You've touched on the issue of language, which I think is key to the confusion people have in this discussion.
My current thinking is that the proposition of "X does not exist" has no answer/proof because the statement is meaningless.
To consider that proposition, at some level you must assume that X does not exist, so the most obvious question is: What is X? If it doesn't exist, how can we even refer to it, or know its properties? If we can actually define X, then it must exist (in the most technical sense of a 'proof': X is an element of the current system you are working in).
It's a contradiction, likely caused by malformed propositions.
I would agree with that, given that I would take existence to be a tautological primitive if left to my own devices. But normally, I interpret it as "X does not exist independently of mental constructs and their derivative effects," which is a workable claim that can be false. And that's how most people mean it when making those kinds of claims.
So there are two meanings to existence: existence 'proper', and existence as a name for the extra-mental nature of a thing.
a) The thing itself b) A name for the thing itself
The question is then, can there be a real b) if there is no corresponding "a)", the thing that is being named.
It would seem the obvious answer is, no. However, I'm sure you could try to construct some twisted logic in an attempt to allow it. Such a logic would probably have flaws (incompleteness theorems likely have something to do with it) and are likely near useless.
I would agree that there are multiple definitions of existence that can be considered fruitfully. However, as a matter of formal logic, attempting to disprove/prove the non-existence of a 'thing' [0] is a trap.
[0] I use quotes here, because I'm not sure anyone here has yet defined what exactly a 'thing' is. :)
If you can describe a thing that exists, in sufficient detail to check the description, then you can describe a thing that doesn't exist too. For the answer to be 'no', you have to reject the entire idea of descriptions. You have to reject the entire idea of categories, leaving only sets with predefined member lists.
I think that line of thought is a waste. If you reject language as too imprecise to use on reality, you end up concluding that proofs cannot exist, so you must not actually be talking about proofs.
Plus, it's easy to name something that doesn't exist.
There is no piece of paper on Earth that has printed on it the string T5hYEQdla6ZLTjxQnA3D. This is something that could exist. You could even make one yourself! But as I make this comment, it does not exist.
>a) The thing itself b) A name for the thing itself
Yes, that is generally accepted. Generally philosophers talk about the name, 'A', the thing, A.
> It would seem the obvious answer is, no.
If you think that is obvious, you need to spend more time thinking about it. For example, you seem to be implying that we don't know if 'alien' is a real word or not since we don't know if aliens exist. (Some people may claim to know, but most of us have not seen proof.)
However, there is a level where it is not about the words, but the actual things. In your example, the word 'alien' is real, but there is no 'real' definition of it, in the sense that there is no definition that can be given that could select an actual instance of 'alien' (I may have confused the quotes by this point) precisely (perhaps) because 'aliens' don't actually exist (even though there is a word that can be mapped to some vague concept of what an alien might actually be like).
The concept 'alien' is actually pretty well defined and specific, the least specific part of it is probably the definition of 'life'.
I would argue that the statement does indeed have meaning, because you have some understanding of logic. If the statement had no meaning it would be impossible to disprove.
It is quite possible to create a meaningful definition that has no referent: "My first born child" is a statement that can have at most 1 referent but can also have 0 referents.
Just the fact that it is possible that a definition has 0 referents does not make that definition "a contradiction" or "meaningless".
A proof, essentially, is that which compels an unbiased rational mind into agreement. Thus we have to ask what compels a rational mind. (And what is a rational mind?)
The answer, roughly, is "information." And if your claim requires information behavior that hasn't been observed, one cannot accept the claim.
So all you have to do is identify a structure internal to the claim that contradicts what is known about information processing rules. Which induces a kind of language dependence, but this is not a problem because you cannot make language-independent claims in the first place. And more importantly, language cannot be meaningful unless it obeys some laws, so naturally any claim that violates them cannot be true. (E.g., Conservation of Probability prevents the existence of true claims of supernatural phenomena or self-contradiction.)
In this manner, truth is a 'stack' of verifiable justifications. Something is true if:
* you are justified in believing it, and
* you are justified in asserting your justification, and
* you are justified in asserting the previous assertion, and
* Et cetera., ad infinitum, or for as far as the flow of entropy in your environment allows.
You don't have to enumerate things. You just have to properly understand the claim. You have to accurately process the information encoded in its expression. To ask for a full enumeration is to ask for infinite information -- something that doesn't exist -- and thus cannot be what proof is about, or else the word 'proof' would be meaningless.