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Re:Bribery Attacks on Bitcoin Consensus [pdf] by sp332 on Friday May 22, 2015 @08:26AM (#9587830)
I think confirmation count isn't so useful when one person or pool owns something close to 50% of the hashing power. Everyone gets complacent because they can't launch a 51% attack, but it's possible for someone with 40% of the power to effectively pull off the exact same attack for a span of six blocks. It is improbable, but not that improbable.
Re:Bribery Attacks on Bitcoin Consensus [pdf] by smokeyj on Friday May 22, 2015 @11:16AM (#9588795)
Writing six blocks in a row doesn't mean you can double spend a transaction with six confirmations. Unless you meant something else.
Re:Bribery Attacks on Bitcoin Consensus [pdf] by sp332 on Friday May 22, 2015 @11:42AM (#9588963)
That is pretty much what I meant. If you can write your own confirmations, why not?
Re:Bribery Attacks on Bitcoin Consensus [pdf] by smokeyj on Friday May 22, 2015 @12:34PM (#9589366)
Miners would have to mine valid blocks secretly, risking never receiving a payout unless x-consecutive blocks have been mined. I mean it's technically possible, just economically infeasible.