Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by ChuckMcM on Thursday April 23, 2015 @04:58PM
(#9429761)
Ok, I read that twice, is the summary "The market is a complex tightly coupled system." ?
I get that, and I get such systems can be subject to anomalous events (early fly by wire systems for dynamically unstable aircraft was a good test case to study). But such systems can also be 'calmed' by damping. Isn't the SEC in charge of adding such damping to our financial trading systems?
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by clearf on Thursday April 23, 2015 @05:27PM
(#9429957)
One of the authors here. I think that's a pretty good summary. And, yes, I agree that there are ways to introduce damping into many such systems and some has been added since the Crash, as another comment points out.
I think it would be great if the SEC believed that that was their mandate. Unfortunately, I think that is predicated on much more sophisticated and nuanced understand of the dynamics of the markets than regulators typically have.
The claim in the recent CFTC's Complaint that alleged market manipulator Navinder Sarao directly contributed to the crash is only one example of this. If one guy can cause a Flash Crash, there is a bigger problem with the structure of the markets.
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by minimax on Thursday April 23, 2015 @05:54PM
(#9430121)
I'm curious whether you have seen this speech from last year given by Gregg Berman who was, until recently, an associate director in the division of Trading and Markets at the SEC.
I think it shows that the regulators (at least some of them) do want to have a better understanding of the dynamics of the US equity market, and that they are trying to build the tooling that will give them the right sorts of insights. Berman's suggestion that policy changes ought to be driven by data are, I think, something that most technologists would agree with. For whatever it's worth, Berman also has a physics Ph.D. from Princeton. So if your insinuation is just that the regulators are more lawyer than scientist I don't think that's completely true.
edit: Also wanted to add that there has been a lot written about the flash crash and I think this article is definitely one of the better ones.
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by clearf on Thursday April 23, 2015 @06:20PM
(#9430265)
I have heard Gregg Berman speak, though I hadn't read this speech until skimming it just now. I do think that there is, generally speaking, a heartfelt desire to develop the tools and data needed to gain insights that Berman is talking about.
I think there are two challenges to unpack. One, though I wasn't insinuating it, I could have been. I do believe that regulators are more lawyers than physicists. Berman is the exception rather than the rule.
Two, Berman, in particular, makes a fundamental error that I think is very easy to make. There's a difference between "complex" in the sense that something has a lot of parts, and interactively complex in the sense that parts of a system are fundamentally unknowable and it can experience wild and unexpected dynamics. I think Berman doesn't distinguish between those two types of systems (repeated analogies to cell phones give some indication of his thinking), and more generally, regulators don't understand the aggregate cost of complexity.
In my view, things like Midas are orthogonal to some deeper issues facing the markets. Regulators have created a quasi-competitive market that breeds this sort of interactive complexity. Then, when something goes wrong, they rely on punishment and enforcement actions [1] to target individual firms that have made "mistakes." This not only does not address root causes, it creates a culture of silence around technology risk issues within firms and across the industry. I've written more about this here: http://harvardkennedyschoolreview.com/preventing-crashes-les...
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by yummyfajitas on Thursday April 23, 2015 @06:10PM
(#9430216)
Markets have intrinsic damping - long term traders. If you didn't believe that Accenture was really worth $0.03/share during the flash crash, you could come in and buy it up for cheap, then make a huge profit after the flash crash resolved (in the unlikely event your trades weren't broken [1]).
In short, the damping mechanism in markets is that anyone who believes the price is wrong can come in, buy/sell/short and push markets back to the right place. Which is exactly why the flash crash fixed itself. I know a human trader who missed the entire flash crash due to an ill timed bathroom break.
[1] US markets will retroactively break "clearly erroneous trades".
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by yummyfajitas on Friday April 24, 2015 @06:44AM
(#9432408)
That is a risk if you buy low and sell high, but if you buy and hold for a few days it's pretty safe. Worst case you lose buying power for a short time.
But you are right that regulators (not sure if breaking trades is an exchange or SEC thing?) do reduce this natural damping factor.
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by minimax on Thursday April 23, 2015 @05:13PM
(#9429856)
Yes, they are and they did. There are now circuit breakers in the US equities market that didn't exist in 2010. It would be basically impossible to get executions at $0.01 or $199,999.99 or large caps instantly trading at a 20% discount. Trading would be paused for 5 minutes in any symbol where the price got stuck against the LULD band for 15 seconds.
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by egwor on Thursday April 23, 2015 @05:12PM
(#9429853)
The exchanges already have various controls. CME has up/down limits that have to be manually lifted; they also fine people if they exceed the connection limits on their lines and investigate if the ratio between orders and trades is too high. Eurex (big European futures exchange) has fast market and also volatility interrupts too. e.g. http://www.eurexchange.com/exchange-en/trading/production-ne... (this is the Swiss FX futures contract).
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by bcoates on Thursday April 23, 2015 @06:36PM
(#9430342)
Why damp them? is there any reason to believe that these anomalies actually matter?
The article doesn't seem to establish that the flash crash mattered at all in the sense of having any impact, positive or negative, on anyone not involved in the particular trades.
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by clearf on Thursday April 23, 2015 @06:47PM
(#9430395)
What a great question. I do think that, generally speaking, confidence that the markets are stable is good for an economy, and these sorts of events undermine that confidence.
It's important not to understate the cost of failure in these markets. A firm might go bankrupt and have to lay off real people if caught on the wrong side of such an event.
I also think that there is a direct connection between events like the Flash Crash and things like Nasdaq's mishandling of the Facebook IPO, which, again, had real costs in terms of time and money. Both emerge, I would argue, from a similar flavor of complexity.
I'm struggling for an analogy to show that it matters. Maybe it's a little like Target's website going down. It's not Quality, in a Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance way, even if it's only down for a short time, and the consequences were "only lost orders." Compelling?
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by bcoates on Thursday April 23, 2015 @07:08PM
(#9430496)
"I also think that there is a direct connection between events like the Flash Crash and things like Nasdaq's mishandling of the Facebook IPO, which, again, had real costs in terms of time and money. Both emerge, I would argue, from a similar flavor of complexity."
I think this was the point I was missing. So the goal of corrective regulation shouldn't be just to damp wild "flash crash" style transients per se, but to deal with unique anomalous events that commonly arise from the tightly coupled complexity of the market but have individually unpredictable causes and consequences?
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by bandrami on Friday April 24, 2015 @12:15AM
(#9431405)
> A firm might go bankrupt and have to lay off real people if caught on the wrong side of such an event.
Why?
If you mean the fund holding the securities, yes, they might go bankrupt. Risk of having that kind of "job".
If you mean the company whose shares are falling, I don't see how that affects them unless they just happened to be issuing their own stock that day (I don't think any of the companies in question were).
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by codeulike on Thursday April 23, 2015 @05:03PM
(#9429797)
When events are happening at the microsecond scale, its not really a 'market' anymore, its more like a casino. Its just some game with arbitrary rules that various actors are trying to win via different strategies. The link to any real world concept of 'investing in companies' is very weak when positions are only held for the very short term.
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by kasey_junk on Thursday April 23, 2015 @05:25PM
(#9429941)
Why do you assume the markets are about investing in companies? They are in fact very much not about investing in companies. Even the closest analog a single share, doesn't represent an investment in the company. The company got it's investment many many transactions ago, when it offered the shares originally.
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by kd5bjo on Thursday April 23, 2015 @05:49PM
(#9430099)
Well, they're (usually) about taking over someone else's investment. In theory, each share should be priced at the present value of future dividends, all the way forward to the company's eventual liquidation -- if market price is below your estimate of this, you should be buying; if above, you should be selling.
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by kasey_junk on Thursday April 23, 2015 @06:21PM
(#9430277)
Right, but what you are now talking about risk and liquidity. Most market transactions have nothing to do with investment in companies, they have to do with pricing risk. That it makes it easier for companies to find investments in some cases is a beneficial impact of this, not it's main focus.
It is a particularly HN bias to think of the market as a place to go fund a company, but that is largely a by product for most people. For most people (including everyone with an index fund/etf) its a place for managing risk. That doesn't even take into account, that a big component of this story was about S&P futures. Which are all about risk.
So it is uninteresting (even if it were true, which i doubt) that microsecond time scales make the markets less about investing in companies, they already aren't about that.
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by danbruc on Thursday April 23, 2015 @05:52PM
(#9430113)
Aren't markets expected to figure out the true price of things and do other similar stuff? And doesn't that imply that the state of the market should always be close to the global optimum and market force should drive it even further into this direction? Sounds very much like a stable system to me, so how can it run away unless the current state is just a local optimum and a correction to the global optimum - or a better local optimum - happens?
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by evanpw on Thursday April 23, 2015 @06:22PM
(#9430278)
The vast majority of the time, this is true. Notice that after the Flash Crash, most prices came back to basically where they started within a few minutes.
At the micro level, the problem is uncertainty. The "true" or "fair" price of a security isn't something you can just calculate: it's uncertain and subject to change when new information is introduced into the system. So theoretically, when the price gets very far from the fair value, market makers should become more and more eager to trade, since they'll make a large profit when the price comes back. But in practice, they never know whether the person on the other side of the trade is just panic-selling and moving the price farther from equilibrium, or if they know something the market maker doesn't and are moving the price closer to a new equilibrium. As the price gets farther from its previous stable value, the probability that the counterparty is informed grows, and eventually no market maker is willing to trade and the market dissolves.
Re:Why the Flash Crash Really Matters
by bandrami on Friday April 24, 2015 @12:18AM
(#9431410)
And doesn't that imply that the state of the market should always be close to the global optimum
God no. How many stocks even pay dividends any more? The ones that don't are, strictly, "worthless", so their global optimum price should be zero (I'm simplifying; if they come with voting rights then there's a non-zero value to that, but you get the point). It's a bunch of baseball cards at a swap meet.
The disconnect here is that there are agent effects. People make money selling and buying them, so they are incented to push the idea that selling and buying them is a good thing.
I get that, and I get such systems can be subject to anomalous events (early fly by wire systems for dynamically unstable aircraft was a good test case to study). But such systems can also be 'calmed' by damping. Isn't the SEC in charge of adding such damping to our financial trading systems?
I think it would be great if the SEC believed that that was their mandate. Unfortunately, I think that is predicated on much more sophisticated and nuanced understand of the dynamics of the markets than regulators typically have.
The claim in the recent CFTC's Complaint that alleged market manipulator Navinder Sarao directly contributed to the crash is only one example of this. If one guy can cause a Flash Crash, there is a bigger problem with the structure of the markets.
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541505819
I think it shows that the regulators (at least some of them) do want to have a better understanding of the dynamics of the US equity market, and that they are trying to build the tooling that will give them the right sorts of insights. Berman's suggestion that policy changes ought to be driven by data are, I think, something that most technologists would agree with. For whatever it's worth, Berman also has a physics Ph.D. from Princeton. So if your insinuation is just that the regulators are more lawyer than scientist I don't think that's completely true.
edit: Also wanted to add that there has been a lot written about the flash crash and I think this article is definitely one of the better ones.
I think there are two challenges to unpack. One, though I wasn't insinuating it, I could have been. I do believe that regulators are more lawyers than physicists. Berman is the exception rather than the rule.
Two, Berman, in particular, makes a fundamental error that I think is very easy to make. There's a difference between "complex" in the sense that something has a lot of parts, and interactively complex in the sense that parts of a system are fundamentally unknowable and it can experience wild and unexpected dynamics. I think Berman doesn't distinguish between those two types of systems (repeated analogies to cell phones give some indication of his thinking), and more generally, regulators don't understand the aggregate cost of complexity.
In my view, things like Midas are orthogonal to some deeper issues facing the markets. Regulators have created a quasi-competitive market that breeds this sort of interactive complexity. Then, when something goes wrong, they rely on punishment and enforcement actions [1] to target individual firms that have made "mistakes." This not only does not address root causes, it creates a culture of silence around technology risk issues within firms and across the industry. I've written more about this here: http://harvardkennedyschoolreview.com/preventing-crashes-les...
[1] See, e.g., http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70694.pdf and http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-69655.pdf
In short, the damping mechanism in markets is that anyone who believes the price is wrong can come in, buy/sell/short and push markets back to the right place. Which is exactly why the flash crash fixed itself. I know a human trader who missed the entire flash crash due to an ill timed bathroom break.
[1] US markets will retroactively break "clearly erroneous trades".
But you are right that regulators (not sure if breaking trades is an exchange or SEC thing?) do reduce this natural damping factor.
http://cdn.batstrading.com/resources/membership/BATS_US_Equi...
The article doesn't seem to establish that the flash crash mattered at all in the sense of having any impact, positive or negative, on anyone not involved in the particular trades.
It's important not to understate the cost of failure in these markets. A firm might go bankrupt and have to lay off real people if caught on the wrong side of such an event.
I also think that there is a direct connection between events like the Flash Crash and things like Nasdaq's mishandling of the Facebook IPO, which, again, had real costs in terms of time and money. Both emerge, I would argue, from a similar flavor of complexity.
I'm struggling for an analogy to show that it matters. Maybe it's a little like Target's website going down. It's not Quality, in a Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance way, even if it's only down for a short time, and the consequences were "only lost orders." Compelling?
I think this was the point I was missing. So the goal of corrective regulation shouldn't be just to damp wild "flash crash" style transients per se, but to deal with unique anomalous events that commonly arise from the tightly coupled complexity of the market but have individually unpredictable causes and consequences?
Why?
If you mean the fund holding the securities, yes, they might go bankrupt. Risk of having that kind of "job".
If you mean the company whose shares are falling, I don't see how that affects them unless they just happened to be issuing their own stock that day (I don't think any of the companies in question were).
It is a particularly HN bias to think of the market as a place to go fund a company, but that is largely a by product for most people. For most people (including everyone with an index fund/etf) its a place for managing risk. That doesn't even take into account, that a big component of this story was about S&P futures. Which are all about risk.
So it is uninteresting (even if it were true, which i doubt) that microsecond time scales make the markets less about investing in companies, they already aren't about that.
At the micro level, the problem is uncertainty. The "true" or "fair" price of a security isn't something you can just calculate: it's uncertain and subject to change when new information is introduced into the system. So theoretically, when the price gets very far from the fair value, market makers should become more and more eager to trade, since they'll make a large profit when the price comes back. But in practice, they never know whether the person on the other side of the trade is just panic-selling and moving the price farther from equilibrium, or if they know something the market maker doesn't and are moving the price closer to a new equilibrium. As the price gets farther from its previous stable value, the probability that the counterparty is informed grows, and eventually no market maker is willing to trade and the market dissolves.
This failure mode is related to the "Market for Lemons" problem: asymmetric information causing a market breakdown (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Market_for_Lemons).
God no. How many stocks even pay dividends any more? The ones that don't are, strictly, "worthless", so their global optimum price should be zero (I'm simplifying; if they come with voting rights then there's a non-zero value to that, but you get the point). It's a bunch of baseball cards at a swap meet.
The disconnect here is that there are agent effects. People make money selling and buying them, so they are incented to push the idea that selling and buying them is a good thing.