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Re:How to Detect Sneaky N.S.A. ‘Quantum Insert’ Attacks by motoboi on Thursday April 23, 2015 @08:13AM (#9426134)
Given the episode where stolen Realtek certificates been used for years by a government-made malware, I think we should not be so sure that they can't do that.

A single request going through a bogus certificate emitted by NSA "acquired" CA would be hardly detected.

Or, given the fact that they could indeed broke keys, they could simply do a man-in-the-middle, instead of a man-in-the-side.

Re:How to Detect Sneaky N.S.A. ‘Quantum Insert’ Attacks by Dylan16807 on Thursday April 23, 2015 @08:17AM (#9426150)
A stolen key is a server-being-hacked problem, not a CA problem. If the server is hacked, game over.

There are browser extensions that detect bogus certificates; there's a good risk of catching them.

Re:How to Detect Sneaky N.S.A. ‘Quantum Insert’ Attacks by motoboi on Thursday April 23, 2015 @11:49PM (#9431341)
Certificate Authorities normally run as software on a box somewhere.

Sometimes they keep this box offline, but they need to keep a sub-CA online somewhere, or they wouldn't be able to issue certificates.

So, a CA private key and public certificate can be compromised in much the same way a single server certificate.

With a CA private key and public certificate, one can easily emit a bogus certificate for *.google.com or any other domain name. If this CA public certificate is trusted by the browser, a user would hardly notice.

Re:How to Detect Sneaky N.S.A. ‘Quantum Insert’ Attacks by SG- on Thursday April 23, 2015 @08:33AM (#9426226)
Should we pretend the NSA and various organizations don't have the means to infiltrate a CA?
Re:How to Detect Sneaky N.S.A. ‘Quantum Insert’ Attacks by Karunamon on Thursday April 23, 2015 @11:29AM (#9427360)
Again, pinning is a realistic countermeasure to this.