Re:Bribery Attacks on Bitcoin Consensus [pdf]
by smokeyj on Thursday May 21, 2015 @06:15PM
(#9585696)
I think confirmation count does a good job of this, allowing processors to choose the balance between risk and convenience. No one's going to convert large fiat to btc without increasing confirmation count, and splitting smaller transactions will require setting up traceable account. Unless of course the attacker launders thru alt-coins, but then you might run into liquidity issues.
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I think confirmation count isn't so useful when one person or pool owns something close to 50% of the hashing power. Everyone gets complacent because they can't launch a 51% attack, but it's possible for someone with 40% of the power to effectively pull off the exact same attack for a span of six blocks. It is improbable, but not that improbable.
Writing six blocks in a row doesn't mean you can double spend a transaction with six confirmations. Unless you meant something else.
That is pretty much what I meant. If you can write your own confirmations, why not?
Miners would have to mine valid blocks secretly, risking never receiving a payout unless x-consecutive blocks have been mined. I mean it's technically possible, just economically infeasible.