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Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by 0x0 on Saturday June 27, 2015 @08:27AM (#9789934)
The CA system is so broken. Letting a vendor decide who you should trust to issue intermediate certificates that your software will automatically trust to not issue illegitimate certificates doesn't make the system particularly trustworthy, especially seeing as they are still adding new root CAs for entities with unknown agendas (governmental agencies etc).

Maybe the system could be changed to one where domains can only be signed by the DNS registrar, or something.

It's pretty crazy that any CA can issue a certificate for any domain. And paying for more validation doesn't help you at all, since it won't keep the "bad guys" from getting an illegitimate one from a cheaper/lazier CA.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by ajross on Saturday June 27, 2015 @09:28AM (#9790065)
> Letting a vendor decide

The problem with the root of trust problem is that you have to trust someone. Who is your preference? The government? The registries? ICANN? The hardware vendor? Those are all suspect too, and most have been historically compromised.

The only thing I can see that helps is "community" auditing -- things like Chrome's pinning and ... the action that discovered these new certs. So, as much as it sucks, we're sort of doing the right thing already.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by aeijdenberg on Saturday June 27, 2015 @01:52PM (#9790928)
See also Certificate Transparency (RFC6962) which I haven't seen mentioned in this thread yet - the goals of which are to require all certificates be written to publicly auditable, tamper-proof logs in order to be considered secure by clients. In such a manner certificate mis-issuance will be easy to detect for interested parties. As of earlier this year Chrome is already requiring Signed Certificate Timestamps for new EV certificates in order to display the EV indicator.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6962 http://www.certificate-transparency.org/

(disclaimer: I work on this project)

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by voidz on Saturday June 27, 2015 @09:52AM (#9790135)
> Who is your preference? The government? The registries? ICANN?

No, silly: the domain owner! Something that's already possible with DANE: the domain owner gets to decide, as it should be, by publishing information about valid certification into the DNS.

Of ALL options this one is the least crappy IMO.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by Guvante on Saturday June 27, 2015 @10:05AM (#9790176)
You are assuming that DNS is a valid place to store security information. While it can be in many places it cannot be in general due to the lack of authentication.

And if you require some level of authentication you are back to the same problem.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by voidz on Saturday June 27, 2015 @10:12AM (#9790203)
I'm not assuming anything, and I disagree because I think it's a different problem, not the same one. Also, did you read my last sentence?
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by Guvante on Monday June 29, 2015 @04:10PM (#9800614)
Your phrasing is hard to follow. I was assuming you meant that all information necessary to validate the certificate is attached to the DNS record which is crazy as the primary reason for SSL certificates that are centrally signed is when you don't get the right DNS record for some reason (roughly speaking).

If you are instead saying that you should avoid having a URL in the certificate itself, validate it as normal and then use the DNS record to match the certificate to the URL I guess that could work. However you still have the above problem where anyone who has a valid certificate at all can impersonate any website by injecting a DNS record.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by ajross on Saturday June 27, 2015 @09:58AM (#9790157)
And who authenticates the domain owners? Your solution is basically "trust the registries" then. OK, fine. But they've screwed up in the past and they will in the future.
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by 0x0 on Saturday June 27, 2015 @10:35AM (#9790278)
If the registry cannot be trusted, SSL kinda goes out the window anyways since a malicious MX DNS record or WHOIS email entry is usually sufficient to obtain a certificate.

Since we already are at the point where the security of the system hinges on the registrar, why not at least limit the damage potential by only accepting certificates issued by the registrar in question? Instead of letting any CA under the sun ALSO issue these?

PS: If certificate issuance was a required and expected task for all registrars, it could even lead to $0 certificates, which would surely boost HTTPS usage. It would even provide an incentive to pick a thorough registrar if you are concerned about security and validation, since no other entity could issue illegitimate parallel certs behind your back. Brings some meaning back to being a high quality authority (even charging more for more trust) instead of the race-to-the-bottom we have today. Sloppy registrar-CAs would lose business because their trustworthyness actually means something for once. (You wouldn't register your serious domain with a registrar known to have poor validation checks in place for issuing certificates, for example)

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by josteink on Saturday June 27, 2015 @12:32PM (#9790646)
> If the registry cannot be trusted, SSL kinda goes out the window anyway

You seem to have gotten things backwards. If the DNS is hijacked, SSL is the only thing protecting a visitor from being lured into the hijacked site.

Connecting these two things into one makes SSL effectively worthless.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by zwily on Saturday June 27, 2015 @12:59PM (#9790742)
If DNS is hijacked, the hijacker could also get valid SSL certificates (using MX records to get confirmation emails, etc).
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by josteink on Sunday June 28, 2015 @06:36AM (#9793057)
If it is a EV certificate, that would certainly not be sufficient.
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by 0x0 on Saturday June 27, 2015 @01:12PM (#9790780)
Hmm, I think it is you who have things backwards.

They way it is now, hijacking DNS (between the domain NS servers and any CA) would allow an adversary to request and obtain an illegitimate certificate by way of domain validation. If the registrar is the only valid issuer of certificates, this loophole is closed since there is nothing for the CA to verify - the registrar already knows who the customer is and can offer certificate signing without an insecure DNS based domain validation.

For end-users with a hijacked DNS, the registrar-issued SSL certificate would still protect the transmission, because the DNS-spoofing adversary would not be able to present a valid certificate signed by the registrar. In fact, in today's CA environment, if the DNS hijacker is playing ball with a rogue CA, they could also spoof the SSL. With my suggestion, they couldn't, unless the rogue CA is actually the registrar, because the browser would see that the SSL certificate was not signed by the appropriate registrar.

You could create a DNS-style CA setup like this:

* Browsers would ship with ONE root CA, the public key of the "." root zone operator

* Each TLD ("com", "org" etc) has a CA signed by the root zone operator, valid only for signing TLD registrar CAs. The root zone CA could publish a signed list of TLD certificates daily/weekly/monthly (they shouldn't change too often and the number of entries would be relatively low). Anyone could compare notes and see if these change. There aren't any hidden intermediary CAs. Browsers could sync this list daily/weekly/monthly, the deltas should be minimal. ISPs could even provide mirror services, because the whole list is signed by the root zone operator anyways.

* Each registrar under a TLD has a CA certificate signed by the TLD operator, valid for only signing secondary domains under the given TLD. (i.e. customer domains). Just like the RootZone->TLD signed list of CAs, the TLD CA operator could publish a signed list of registrar certificates daily/weekly/monthly (again, they shouldn't change too often and the number of entries would be relatively low). Again, anyone can compare notes and see if things change. No hidden intermediary registrars. Browsers could yet again sync this daily/weekly/monthly and ISPs can mirror the list since it's signed.

* Registrants of customer domain ("example.com", "example.org" etc) can request a domain-specific CA at their registrar, and only at their registrar. This domain-specific CA is valid only for signing leaf domains, i.e. "www.example.com", "mail.example.com". With the domain-specific CA in hand, the customer can create their own leaf domain certificates "at home". The registrar should offer non-EV domain-CA certificates for free (there is no work to be done to validate domain ownership as the customer already has an account there), or charge a fee for EV certificates.

* There needs to be a way to determine who is the valid registrar for a given domain. This could be for example a TLS-based machine-readable WHOIS service address operated by each TLD. The TLS-based WHOIS service would negotiate TLS with the same TLD-CA-certificate as specified in the root list. Thus, a browser can connect to the TLD's WHOIS service and validate that a given domain is under a given registrar, and that the leaf SSL certificate is signed by the domain CA certificate, which is signed by the registrar CA certificate, which is in the signed-by-the-TLD list of registrars, which is in the signed-by-the-root-zone list of TLDs. This stuff could also be cached at the ISP level because everything is chain signed.

Maybe this is how DNSSEC works (I haven't looked into the details), but I think this would be a pretty neat way to limit the damage done by rogue CAs.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by marcosdumay on Saturday June 27, 2015 @10:03PM (#9792173)
> Maybe this is how DNSSEC works

Not exactly, but it's very similar. DNSSEC has no concept of registrars, and each zone is entirely signed by the same entity.

You'd trust that single entity to inform the registrar anyway, so descentralizing it gains you nothing.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by nadams on Saturday June 27, 2015 @10:38AM (#9790288)
And so have the CAs.

I would have to think about it but I'm sure there is SOME way to verify someone (either in person or digitally). This process would only have to happen once to verify the CA cert for their domain. After that - if their CA cert is compromised it's not a big deal because it only affects one domain.

Oh - and any hoster that allows it's employees to reset virtual machine passwords or make account modifications via email/support ticket should NOT be allowed to participate in this scheme.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by voidz on Saturday June 27, 2015 @10:09AM (#9790191)
huh? No, for DANE it is required to have DNSSEC in place. Also read the last sentence of my previous statement again.
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by realityking on Saturday June 27, 2015 @10:27AM (#9790253)
And now you're trusting the registrar, the registry and ICANN. It's always pick a poison.

Also, DNSSEC still has some severe issues in practice. I'd be glad if we could get DANE widely deployed for mail servers.

Edit: Oh, and if you're not using a validating resolver yourself you're also trusting that you're ISP is using one and not manipulating the responses.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by marcosdumay on Saturday June 27, 2015 @10:07PM (#9792191)
> Oh, and if you're not using a validating resolver yourself you're also trusting that you're ISP is using one and not manipulating the responses.

I really don't understand why people keep repeating that complaint. Of course, if you don't check the keys you don't get any security.

How is that a problem of the algorithm? And how is that a problem on practice? If you want some real amount of security you check the keys, being them SSL certificates, DNSSEC signatures, or whatever else encryption system people put on place.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by realityking on Sunday June 28, 2015 @03:58AM (#9792817)
You're speaking from the perspective of somebody who could set this up for himself. "Normal" people don't know stuff like this, but we can't leave them unprotected.

That's why DANE for mailserver is such an attractive target. They're usually run by people who know what they're doing and it helps bring a lot of infrastructure into place.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by marcosdumay on Monday June 29, 2015 @05:39PM (#9801321)
The point is that there's nothing for normal people to setup (or, at least, it does not have to be). Your email software should verify DANE keys, just like your browser verifies TLS keys.

The fact that current software is hard of configure is just a symptom that it's badly designed. The only inherently hard thing in DNSSEC is distributing your domain data (not really harder than setting our server for TLS), and normal people do not do that.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by TheSpiceIsLife on Saturday June 27, 2015 @10:54AM (#9790335)
You still have to trust someone.

I think the trust model is broken for the same reason it can be said three can keep a secret, if two of them are dead.

How can humans create a software or hardware system that absolves us of the issue of trust, when people are, and have always, been up to no good.

The courts are full of people who claim other people have acted outside of good judgement.

I don't think it's possible to have trust without its opposite.

I'd like to be proven wrong.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by whoopdedo on Saturday June 27, 2015 @06:07PM (#9791675)
In the early days of internet commercialization I thought issuing trusted certificates would ideally be provided by banks. Money transfers are all about trust and securing information, it seemed like a perfect fit. You get a smart card from your bank that holds their root certificates and pop that into any computer to authenticate an email or website. It also holds your private keys for authenticating yourself to others for online banking, voting, etc.

Of course I've since learned how awfully inertial the banking industry is and that the security of financial transactions is a lot of hand-waving and wishful thinking. On top of that, there's outright corruption of banks profiting from theft and always cooperate with governments.

So the answer is, you shouldn't have to trust anyone. The security infrastructure must be built assuming hostilities are everywhere. Any trust that is given should be limited to just what is necessary to accomplish the task at hand.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by pdkl95 on Saturday June 27, 2015 @09:52AM (#9790134)
You let the USER decide who to trust, as they are the only person who has enough information to do so. Maybe they trust the community for some things, maybe they trust a government for a different set of use cases, and maybe they trust their nerd friend for other stuff.
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by mentat on Saturday June 27, 2015 @10:11AM (#9790200)
If there's anything we've learned from the last 20 years in security it's that the user is the least fit to decide. They are bad at passwords, they are bad at clicking things in email, they just are not security conscious. "Click here to trust my CA", how's that going to end?
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by userbinator on Saturday June 27, 2015 @12:03PM (#9790556)
If anything that is an education problem, which is further compounded by the trend of wanting to turn users into completely passive entities who don't know or have to do anything, because then they are more easily controlled and manipulated.

The industry does not encourage users to think and learn. The industry wants its software to do the thinking for them. It doesn't want users to think about trust at all. I think that is the scariest part of where things are heading.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by nitrogen on Saturday June 27, 2015 @12:24PM (#9790625)
Users in the past had every opportunity to think and learn, and their failure to do so is why we are where we are today. I mean, there are still people who refuse to wear seatbelts or vaccinate their children... How can we ever expect people to understand all the moving parts in a secure computer system?
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by xenadu02 on Saturday June 27, 2015 @12:20PM (#9790613)
That's the great fallacy though. The amount of technical knowledge required to make truly informed security decisions is out of the question for 99% of all computer/mobile users.

It isn't about being passive; it's about having lives and jobs and other things to do with their time. A heart surgeon may be a genius but he doesn't have time to keep up with the latest research and teach himself PKI, certificates, crypto, and permission models across all the platforms he uses (and keep up to date on those too!)

Users will not waste their time thinkin about trust. The history of our industry is ample evidence that it would be a losing battle. Not to mention a single mistake can be ruinous, requiring absolute perfection 100% of the time (from users and programmers).

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by nitrogen on Saturday June 27, 2015 @12:27PM (#9790633)
Not to mention a single mistake can be ruinous, requiring absolute perfection 100% of the time (from users and programmers).

One can hope that, eventually, formally mathematically verified open source systems will help solve the issue, at least on the programming side.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by namplaa on Saturday June 27, 2015 @02:18PM (#9791026)
I doubt the halting problem will be solved.
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by nitrogen on Saturday June 27, 2015 @08:37PM (#9791986)
The solution to the halting problem is to stop building universal/Turing-complete machines.

Edit: since this was downvoted, I will elaborate. The halting problem only applies to arbitrary programs on Turing-complete systems. It is possible to create useful systems that are not Turing complete. As a baseline example, it is easy to tell that the following Ruby program halts:

    exit
Problems arise when one allows unbounded loops and unbounded recursion. If all loops and all recursions are provably finite, then a program can be proven to exit. All sorts of useful things can be done with systems composed of small, provably terminating programs. And it turns out, the vast majority (if not all) of the things relevant to securing a computer system can be implemented in formally provable ways.
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by jessaustin on Saturday June 27, 2015 @04:13PM (#9791396)
They are bad at passwords...

That's like saying they are bad at juggling with one hand while riding a unicycle. Passwords are the bad thing, and users have been subjected to them for quite long enough.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by threeseed on Saturday June 27, 2015 @10:43PM (#9792253)
Case in point: users handing over passwords:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=opRMrEfAIiI

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by IE6 on Saturday June 27, 2015 @11:52AM (#9790515)
Agree - most users of computers do not know anything bout infosec nor do they care.
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by pdkl95 on Saturday June 27, 2015 @01:52PM (#9790927)
14% of adult Americans (about 30M people) are functionally illiterate[1]. They are bad at reading things in snailmail, many just don't see the value in it. We have records, stories, and even myths that seek to warn people about the disreputable men who take advantage of their mark's ignorance.

Does society try to keep these people illiterate? Does we give up, accuse the millions of illiterate people of not caring, and find ways to hide important things from them? Do we simply let them stay ignorant while making sure we hide any books when they are around, because books when they are around "because they don't care"? While I'm sure there have been been people who have done these things, we - as a modern society - generally find the idea of being illiterate to be a serious problem; serious enough that we spend significant amounts of money on education programs and other attempts to fix the problem of illiteracy.

Technology has created a new literacy. I'm not talking about programming or suggesting that people need to know HTML or anything. However, if you want to function in modern society, you need to understand some of the evolving language that society uses. This new literacy includes things like understanding that strings of the form "[email protected]" are probably an email address, and when you read something that starts "http://" or ends in ".com" or ".net" is probably referring to a website. The fact that the educational system has yet to catch up to the changes in technology is not a reason to force decisions on people, nor is it a reason to accuse them of not caring; instead, we should be interpreting the problems people have with security as a sign that a lot more education is needed, and we need to find ways to help people learn so they can protect themselves.

Unfortunately, there are a lot of people in the tech community that are confusing "frustration at not understanding obtuse technology" with "not caring about security". Many people do care, but lack the slightest idea about how to even approach important technical decisions. Certificates, keys, signing, and the like are not what matters, and are minutia tha should be left to those with proper technical knowledge. What matters in security is where the trust is being placed, and that is something a lot of people are skilled at.

Obviously, change isn't going to happen overnight. My suggestion is that we need a way to let people at least start down that path of managing trust. A good first step would be simply exposing the process so people can learn that a trust decision is even necessary.

[1] functionally illiterate is defined as those adults with a reading level below the basic requirements necessary to "perform simple and everyday literacy activities". Data is from https://nces.ed.gov/naal/kf_demographics.asp

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by octo_t on Saturday June 27, 2015 @09:58AM (#9790153)
and what should the default be for non-technical users? no trust at all? And asking each time "do you want to trust this root certificate"? (because we know how well that works....)
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by pdkl95 on Saturday June 27, 2015 @10:07AM (#9790183)
No, we need a system where different types of trust can be selected. (see my other post)

A PKI system like we have now is one of them, but we need a system where that is not the only available trust. Yes, it will be necessary to educate people about this topic (and never discussing it with the user will only keep them ignorant). Right now we have a system where users are forced to trust various CA, and if someone decides they want to trust something else, that is difficult or impossible.

The problem of WHO to trust for a particular website (that is, every website) is a separate problem which can be solved over time. My point is that we don't even have the tools to let people even being to solve that problem.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by pessimizer on Saturday June 27, 2015 @12:01PM (#9790550)
>and what should the default be for non-technical users? no trust at all?

Yes. They should pay a service to keep track of who they should trust. They wouldn't be opened up to any more risk by this than as with the status quo, MS + Apple + Google would end up giving it away for "free" for those don't have a problem with that or don't know better, and the option to get more technical about issues of trust would always be available to them.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by Guvante on Saturday June 27, 2015 @10:07AM (#9790185)
You already have the tools to change who you trust. If you are afraid of automatic updates to your trusted domain list then setup a VM to test the updates or use a script to verify when the list changes.
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by wtbob on Saturday June 27, 2015 @07:06PM (#9791788)
ICANN's the obvious choice since they are in charge of assigned names and numbers. They are controlled by a board, who could use a k-of-n signing scheme to sign off on their decisions, to include delegation, and their successors.
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by sigsergv on Saturday June 27, 2015 @09:01AM (#9790009)
You're absolutely right, and situation is much worse actually. Some time ago another “feature” was introduced — “key pinning”, for some reason it's compared to standard ssh client behaviour (explicit key for given address). But it's nothing similar actually. If MITM have access to any of root certificates installed on your device then he/she could create “valid” certificates that won't raise any warnings in the browser.

There is some addon (if I remember correctly) for Firefox that binds specific key to specific domain and raises warning if certificate changes.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by mattkrea on Saturday June 27, 2015 @09:03AM (#9790011)
I think you may be referring to Certificate Patrol (https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/certificate-p...)
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by hmottestad on Saturday June 27, 2015 @08:41AM (#9789968)
It still works to hinder that guy who sits at the coffee shop trying to man-in-the-middle attack people connected to hit fake wifi.

If you want a system that can hinder a government doing that, or a large organisation, or a corporation. Then look elsewhere.

Do you remember to wipe your hard drive when you get your computer back from the repair shop? They could very well have installed a new root CA without you noticing....

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by tokenizerrr on Saturday June 27, 2015 @09:00AM (#9790005)
I always recommend people to take out the hard drive before sending it in. This has caused some small issues, but most stores don't seem to mind as long as you are very explicit about telling them.
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by 0x0 on Saturday June 27, 2015 @09:04AM (#9790013)
I wipe before AND after, if I have to hand the computer in for repairs. :)
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by snowy on Saturday June 27, 2015 @09:55AM (#9790143)
I agree it works against most adversary's.

Wiping your HDD might not be enough: https://blog.kaspersky.com/equation-hdd-malware/

Theoretically you could hide malware in your GPU, USB, FireWire, webcam, NIC, baseband, Bluetooth, where ever.

No matter who you are or how smart you think you are if your adversary is determined and has the required resources they are going to get you.

Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by anonbanker on Saturday June 27, 2015 @01:10PM (#9790775)
SSL: Even in 2015, still more concerned with the local neighborhood boogeyman then Government intrusion.
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by hmottestad on Sunday June 28, 2015 @07:22AM (#9793120)
TLS
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by anonbanker on Monday June 29, 2015 @09:14PM (#9802227)
as if it were less guilty of the same crimes.
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by CyberDildonics on Saturday June 27, 2015 @09:22AM (#9790050)
I still don't understand why there isn't a public private key for each connection. We seem to accept this broken style of encryption instead of pushing for real encryption.
Re:Microsoft quietly pushes 18 new trusted root certificates by jlgaddis on Saturday June 27, 2015 @09:51AM (#9790128)
Like session keys and PFS?