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Re:OpenSSL Security Advisory by toast0 on Thursday July 09, 2015 @11:22AM (#9858351)
Alternate chains aren't a broken input issue; it's an issue where not all clients have the same CAs; so if you need to chain to an old 1024-bit root to take care of really old clients, newer clients without 1024-bit roots should be able to validate still. Older versions of openssl need to keep the 1024-bit root around, because the only validate the full chain provided by the server.
Re:OpenSSL Security Advisory by caf on Thursday July 09, 2015 @09:24PM (#9861814)
To clarify this a bit:

The problem is that you want to retire a 1024-bit CA root, and replace it with a 4096-bit CA root. To do this effectively, new clients need to stop trusting the old 1024-bit CA root, or there's no point doing the transition.

However, you still want certificates that you issue to be verified by old clients that don't know about the 4096-bit CA root.

To solve this, you issue certificates with two alternate chains of trust - one up to the old 1024-bit root, and one up to the new 4096-bit root - and teach the new clients to check all the alternate chains.

It's this last bit that required the code change in OpenSSL, which contained the logic error that resulted in this vulnerability.