The problem is that you want to retire a 1024-bit CA root, and replace it with a 4096-bit CA root. To do this effectively, new clients need to stop trusting the old 1024-bit CA root, or there's no point doing the transition.
However, you still want certificates that you issue to be verified by old clients that don't know about the 4096-bit CA root.
To solve this, you issue certificates with two alternate chains of trust - one up to the old 1024-bit root, and one up to the new 4096-bit root - and teach the new clients to check all the alternate chains.
It's this last bit that required the code change in OpenSSL, which contained the logic error that resulted in this vulnerability.
His famous principle is about border cases, when the spec is vague, handwavy or thought by some to be vague. It's not about the other cases.
Remember that Jon Postel was the RFC editor. He didn't want anyone to ignore the RFCs, he wanted the RFCs to be readable and pleasant, and he wanted implementers to do the right thing when when an RFC erred on the side of readability.
FWIW I wrote a blog post about this a few years ago, http://rant.gulbrandsen.priv.no/postel-principle
HTTP also has corner cases that widely-used implementations simply aren't handling consistently because the original RFCs are vague or the ideas being conveyed are buried in even older RFCs that nobody has the incentive to drill in to, or simply aren't known to them.
IMHO the IETF really should move to a wiki format, where information and wording changes on a particular protocol can be seen in one place. Plaintext snapshots of particular versions could still be published.
[0] https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/dnsop/current/msg13349...
[1] https://kea.isc.org/wiki/ZoneLoadingRequirements#a3.3RFCimpl...
Is the rule a bit messy? Yes it is!
It's so much simpler to use, and less problematic.
When dealing with integration among many parties, there is tremendous pressure to just "make it work". The web arguably is an example of this - the standards were post-facto representations of what's already implemented.
Of course we are all hating the long term implications on our codebases , but "let's force everyone to do it one way through strict behaviour" seems to discount the social dynamics of interoperability.
Moving away from Postel's principle in production will not lead to successful open and interoperable implementations, it will rather trend towards towards one single implementation , likely open source, that is shared and tweaked by all. That has some positive (interop!) and negative implications (limited ability to innovate / dragged down into programmer religions, etc).
I would say it's also true for security-related protocols, such as in this case.
But for general network protocols some leniency in processing is necessary, or even beneficial for forwards-compatibility.
I think the latest big thing I've learned in my career is that trying to fix broken input data silently is always bad. Fixing stuff silently isn't helpful for the callers, it's very difficult to do and it produces additional code which also isn't running in the normal case, so it's much more likely to be broken.
Additionally, your callers will start to depend on your behaviour and suddenly you have what amounts to two separate implementations in your code.
I learned that while blowing up (though don't call exit if you're a library. Please.) is initially annoying for callers, in the end, it will be better for you and your callers because code will be testable, correct and more secure (because there's less of it)