Likewise, the average bank member is (speculating here) gonna say, "who wants to steal that $75 in my checking account? not worth it". But an account breach could end up costing a lot more than $75, especially to the bank who has to file insurance claims and do the paperwork, and ofc the time lost to the person who only had $75 to begin with.
What I'm trying to say is (I think) that the cost of a bank account breach is hard to measure, because there are a ton of marginal costs associated with it. Locking your credit reports, getting new bank accounts, changing all your autopays, possibly bouncing checks or autopays not going through, filing police reports, filling out claims paperwork, following up on all that, unlocking your credit next time you want to buy a car, etc. Lots and lots of marginal costs in terms of fees and your time.
But it isn't rationally wrong, from the perspective of the bank. The bank isn't paying for the user's time while using 2fa; for the bank the cost is "only" creating and operating the 2fa system.
Likewise if you are an ISP or a datacenter operator, security best practices might actually make economic sense, both because of the higher thread and the relatively high stakes.
Thing is, if making the choice to have two-factor authentication for the bank is rationally wrong (i.e. the cost of security exceeds the damage of compromise), this isn't actually helping?
The point of the article is that users reject security advice for good reason. Forcing them to accept your security advice doesn't help; quite the opposite, it is forcing them to pay the cost of security despite it being not viable.
(in this particular example it maybe that the two factor auth is low-friction enough that it 'pays off'. If the article is right, simply giving people the option of two factor auth will have them use it)