I think it would be great if the SEC believed that that was their mandate. Unfortunately, I think that is predicated on much more sophisticated and nuanced understand of the dynamics of the markets than regulators typically have.
The claim in the recent CFTC's Complaint that alleged market manipulator Navinder Sarao directly contributed to the crash is only one example of this. If one guy can cause a Flash Crash, there is a bigger problem with the structure of the markets.
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541505819
I think it shows that the regulators (at least some of them) do want to have a better understanding of the dynamics of the US equity market, and that they are trying to build the tooling that will give them the right sorts of insights. Berman's suggestion that policy changes ought to be driven by data are, I think, something that most technologists would agree with. For whatever it's worth, Berman also has a physics Ph.D. from Princeton. So if your insinuation is just that the regulators are more lawyer than scientist I don't think that's completely true.
edit: Also wanted to add that there has been a lot written about the flash crash and I think this article is definitely one of the better ones.
I think there are two challenges to unpack. One, though I wasn't insinuating it, I could have been. I do believe that regulators are more lawyers than physicists. Berman is the exception rather than the rule.
Two, Berman, in particular, makes a fundamental error that I think is very easy to make. There's a difference between "complex" in the sense that something has a lot of parts, and interactively complex in the sense that parts of a system are fundamentally unknowable and it can experience wild and unexpected dynamics. I think Berman doesn't distinguish between those two types of systems (repeated analogies to cell phones give some indication of his thinking), and more generally, regulators don't understand the aggregate cost of complexity.
In my view, things like Midas are orthogonal to some deeper issues facing the markets. Regulators have created a quasi-competitive market that breeds this sort of interactive complexity. Then, when something goes wrong, they rely on punishment and enforcement actions [1] to target individual firms that have made "mistakes." This not only does not address root causes, it creates a culture of silence around technology risk issues within firms and across the industry. I've written more about this here: http://harvardkennedyschoolreview.com/preventing-crashes-les...
[1] See, e.g., http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-70694.pdf and http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-69655.pdf
In short, the damping mechanism in markets is that anyone who believes the price is wrong can come in, buy/sell/short and push markets back to the right place. Which is exactly why the flash crash fixed itself. I know a human trader who missed the entire flash crash due to an ill timed bathroom break.
[1] US markets will retroactively break "clearly erroneous trades".
But you are right that regulators (not sure if breaking trades is an exchange or SEC thing?) do reduce this natural damping factor.
http://cdn.batstrading.com/resources/membership/BATS_US_Equi...
The article doesn't seem to establish that the flash crash mattered at all in the sense of having any impact, positive or negative, on anyone not involved in the particular trades.
It's important not to understate the cost of failure in these markets. A firm might go bankrupt and have to lay off real people if caught on the wrong side of such an event.
I also think that there is a direct connection between events like the Flash Crash and things like Nasdaq's mishandling of the Facebook IPO, which, again, had real costs in terms of time and money. Both emerge, I would argue, from a similar flavor of complexity.
I'm struggling for an analogy to show that it matters. Maybe it's a little like Target's website going down. It's not Quality, in a Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance way, even if it's only down for a short time, and the consequences were "only lost orders." Compelling?
I think this was the point I was missing. So the goal of corrective regulation shouldn't be just to damp wild "flash crash" style transients per se, but to deal with unique anomalous events that commonly arise from the tightly coupled complexity of the market but have individually unpredictable causes and consequences?
Why?
If you mean the fund holding the securities, yes, they might go bankrupt. Risk of having that kind of "job".
If you mean the company whose shares are falling, I don't see how that affects them unless they just happened to be issuing their own stock that day (I don't think any of the companies in question were).
I get that, and I get such systems can be subject to anomalous events (early fly by wire systems for dynamically unstable aircraft was a good test case to study). But such systems can also be 'calmed' by damping. Isn't the SEC in charge of adding such damping to our financial trading systems?