All of our reasoning about the world is inference based, hence probabilistic. That's in the nature of science, religion and everything else in between. There is strong evidence for the existence of God, but it's inherently inductive. Not to mention various conceputal complication which follow from in different kind of reasoning about God (in whatever view).
Proofs can be valid even if their premises (assumptions) are not true. Mathematics does not rest on the truth of it's assumptions, but on the validity of it's proofs.
If you can create an interesting system of proofs off of an a different sent of premises, then that can also be very useful (see non-euclidean geometry). If you can't create an interesting system, then those premises have no value.
I also disagree that all our reasoning about the world is probabilistic. By saying that all reasoning is inductive, you make you earlier assertion that "I'd say that when it comes to existence, it is always inductive." empty because you are claiming that all reasoning is inductive.
That's not how it works. Numbers are their properties. You are free to use any properties you want when you commit mathematics, and you will get different sorts of behavior from your numbers depending on your choices. There is nothing to doubt about a set of properties being itself. No 'establishment' tells you how numbers work. Use whatever you like.
I'm reminded of Duhem's rather humorous "German Science" where he characterizes German mathematics as being disproportionately oriented toward rigorously deducing nonsense from arbitrary axioms as opposed to the French tendency to rely on intuition to arrive at sensible axioms but neglecting systematic rigor afterwards.
Math is a tool to help you make logical conclusions.
I would posit the opposite: As the capability of our language to describe characteristics of god expands, it becomes harder to disprove god because the number of possible descriptions increases.
If I believe John knocked the book off the table, but then I learn it was the wind, that doesn't change the characteristics of John.
Most certainly, guilty as charged.
> It does if you believed that John knocked the book off the table to punish you.
I don't see how my belief about the reason John took that action makes whether John took that action (or not) a defining characteristic of John.
He suggests you get around this by providing an argument about unicorns and then goes on to talk about how premises don't always need to be justified, but the problem is proving the nonexistence of a thing -- and he provides a formal deductive example of a proof of nonexistence of a thing by instead substituting as a premise nonexistence of another thing (evidence). Sure, if you can prove no evidence for unicorns exists and that for unicorns to exist they MUST have left evidence you can prove they don't exist. But the first one is a reduction to the original problem -- in order to show something doesn't exist (be it unicorns or evidence for unicorns) you need complete and total knowledge about existence, which no human up to this point has had enough hubris to claim, and the second requires a level of certainty that doesn't really exist.
If we're discussing the existence of a thing that doesn't leave evidence (god) especially it's very fair to say you can't prove a negative and I think his attack on this tactic is a non-starter.
There has never been even the tiniest bit of evidence against the existence of god. There is certainly evidence against a god with specific qualities; a benevolent god, a god that wants this to happen, etc. But if you don't require god to have any specific qualities there isn't a shred.