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Re:Elsevier, that just freaked me out by acdha on Friday September 11, 2015 @11:30AM (#10204222)
> No, it will not be fixed. There is no vulnerability. … The only solution is to educate people to not plug hardware they don't trust into their machines.

“We just need to educate users about passwords” “We just need to educate users about how to verify SSL certificates” “We just need to educate users about how to install only software from trusted publishers” etc.

This reaction is understandable but it's a non-starter if we ever want to make meaningful progress on security. The underlying problem here is that everything local was assumed to be trustworthy and that's not true and, thanks to reflashable firmware, not even something which can be assumed to stay true even if it happens to be the case when you start.

Fixing problems like this will require changes – X-Istence mentioned OS prompting for new device classes, which would particularly effective on devices like laptops (i.e. the default for most users) which could require confirmation on the built-in hardware any time an external device tries to duplicate built-in functionality (keyboard, mouse, network, etc.), but we probably need more ambitious measures like adding a public-key exchange for certain device classes or a hardware switch which controls whether a port is allowed to control the computer or provide block storage but not both.

The one thing which is certain is that the .gov / .mil security people who seal ports with epoxy aren't looking as paranoid these days…

Re:Elsevier, that just freaked me out by brillenfux on Friday September 11, 2015 @11:36AM (#10204258)
I think signed firmware would probably solve most problems.

Hobbyists would have to run their system in an insecure mode, though and it's a whole new story if a certificate-based system would actually work in a market as volatile as USB peripherals.

So, I don't think there's one magic bullet but it's far too silent on that front!

Re:Elsevier, that just freaked me out by brohee on Friday September 11, 2015 @12:49PM (#10204719)
I don't see how signed firmware solves that issue at all. It could solve BadUSB, where one corrupts a legitimate device with poisoned firmware, but it doesn't address at all a user tricked into plugging a bad device...
Re:Elsevier, that just freaked me out by acdha on Friday September 11, 2015 @12:59PM (#10204785)
It adds an accountability mechanism for spoofing device types: the vendor's signing certificate can be revoked if they release devices which pretend to be from a different vendor or which misrepresent the device class.

A reasonable criticism is that this would likely result in several examples of customers being screwed when SmallCorp Inc. loses control of their signing key, it's used to sign malware, and the revocation takes out all of the legitimate users but that's arguably an unavoidable cost of the industry maturing.

Re:Elsevier, that just freaked me out by Someone on Friday September 11, 2015 @01:22PM (#10204934)
Also, if "large device manufacturer" ever losse its key, zillions of devices could become unusable overnight (scenario: Evie signs malware with the leaked key, Apple and Microsoft revoke it in a high-priority update; all devices signed with the key become unusable; the world is 'not happy')

You likely also would need a way to update the key or flash new firmware and, possibly, a way for the updater to detect whether the device it is talking to has been tampered with. That's expensive for low-margin products such as USB sticks and mice.

Also, the average user would not know how to update the firmware, and even if he knew, might not be able to because his keyboard and mouse are fried.

Re:Elsevier, that just freaked me out by jcrawfordor on Saturday September 12, 2015 @04:53AM (#10207630)
In this case there was no faking of the vendor installed. HID is a generic input class, you're not making any promise about who manufactured a device when you make it represent as HID.

A lot of people seem to think that this was a device with hacked or other illegitimate firmware. It was not. It was a device called a WebKey, which is available from a number of vendors and is intended to do exactly what the author is describing.

Is it a dumb product? Yes. But this is not any kind of firmware exploit. It's just a keyboard that doesn't look like a keyboard, some as a YubiKey or one of several other sorts of non-keyboard devices that present as keyboards.

Re:Elsevier, that just freaked me out by acdha on Saturday September 12, 2015 @10:04AM (#10208100)
Right, note that up-thread (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=10204222) I was agreeing with the general call for OS safeguards such as confirming that a particular device be allowed to act as a particular class.

Signatures become relevant due to what will inevitably happen if those safeguards become common: right now someone is selling devices like this to marketing people. If Windows 11 breaks that with a permission check, the companies have the choice of either dropping that product or changing it to pretend to be a Microsoft USB keyboard on the whitelist. If it's some fly-by-night marketing services company in China, there's limited recurse to go after them unless you have a lever such as being able to revoke signing keys.

Re:Elsevier, that just freaked me out by acdha on Friday September 11, 2015 @12:40PM (#10204676)
Agreed – signed firmware is going to be the way forward for a lot of things but it's going to open up other problems like fighting to retain the user's ability to decide whose signatures to trust and I'm sure we'll see a bunch of horrible key management by vendors.