So whilst it would be possible to decrypt phone connections if you had your hands on the original secret Ki stored in the SIM, you'd have to record every connection between the phone and the network in order to obtain all the subsequent keys as well & if you miss out on the initial sign-on, or any individual re-keying then you’ll be shut out of that phone’s radio communications thereafter.
I imagine the NSA would be willing to try and do this for some target networks, but where they already have internal network access (US/UK/Five Eyes, any other network they've hacked into) it would be a lot of pointless effort.
The fake base station attack presumably works by forcing a downgrade to 2G, which is another approach, but one that requires local assets on the ground within phone range (unless you can do something with high gain antennas pointed at a specific target phone from a distance? That sounds hard, but the NSA likes hard as we know - throwing resources at something isn’t a problem for them.)
Short version: Knowing the OTA key lets you push malware to the target phone SIM which you can use to surreptitiously exfiltrate data from the phone via SMS messages, amongst other things.
3G/4G somehow uses random, short lived keys for encrypted communication, which change frequently enough to be a pain.
EDIT: It has been a while since I studied this, but I believe the shared key is used for trust - that this isn't a fake base station and the client is who they say they are. Then they use the equivalent of public key cryptography to establish short lived encryption keys. Stealing keys would probably enable a MitM only?
The problem is that whilst, yes, unique and constantly rotating randomness is used to establish unique session keys, the session keys are derived from the random nonce that's an encryption of the network selected randomness. In other words if you have the SIM key, you can figure out what the session keys also were. Ultimately the standard SIMs don't seem to use asymmetric crypto anywhere, meaning a compromise of the SIM key still allows you to undo all the encryption. Ultimately everything is derived from these shared keys.
And yes the problem of 2G downgrade attacks remain. There doesn't seem to be any good solution for those short of phasing out 2G entirely.
It would be a huge service to humanity if you summarized your findings and published them, with references to the specs...
Sorry for being OT, but maybe HN should recheck whether downvoting a comment just to express disagreement about a factual statement (as opposed to punishing bad or trollish ones) is conducive to a civil and constructive discourse here.
On my tablet, the up/down arrows are ridiculously small; I usually have to zoom in a couple times to be sure to tap the intended arrow.
Unless it is so bad it goes grey, I can't see any indication.
I agree this wasn't as prevalent 1-2 years ago, I have no idea whats going on either.
Now, while this is true, I believe that a bad actor can still listen to the radio transmissions passively and decrypt those. But that is a lot harder than just plugging in to the tower and listening.
http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/05/a-few-though...
You can very cheaply(~$100) buy a 2G/3G/4G jammer from any Chinese wholesaler site(but don't,because it's illegal pretty much everywhere). Most of these jammers have a switch to jam only 3G and 4G, leaving 2G functional - that would force the phone you are attacking to switch to 2G mode as it couldn't find any 3G/4G towers.
Their protection is that many MNOs are using proprietary authentication algorithms, making it harder to scale global surveillance. But that applies equally to 2G/3G/4G.
Are they basing this on the specific type of key discussed in the documents? I don't know a lot about it, but I'm inclined to believe there are valuable keys burned-in to 3G+ cards too.
I also wonder if there is a downgrade attack to force 2G, so that those keys are not completely worthless.