Re:How to Detect Sneaky N.S.A. ‘Quantum Insert’ Attacks
by motoboi on Thursday April 23, 2015 @11:49PM
(#9431341)
Certificate Authorities normally run as software on a box somewhere.
Sometimes they keep this box offline, but they need to keep a sub-CA online somewhere, or they wouldn't be able to issue certificates.
So, a CA private key and public certificate can be compromised in much the same way a single server certificate.
With a CA private key and public certificate, one can easily emit a bogus certificate for *.google.com or any other domain name. If this CA public certificate is trusted by the browser, a user would hardly notice.
Sometimes they keep this box offline, but they need to keep a sub-CA online somewhere, or they wouldn't be able to issue certificates.
So, a CA private key and public certificate can be compromised in much the same way a single server certificate.
With a CA private key and public certificate, one can easily emit a bogus certificate for *.google.com or any other domain name. If this CA public certificate is trusted by the browser, a user would hardly notice.