboard and mouse are fried.
A lot of people seem to think that this was a device with hacked or other illegitimate firmware. It was not. It was a device called a WebKey, which is available from a number of vendors and is intended to do exactly what the author is describing.
Is it a dumb product? Yes. But this is not any kind of firmware exploit. It's just a keyboard that doesn't look like a keyboard, some as a YubiKey or one of several other sorts of non-keyboard devices that present as keyboards.
Signatures become relevant due to what will inevitably happen if those safeguards become common: right now someone is selling devices like this to marketing people. If Windows 11 breaks that with a permission check, the companies have the choice of either dropping that product or changing it to pretend to be a Microsoft USB keyboard on the whitelist. If it's some fly-by-night marketing services company in China, there's limited recurse to go after them unless you have a lever such as being able to revoke signing keys.
“We just need to educate users about passwords” “We just need to educate users about how to verify SSL certificates” “We just need to educate users about how to install only software from trusted publishers” etc.
This reaction is understandable but it's a non-starter if we ever want to make meaningful progress on security. The underlying problem here is that everything local was assumed to be trustworthy and that's not true and, thanks to reflashable firmware, not even something which can be assumed to stay true even if it happens to be the case when you start.
Fixing problems like this will require changes – X-Istence mentioned OS prompting for new device classes, which would particularly effective on devices like laptops (i.e. the default for most users) which could require confirmation on the built-in hardware any time an external device tries to duplicate built-in functionality (keyboard, mouse, network, etc.), but we probably need more ambitious measures like adding a public-key exchange for certain device classes or a hardware switch which controls whether a port is allowed to control the computer or provide block storage but not both.
The one thing which is certain is that the .gov / .mil security people who seal ports with epoxy aren't looking as paranoid these days…