a) The thing itself b) A name for the thing itself
The question is then, can there be a real b) if there is no corresponding "a)", the thing that is being named.
It would seem the obvious answer is, no. However, I'm sure you could try to construct some twisted logic in an attempt to allow it. Such a logic would probably have flaws (incompleteness theorems likely have something to do with it) and are likely near useless.
I would agree that there are multiple definitions of existence that can be considered fruitfully. However, as a matter of formal logic, attempting to disprove/prove the non-existence of a 'thing' [0] is a trap.
[0] I use quotes here, because I'm not sure anyone here has yet defined what exactly a 'thing' is. :)
If you can describe a thing that exists, in sufficient detail to check the description, then you can describe a thing that doesn't exist too. For the answer to be 'no', you have to reject the entire idea of descriptions. You have to reject the entire idea of categories, leaving only sets with predefined member lists.
I think that line of thought is a waste. If you reject language as too imprecise to use on reality, you end up concluding that proofs cannot exist, so you must not actually be talking about proofs.
Plus, it's easy to name something that doesn't exist.
There is no piece of paper on Earth that has printed on it the string T5hYEQdla6ZLTjxQnA3D. This is something that could exist. You could even make one yourself! But as I make this comment, it does not exist.
>a) The thing itself b) A name for the thing itself
Yes, that is generally accepted. Generally philosophers talk about the name, 'A', the thing, A.
> It would seem the obvious answer is, no.
If you think that is obvious, you need to spend more time thinking about it. For example, you seem to be implying that we don't know if 'alien' is a real word or not since we don't know if aliens exist. (Some people may claim to know, but most of us have not seen proof.)
However, there is a level where it is not about the words, but the actual things. In your example, the word 'alien' is real, but there is no 'real' definition of it, in the sense that there is no definition that can be given that could select an actual instance of 'alien' (I may have confused the quotes by this point) precisely (perhaps) because 'aliens' don't actually exist (even though there is a word that can be mapped to some vague concept of what an alien might actually be like).
The concept 'alien' is actually pretty well defined and specific, the least specific part of it is probably the definition of 'life'.
I would agree with that, given that I would take existence to be a tautological primitive if left to my own devices. But normally, I interpret it as "X does not exist independently of mental constructs and their derivative effects," which is a workable claim that can be false. And that's how most people mean it when making those kinds of claims.
So there are two meanings to existence: existence 'proper', and existence as a name for the extra-mental nature of a thing.