Some would say "this, this is why", but those people are not responsible for selling and maintaining millions of vehicles.
Surely there's a way to make this information read-only. I can see information about my engine on my dashboard via the speedometer and tachometer; it would be ludicrous if I could kill my engine by grabbing the little needles and cranking them down to zero.
There absolutely is a way. Just off the top of my head you could relay the information from the high-sec CAN bus to a low-sec one with a micro-controller. So the low-sec bus can only receive messages from the high-sec one.
Not enabling firmware loading over CAN on the relay is a must as well for obvious reasons, but the key is the code on the relay microcontroller can be kept very simple (easier to audit/secure).
Problem is, most automotive engineers are clueless about security and most "hackers" are clueless about automotive hardware, software and protocols. There is no dialog.
I wish articles like these posted at least some specifics. A lot of these hacks in the past were completely impractical. Yes, yes, they had shown some interesting possibilities, but it was disingenuous to present them as real-life attacks (which many media outlets did).
They might need Internet access for updates, in which case, there should be a physical switch that connects the net and disables the engine.
Better code quality is important too, of course.
I agree with cameldrv that it's going to be a challenge.
Actually, no. Google's Urmson has spoken at "connected vehicle" conferences and indicated they don't need car to car communication.
Thinking that "basic driving functions" will need to rely _heavily_ on internet access is thinking wrongly.
From a business perspective, security isn't a marketable feature until it becomes a problem—you don't install safety belts, or airbags, or protection against malware until after people start suffering from their absence in a vehicle.
Why? Because while you're busy building a well-secured system, your competitors are busy implementing new features that give them an actual advantage in the marketplace. As unfortunate as it might be, consumers tend to understand things like “remotely start your car with your phone” better than “your ability to brake won't be taken away from you while you're barrelling down the highway at 70 mph.”
It's sad and more than a little scary, but it's also nothing really new. Computer security, at least in the consumer sector, wasn't really a feature until viruses started showing up in the Eighties, and Internet security wasn't really a feature until the average Windows user's PC was getting taken over remotely the moment it was connected to the Net. Even Apple has only been able to tout security and privacy as a feature in its products by juxtaposing it to Google's business model—had the latter not existed and its data grab become part of public discourse, I doubt that Cupertino would have been able to make so much noise about it.
So, it's perfectly possible that every engineer and manager who worked on these systems is really quite competent and perfectly aware of the potential for security flaws (indeed, I doubt that they would have been able to make something so complex work otherwise), and still the sum of all the decisions made and market pressures applied caused the resulting product to be so vulnerable despite everyone's best intentions. It's not because people don't care or don't know, but rather because there are only so many resources available, and the market has pushed them all in a specific direction that happens to be away from security.
But this is also why we need this kind of research. Now that these problems are out in the open, and politicians are starting to take notice, security will become a feature that the public will care about, and, hopefully, car manufacturers will start adopting (or be forced to adopt) better standards.
Even if you disagree, preventing corporate liability is a component of competence in the law's opinion. That is, if the company is found liable, that's saying the employees responsible did something wrong, even if it's not holding them individually accountable.
Parent is 100% correct. It's market-adaptation. Same reason Samsung ships known-vulnerable extensions to Android: features >> security.
> So, it's perfectly possible that every engineer and manager who worked on these systems is really quite competent and perfectly aware of the potential for security flaws [...], and still the sum of all the decisions made and market pressures applied caused the resulting product to be so vulnerable despite everyone's best intentions.
I think this is key. Although I'd lump it more on management given that they allocate technical resources. When you have a lack of technical knowledge in management, you lose the ability to make technically informed decisions.
Sometimes the nuances of a situation can't be summed up in a PowerPoint slide. Especially when it's a slide that someone created to summarize a slide deck from an engineer that they saw.
You think at least some of the OPM vulnerabilities were internally unknown? Even with incompetence, you had to have actual engineers who looked at settings and/or lack of feedback and went "Hunh..."
According to the article, US politicians are looking at introducing legislation to enforce cybersecurity measures. At that point, it will just be another safety rating that manufacturers can and do use to promote their vehicles.
I want all my devices to be as dumb as wires.
Wired technology just works, out-of-the-box, no setup, no maintenance, no nothing .. just make sure the plug fit in both ends, and done!
Wireless technology should work similar, but via the air, like an invisible wire .. not as a open gate to the internet!
..and please let's not add multi-purpose CPU just for the sake of marketing!
Companies in industries that need to find ways to make secure software; it's not a hard problem if you're willing to throw enough money at it. But as long as customers don't care whether their products or data are secure, we'll get the security we pay for.
This doesn't mean they're doing a good job though. Here's a link to where i previous discuss this: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=9801769
a) The developers were this incompetent
b) This "exploit" was a feature requested by the DHS
It's all well and good for us to chuckle at the terrifying software/systems decisions being made by these teams, but how do we address the root of the problem? It's very clear that entire meta-categories of horrific errors are being made at a very fundamental level. Is this a problem of outsourcing? Of confusing "coders" with engineers?
And how do we solve it? Shame the software team such that they can never get hired in a serious role again anywhere? Professionalize the job into a strictly licensed regime like other branches of engineering?
Whenever I read these types of articles, my main thought has always been, "so who, the hell, wrote the code?" It'd be interesting to know their story.