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A comment on Anonabox Analysis. Parent comment

Re:Anonabox Analysis by orthecreedence on Monday April 06, 2015 @05:02PM (#9330680)
I was going to reply with a bunch of stuff about how Tor exit nodes don't terminate TLS, but I thought more about what you are saying. You're right, it's not a good idea at all to be logged into any account that de-anonymizes you in any way while using Tor, because then for the rest of that Tor session, you are potentially compromised.

Your anonymous presence and your public presence should always be 100% separate.

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Re:Anonabox Analysis by amelius on Monday April 06, 2015 @05:23PM (#9330773)
In general, I don't think it is a good idea to connect to multiple services over the same Tor link. One of those services could be compromised in some way (hacked, government backdoors, etc.), and could be used to de-anonymize sessions at other services, by using the ip-address of the exit-node and the time-frame in which the communication took place.
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Re:Anonabox Analysis by lbthomsen on Monday April 06, 2015 @10:45PM (#9331751)
After discussion on the Tor mailing list a while back, that issue was solved in Cloak (http://reclaim-your-privacy.com and http://github.com/ReclaimYourPrivacy) by using different Tor circuits for each service! The relevant file is here: https://github.com/ReclaimYourPrivacy/cloak-cloak/blob/maste...
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