Thing is, if making the choice to have two-factor authentication for the bank is rationally wrong (i.e. the cost of security exceeds the damage of compromise), this isn't actually helping?
The point of the article is that users reject security advice for good reason. Forcing them to accept your security advice doesn't help; quite the opposite, it is forcing them to pay the cost of security despite it being not viable.
(in this particular example it maybe that the two factor auth is low-friction enough that it 'pays off'. If the article is right, simply giving people the option of two factor auth will have them use it)
Likewise, the average bank member is (speculating here) gonna say, "who wants to steal that $75 in my checking account? not worth it". But an account breach could end up costing a lot more than $75, especially to the bank who has to file insurance claims and do the paperwork, and ofc the time lost to the person who only had $75 to begin with.
What I'm trying to say is (I think) that the cost of a bank account breach is hard to measure, because there are a ton of marginal costs associated with it. Locking your credit reports, getting new bank accounts, changing all your autopays, possibly bouncing checks or autopays not going through, filing police reports, filling out claims paperwork, following up on all that, unlocking your credit next time you want to buy a car, etc. Lots and lots of marginal costs in terms of fees and your time.
But it isn't rationally wrong, from the perspective of the bank. The bank isn't paying for the user's time while using 2fa; for the bank the cost is "only" creating and operating the 2fa system.
Likewise if you are an ISP or a datacenter operator, security best practices might actually make economic sense, both because of the higher thread and the relatively high stakes.
Plus the loss of goodwill, for the customers who aren't happy with the added friction of 2fa.
A point that Bruce has harped on for years is that the law often creates the wrong incentives for security policies. In particular, in the U.S., the downside of what we call "identity theft" often falls squarely on the consumer, while the security policies for the banking industry are designed by banks. Thus the policy makers may not have to live with the downsides of their own policies.
I'm guessing that the incentives created by the law for banking security are rather different in Singapore -- maybe not ideal, but certainly different.
Can you (or anyone else) comment knowledgeably on this?
http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/MAS/Regulations%20and%20Financ...
For example, check out: Appendix A - "COUNTERING MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACKS "
It has specific guidance such as "Digital signatures and key-based message authentication codes (KMAC) for payment or fund transfer transactions could be used for the detection of unauthorised modification or injection of transaction data in a middleman attack. For this security solution to work effectively, a customer using a hardware token would need to be able to distinguish the process of generating a one-time password from the process of digitally signing a transaction. What he signs digitally must also be meaningful to him. This means the token should at least explicitly show the payee account number and the payment amount from which a hash value may be derived for the purpose of creating a digital signature. Different crypto keys should be used for generating OTPs and for signing transactions. "
The United States (at least the Banks I dealt with) are way behind where Singapore is in terms of Security.
People use phones for the second factor because they are convenient and always with them. I think the solution to the problem you stated above is to use "something you are" (thumprint biometrics) as the second factor of authentication instead of "something you have" (SMS code/mobile authenticator).
In the next couple years, most high-end smartphones will probably have thumbprint scanning technology, this seems like a better solution (and more convenient) as you only have to scan your thumb and it'll work as long as you have data, you don't need to worry if you have good cell reception (for SMS).
Still leaves the user open to MITM, viruses, and SMS interception. You should take a look at chipTAN [1] [2]. The user has to confirm account number and transfer amount on a little device before the crypto chip on the debit card generates a TAN that is valid only for this specific transaction.
I'm not a great fan of German IT (often unimaginative and slow-moving; e.g. none of the major German e-mail providers offer any form of 2FA), but this chipTAN thing is pretty fascinating from a crypto standpoint.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transaction_authentication_num...
It's inconvenient, but relatively secure. All in all a worthwhile trade-off I would say. It was shocking to me how casually credit card transactions were done when I went to the US the past few years. I didn't even know the magnetic strip on my card even had a purpose until I had it scanned into a register. I've never known a store in europe use the magnetic strip and signature, they always use the chip and pin method.
The thing is - once you get used to this system, the "cost" faced by the user goes away. I type in a 2FA a dozen times a day when logging in, and the overhead (wait 3 seconds, type in a 6 digit number in 3 seconds) - is really pretty insignificant.
This is, I think the point of the article. While it may rationally make sense to use a solution like this, many users may flat out reject it.
What's a paper cheque?
The only accounts actually worth protecting are bank/government accounts, email and maybe Facebook.
Small-businesses need to watch out. They often have significant cash in accounts, are targeted because of that, and don't have the same legal protection.
What's a paper cheque?
In some countries, banks give account holders books of banknote-sized paper 'cheques' or 'checks' - you can see pictures at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cheque - they can use for making payments.They have some convenient properties, but poor fraud protection. As such nowerdays they're mostly relegated to applications where fraud isn't a big worry.
For example charity donations, payments to friends and family, paying for little johnny's karate lessons, stuff like that. Some utility companies also allow you to pay by mailing in a cheque.
You can preemptively write cheques for future payments, like buying a car in two payments: one now and one in 3 months.
It also works for guarantee deposits, or write blank cheques with only the receiver filled in, etc.
I haven't seen a non-utility, non-bank business accept paper checks in about 13 years.
Most businesses get to pay for the privilege of having a business account and per transaction, as a volunteer org our banking expenses were zero, and all the competitors (square, paypal, various wallets, etc) all want a cut of the action, even if its small, so we had no interest.
A startup in the wallet business could get a lot of buzz and transactions by offering free service to all volunteer orgs / non profits. Even just temporarily for a year...
And why would a charity care about a bounced check?
FWIW, personal checks for religious offerings seem to be common and accepted (at least accepted enough that I've seen them in offering plates in multiple churches, and I've never seen any church tell people that they'll reject personal checks), so I think you're right on that front.
Anecdotally, I pay for my music lessons with personal checks, and I paid rent in my SF apartment, to an individual landlord, with personal checks sent via USPS. In both cases there are reasonable means to complain if those checks bounce.
- They can be mailed, unlike credit cards and cash
- They have no fees for either the sender or receiver
Of course you sacrifice convenience and security in exchange for no fees, which is why they are most commonly used for large transactions between trustworthy parties. For example, tax payments to the IRS.
Only in countries where checks are common.
Want to do login to your bank account? 100% required that you have an two-factor SMS token in addition to your user ID and password.
Want to do bill pay to a new-payer? Not only do you need to have your two-factor SMS token to first login, and then make the payment, you also need the physical token they sent you to do a crypto-sign of the bill payer account information before you can add the new bill-payer.
Coming from the United States, I'm blown away how much more secure (and convenient - Love bank-bank transfers, haven't used a paper cheque in 2+ years) banking is in Singapore. Probably suggests why paypal probably took off faster in the USA then here as well.