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Re:Bribery Attacks on Bitcoin Consensus [pdf] by hippich on Thursday May 21, 2015 @04:37PM (#9585233)
cashing large amount of bitcoins is slow process. cashing small amount does not make enough to cover processing power required to double spend.
Re:Bribery Attacks on Bitcoin Consensus [pdf] by schoen on Thursday May 21, 2015 @06:03PM (#9585651)
Since individual Bitcoin transactions can be as large as you like, you could conceivably double-spend tens of thousands of BTC in a single block. It's possible or even likely that there's nobody who would actually give you cash equivalents for tens of thousands of BTC without more precautions, but I don't see a clear limitation in the Bitcoin technology itself to limit how lucrative an isolated double spending attack could be.
Re:Bribery Attacks on Bitcoin Consensus [pdf] by smokeyj on Thursday May 21, 2015 @06:15PM (#9585696)
I think confirmation count does a good job of this, allowing processors to choose the balance between risk and convenience. No one's going to convert large fiat to btc without increasing confirmation count, and splitting smaller transactions will require setting up traceable account. Unless of course the attacker launders thru alt-coins, but then you might run into liquidity issues.
Re:Bribery Attacks on Bitcoin Consensus [pdf] by sp332 on Friday May 22, 2015 @08:26AM (#9587830)
I think confirmation count isn't so useful when one person or pool owns something close to 50% of the hashing power. Everyone gets complacent because they can't launch a 51% attack, but it's possible for someone with 40% of the power to effectively pull off the exact same attack for a span of six blocks. It is improbable, but not that improbable.
Re:Bribery Attacks on Bitcoin Consensus [pdf] by smokeyj on Friday May 22, 2015 @11:16AM (#9588795)
Writing six blocks in a row doesn't mean you can double spend a transaction with six confirmations. Unless you meant something else.
Re:Bribery Attacks on Bitcoin Consensus [pdf] by sp332 on Friday May 22, 2015 @11:42AM (#9588963)
That is pretty much what I meant. If you can write your own confirmations, why not?
Re:Bribery Attacks on Bitcoin Consensus [pdf] by smokeyj on Friday May 22, 2015 @12:34PM (#9589366)
Miners would have to mine valid blocks secretly, risking never receiving a payout unless x-consecutive blocks have been mined. I mean it's technically possible, just economically infeasible.