These capabilities are sensitive enough that you want to give users control over who is granted access. But if pages are being loaded over HTTP, the user can have no way of establishing the authenticity of the Javascript code they're granting permissions to.
Yes, the hosts could wildcard. Yes, there are other solutions out there. But for the average Joe who is blogging about his vacations and family? They're going to be completely lost.
Why don't shared hosts just wildcard? Shared certificate? Well, let's think about it... Charging ~$5/month/dedicated IP is a nice upsell, and getting $70 for an installed SSL cert that costs them $10 from their SSL cert reseller, that takes them 2 minutes to configure... That's a nice slice of pie. I'd take that bet any day.
It's only an upsell now. If in the future SSL is required to get access, it stops being an upsell and starts having to be part of the basic package. Whether that will raise prices significantly is yet to be seen.
Average Joe uses Facebook, Tumblr, Wordpress, or any number of existing hosts to blog to his family.
* It is a static site with no forms or logins
* It is non-critical info
* The site operator can't afford a certificate (Let's Encrypt is only one site...)
As you say: Color-code sites with a bit more granularity. Don't cripple the cleartext web.When the user first visits an HTTPS page with a self-signed cert, they get the content, and the URL art style has a broken lock or something warning it's not known to be secure. (It's better than raw HTTP but it's not trusted.) With certificate pinning by the browser, the next time the user visits that page, if it's different, then they get the current experience that warns them in big scary text and requires several clicks to get past. There's a question of if it's different in that the server owner upgraded to a paid SSL cert should it show a warning or not, but if there's a way to sign that upgrade with the old cert that the browser can know about there shouldn't be a problem...
Do we assume the user is going to notice that URL art style, and actually heed it? Because if the answer is "no" (and I think in reality, the answer would be "no"), then pick a high value site, and MitM it with a self-signed cert. The user misses the indicator, and proceeds to interact with the site; does JS work? (let's steal the user's cookies) do forms work? (please log in!)
Showing a big scary warning in one case, and not in the user, implies to the user that the browser has some reason to think one is more secure, which is misleading.
Of course the whole thing can be automated by the browser and happen behind the scene - i.e. Firefox connecting to a Mozilla service for each self signed website it sees and comparing the fingerprints. Then it can store information about this self-signed certificate as trusted.
Except that rather than creating a self-signed certificate and then asking an external service to store a fingerprint, you just let the external service sign your certificate.
EDIT: Oh yeah, and signing the certificate up-front has the nice benefit of not forcing browsers to leak private information (namely, the domain names that are being accessed) to a centralized third party.
Wouldn't it just be significantly easier to simply change the URL art style to make clear that HTTP is "insecure." Like a red broken padlock on every HTTP page?
That has the following advantages:
- HTTP remains fully working for internal/development/localhost/appliance usage (no broken features).
- Users are reminded that HTTP is not secure.
- Webmasters are "embarrassed" into upgrading to HTTPS.
- Fully backwards compatible.
Seems like a perfect solution where everyone wins.